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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This dissertation explores the particular evolution of an organization, the Mondragon Co-
operative Corporation, to shed light on the co-operative development process, and compares 
some of its complexities to the Manitoba co-operative sector. This study uses historical, political, 
and socio-economic research, institutional analysis, policy and legal analysis, and semi-
structured interviews to better understand the co-operative development process from a critical 
and interdisciplinary perspective. 
 
This study uncovers the importance of institutional frameworks in understanding the 
development of the Mondragon group. By analyzing its well-known development story through 
this critical and interdisciplinary lens, this dissertation helps rethink the assumptions of much of 
the literature on co-operative and policy development that often overlooks the study of this 
phenomenon. Co-operative development factors and strategies widely discussed in the literature 
often fail to analyze the invisible cultural assumptions that underpin and help determine the 
development process. By studying the extent to which Mondragon's development is deeply 
embedded in and shaped by its cultural, legal, and institutional contradictions, this dissertation 
aims to rethink the co-operative development phenomenon.   
 
This study finds that institutional frameworks are crucial to understand co-operative 
development choices and strategies. The contradictions and complexities of institutional 
frameworks create room to counter the status quo. The study of the Mondragon group tells us 
that co-operatives can unknowingly reproduce contradictions while challenging the dominant 
logic to seek change. The influence of institutional contradictions and complexities is highly 
important to make sense of co-operative development behaviours as well as to understand how 
institutions change in society.  
 
This study concludes with a comparison of the Manitoba co-operative experience in the light of 
the Mondragon case, and offers concluding thoughts and recommendations for the Manitoba co-
operative sector.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION: BUILDING AN INSTITUTIONAL AND PUBLIC POLICY 
APPROACH TO CO-OPERATIVE DEVELOPMENT 
 
 
1.1 Introduction: Why study co-operative development?  
 
This interdisciplinary and comparative dissertation investigates co-operative development in two 
different contexts—Spain and Manitoba, Canada—with special emphasis on the roles of public 
policy and legislation. The trajectories of co-operative development in these contexts are as 
interesting for their similarities as for the important differences that help clarify factors and 
strategies that foster or frustrate their development. By analyzing those critical components of 
the enabling environment in each context, this dissertation focuses on institutional frameworks 
and their impacts on the development of co-ops in order to inform co-operative development 
systems in Canada and in Manitoba in particular. In exploring the policy domain, this study will 
be attending to the socio-cultural factors in Spain that have predisposed them to achieve 
remarkable co-operative development and innovative co-operative policy.  
 
This first chapter situates in relation to the broader literature the object of study, co-operative 
development, its critical components, and the role of institutional frameworks in development.  It 
starts by explaining why studying co-operative development factors and strategies is timely in 
the light of previous and current waves of globalization and the world economic, financial, and 
environmental meltdown of 2008, which, for many, unveiled an underlying logical contradiction 
in the dominant economic theory (McMurtry, 2009; Restakis, 2010). In periods of socio-
economic upheaval, an increasing gap between the rich and the poor, environmental degradation, 
market failures and state retreats, the co-operative movement represents hope to address many 
important social, economic, and environmental issues (Birchall & Hammond Ketilson, 2009; 
International Labour Organization, 2002; United Nations, 2010).  This chapter records the 
important role co-operatives can play to sustain communities in the midst of the global economic 
downturn, and provides evidence that co-operatives deserve government and institutional 
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support—an argument that can be strengthened by the research on co-operative development, 
public policy, and legislation represented in this dissertation. This chapter lays out the theoretical 
ground for the uniqueness of these socio-economic organizations. It explores the co-operative 
identity, its collective action nature, its problems—including conflicts between democratic 
control and market competitiveness, principal-agent dilemmas (Fulton & Laycock, 1990), 
isomorphic pressures (DiMaggio & Powell, 2004), and top-down development (Pollet & 
Develtere, 2004) —and its differences from investor-owned firms. Finally, the research 
relevance and some methodological issues are explained. 
 
1.1.1 Global context for co-operative development studies 
 
A deeper understanding of co-operatives—“autonomous association[s] of persons united 
voluntarily to meet their common economic, social, and cultural needs and aspirations through a 
jointly-owned and democratically-controlled enterprise” (ICA, 1995)—and their ability to satisfy 
those community needs and aspirations is particularly important in the context of globalization.  
Indeed, co-operatives arose in response to an earlier wave of globalization in the nineteenth 
century that was characterized by industrialization, unfettered markets, and their disastrous 
socio-economic consequences for ordinary people. Those consequences included poverty and 
social exclusion for those transitioning from independent artisanal work to wage labour to form a 
new working class, who lacked “wealth, economic security, and political or economic power” 
(Fairbairn, Bold, Fulton, Hammond Ketilson, & Ish,1991, p. 6). This new working class did not 
have any of the social supports, such as health insurance, pensions, labour security, of the 
welfare state and thus was often exploited by employers paying low wages in unsafe working 
conditions, or abused by merchants selling adulterated food products, and creditors offering 
predatory loans (Fairbairn, 1992; McMurtry, 2009). It was in this context that a group of workers 
formed in 1844 the first co-operative in Rochdale, England, that sought answers through mutual 
self-help to "the social dislocations of the industrial revolution," which were not being addressed 
by the private sector or the government (Fairbairn, 1992, p. 4). They became known as the 
Rochdale Society of Equitable Pioneers. Their experience is as relevant in current times as it was 
then, as much of their lived reality is being repeated today.  
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 The effects of the economic, financial, and environmental storm are tangible in the lives of 
ordinary people who lack or have inadequate employment, access to clean drinking water, fair 
prices for their crops, shelter, and access to education for their children (Restakis, 2010). These 
are the daily struggles for billions of people in developed and underdeveloped countries alike.  
But these multiple crises have also opened up new opportunities to highlight the important role 
of co-operatives as "a sustainable form of enterprise" that are better able to weather the storm 
than other types of businesses, and able to sustain communities by maintaining the provision of 
livelihoods and essential services (Birchall & Hammond Ketilson, 2009, p. 3; Findlay, 2012). 
Evidence shows that co-operatives are vital to communities as they continue to carry out 
business and lessen the impacts of the crisis while their competitors close down (Birchall & 
Hammond Ketilson, 2009).   
 
The social turmoil and mass protests in Seattle at the World Trade Organization conference in 
November, 1999, the G20 and G8 in Toronto and Huntsville, Canada, in June 2010, and the 
massive popular demonstrations at the Copenhagen and Kyoto meetings are symptoms of the 
negative effects of globalization (Restakis, 2010). Although the negative consequences have 
eroded socio-economic structures and exacerbated inequality, a positive consequence, as in the 
nineteenth century, has been the mobilizing of new communities in search of values, local 
answers, and alternative socio-economic models. Eddy (2009) highlights a return to the 
"grassroots – not the political parties or governments, but from social movements mobilising 
around social justice, the environment, and labour market protection" after the 2008 global 
meltdown (p. 6). Co-operatives are precisely the locally rooted organizations that adhere to 
community values such as “equity, democracy, social justice and sustainability,” and entail a 
values-based economic rationality well suited to finding local answers “through business 
operations” that can address some of those issues (Pollet & Develtere, 2004, p. 12). Recently, 
Argentina went through a severe economic, political, and social crisis as a result of the failure of 
neoliberal policies imposed on the country by the International Monetary Fund and the World 
Bank, which led to unemployed citizens taking over closed factories and converting them into 
worker co-operatives to find answers to their acute socio-economic situation (Restakis, 2010; 
Ruggeri, 2005). Around the world, communities have been looking for solutions in the social 
solidarity economy movement, using the co-operative model in most cases as an instrument for 
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economic emancipation, social change, and environmental sustainability. For instance, the 
National Bank Transfer Day (November 5, 2011) encouraged Americans to move their savings 
from traditional banks to credit unions to protest  unfair or excessive business practices. Another 
example of social solidarity economy is the Evergreen Cooperative Initiative of Cleveland, Ohio. 
Started as a response to the global economic downturn, Evergreen is a group of three worker co-
ops committed to creating sustainable employment in a low income area of the city (Evergreen, 
2012). In the midst of the recent global crisis, a renewed interest in co-operative development 
has been noted (Birchall & Hammond Ketilson, 2009; Great Transition Initiative, 2012; ILO, 
2012). Indeed, globalization has created the conditions for renewed co-operative development 
studies. 
 
Today, the case for the development of co-operatives as the method to expand "economic 
democracy" worldwide is more relevant than ever (Restakis, 2010, p. 3). Globalization and its 
periodic crises render communities relatively powerless in the face of political and economic 
events elsewhere (Fairbairn et al., 1991). Yet the structure of co-operatives addresses 
powerlessness by finding a place for democracy in the world of economics as they are member-
owned and democratically controlled, thus giving ordinary people the chance to use ownership to 
decide their own destinies (Laycock, 1990). The spread of 2011 "Occupy" movements 
demanding more equitable economic systems highlights how propitious the times are for co-
operatives as "equitable economic models" proposing a more sustainable socioeconomic 
development model (Whitman, 2011, p. 1). Co-operatives embody "economic democracy" as 
they improve people's ability to exercise democratic values of access and participation while 
embedding democracy in the economic ownership of the organization as well as the distribution 
of its wealth (Laycock, 1990, p. 89).  
  
The renewed interest in co-operatives in the context of globalization and economic and financial 
meltdown is supported by a history of co-operation as a behaviour that is intrinsic to humans and 
humanity. Co-operative organizations can be found almost anywhere in the world since “co-
operation is at least as instinctive to human beings as competition” (Craig, 1993; MacPherson, 
2009, p. 214). In a broad sense, “co-operation is as old as the human species,” notes Birchall 
(1994), as the survival of human beings in ancient times was tied to working together to pursue 
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food, shelter and collective defense (p. 1). Co-operatives represent an organizational structure 
that formalizes the principles of co-operation to help find collective answers for a particular 
group's problems and goals (Craig, 1993). Often arising to satisfy unmet needs, and sustain 
popular aspirations, co-operatives fill gaps created by market failure or the withdrawal of public 
services (Fairbairn et al, 1991). Unfortunately, mainstream economic ideology has over-
emphasized the competitive and individualistic aspect of human nature as taken-for-granted 
natural facts, and relegated co-operation to a marginal place in educational institutions and in 
popular culture (Laycock, 1990). Indeed, co-operative forms of ownership are rarely present in 
educational curricula, and mass media highlight "heroic" individual achievements while 
portraying co-operative behaviours as "irrational" or "just plain stupid"  (Laycock, 1990, p. 81). 
Similarly, Piet Moerland, chair of Rabobank and president of the European Association of 
Cooperative Banks, argues that the co-operative model is underestimated not only in the media, 
but also by legislators and their regulatory frameworks (Whitman, 2011).  
 
Underlining the relative invisibility of the co-operative model, Stilwell (2009) notes that 
universities and think-tanks remain sharp promoters of "orthodox economics" even after the 
2008 global economic meltdown that demonstrated the failure of neoliberal policies based on 
classical economic theory (p. 11). Thus, educational institutions maintain support for mainstream 
thinking, and do not challenge standard curricula that train managers within the dominant 
economic theory without giving space to other views and economic models. In addition to Piet 
Moerland, Dame Pauline Green, current president of the International Co-operative Alliance, has 
emphasized how little known co-operatives are, specially the number of lives affected by them 
and their market value (Whitman, 2011). Also, co-operatives remain insufficiently known and 
understood in business schools in particular (Findlay, 2012; McMurtry, 2009). A study 
conducted by the Social Economy Centre at the University of Toronto, for example, found that 
co-operatives are almost absent in economic textbooks of the Ontario High Schools and similarly 
unknown in university business school programs—despite being a significant force in Canadian 
economic and social life (Quarter, Schugurensky, McCollum & Mook, 2007).  
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Competition is not the only natural way to interact, organize, and operationalize our lives since 
human urges to compete and achieve are possible only because their “basic needs” are already 
covered by the “taken-for-granted co-operation” of each other in our society (Birchall, 1994, p. 
1). Kohn (1992) praises the societal benefits of co-operation and argues that "the difference 
between co-operation and competition is the difference between listening to each other's points 
of view and twisting each other's arm" (p. 157). Highlighting only competition as the best way to 
proceed socially, politically, and economically misses the fact that competition does not exist 
without at least some form of co-operation, as both are usually present in social interaction and 
can be found in different degrees in any group and any activity (Craig, 1993). 
 
Having established that co-operation is a natural element of human life and that competition is 
neither the natural nor inevitable modus operandi, here the focus is on how and why co-
operatives are valued and why they merit further investigation and investment. The co-operative 
model is the formal organizational structure recognized in the literature as a sustainable 
enterprise model capable of securing and sustaining livelihoods and services in communities. 
Co-operatives' longevity is highlighted by Whitman (2011) as the survival rate of start-up co-
operatives is also higher than their private sector competitors. According to the Canadian Co-
operative Association (2007), “after five years, the survival rate of a new co-operative enterprise 
is almost twice that of an investor-owned company” while also facilitating investment in their 
communities through the creation of employment, donations, and sponsorship (Government of 
Quebec, 2003). Evidence suggests that co-operatives in all sectors outlive their competitors, and 
"the rate of survival of new start ups is better" (Birchall & Hammond Ketilson, 2009, p. 13).The 
co-operative movement represents over 1 billion members around the world (ICA, 2013), exists 
in most countries, and is “the most durable and powerful grassroots movement in the world” 
(Restakis, 2010, p. 3). Co-operatives are able to maintain the “social contract” of communities by 
guaranteeing the availability of employment, supporting local entrepreneurship, and 
"improv[ing] quality of life—without sacrificing competitiveness” (Lotti, Mensing, & Valenti, 
2006, p. 4).  In addition, co-operatives around the world “provide over 100 million jobs, 20% 
more than multinational enterprises,” which speaks to the potential of co-operatives to meet 
aspirations and income needs in local communities (ICA, 2010). Considering the importance of 
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co-operatives, this study explores how these organizations might be better supported to 
adequately develop and grow.  
 
Further, international organizations have recognized co-operatives as enterprises deserving of 
institutional support by giving special attention to their promotion and development. The General 
Assembly of the United Nations issued numerous resolutions acknowledging the major role co-
operatives around the world play in the economic and social development of communities (UN, 
2010). For that reason, the UN Resolution 54/123 specifically “urges” the governments of the 
UN's Member States and specialized agencies to provide a supportive environment for the 
establishment and development of these organizations considering their influence, particularly 
“in the eradication of poverty, the generation of full and productive employment and the 
enhancement of social integration” (2000, p. 2). Several governments (Bolivia, Burundi, Czech 
Republic, El Salvador, Finland, Israel, Panama, Philippines, Portugal, Slovakia, Turkey and the 
United States) and international organizations (International Monetary Fund, World Trade 
Organization, World Health Organization, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations, International Labour Office; International Maritime Organization; United Nations 
Conference on Human Settlements (Habitat); United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development; United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; United Nations 
Environment Programme; United Nations Industrial Development Organization, and the ICA) 
responded to that call committing institutional support for co-operatives and to the creation of 
more adequate environments for co-operatives to grow, among other objectives (UN, 2001, p.13-
14).  
 
Along those lines, the UN (2001) exhorted governments to "keep under review the legal, judicial 
and administrative provisions governing the activities of cooperatives," with the intention of 
levelling the playing field in relation to other forms of enterprise (p. 13). Further, the UN (2010) 
declared 2012 the International Year of Co-operatives with the intention to "raise awareness of 
their contribution to social and economic development, in particular recognizing their impact on 
poverty reduction, employment generation and social integration," and to support the growth of 
these organizations (p. 1). Similarly, the ILO issued a recommendation encouraging governments 
to pursue co-operative development “recognizing the importance of cooperatives in job creation, 
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mobilizing resources, generating investment and their contribution to the economy” (2002, p. 1). 
As well, the ILO stated that co-operatives' "documented resilience to crisis and thus 
sustainability, and their particularity of being principles-based enterprises that are member-
controlled and led are increasingly drawing the attention of governments, policy makers and 
citizens around the world" (2012, p. vii). Recently, a World Bank (2008) report also stressed the 
important role financial co-operatives or "promising institutions" play in delivering financial 
services to rural areas in developing countries, thus facilitating agricultural development (p. 
146). The report views positively the adoption of the co-operative model for effective and 
sustainable agricultural development as it highlights the example of "producer cooperatives" that 
were at the core of the "recent expansion of organic export production in East Africa" (World 
Bank, 2008, p. 189). The report also calls for a "proactive state" to support the development of 
co-operatives as producer associations in the context of pursuing an effective "agriculture-for-
development agenda" (World Bank, 2008, p. 156). Promotion of co-operatives and adequate 
support for their development, all these organizations argue, is relevant to the economic and 
social development fate of communities worldwide.   
 
1.1.2  Why study policy and institutional frameworks in Spain? 
  
There is general agreement in the literature about the components, such as public policy and 
legislation, financial mechanisms, technical assistance, co-operative sector federations or 
umbrella organizations, research and education, and socio-cultural factors, that lead to co-
operative development (Canadian Co-op Association, 2007; Cornforth & Thomas, 1990; 
Fairbairn, Fulton, Hammond-Ketilson, Krebs, & Goldblatt,1993; Meek & Woodworth, 1990; 
Pollet & Develtere, 2004). However, the way each development component and strategy plays 
out varies depending on particular historical, political, economic, and socio-cultural 
circumstances of each particular segment of the co-op movement.  
 
It has been consistently argued that public policies and legislation can significantly contribute to 
a supportive environment that addresses obstacles and sets in motion the mechanisms necessary 
for co-operative development, including financial mechanisms, technical assistance, co-operative 
umbrella organizations, research and education (Adeler, 2009; Axworthy & Perry, 1988; 
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Fairbairn et al.,1993; Harris, Fulton, Stefanson, & Lysyshyn, 1998; Laycock, 1987; Loxley & 
Simpson, 2007; Vaillancourt, 2008). However, insufficiently addressed in the literature has been 
public policy and legislation as a consequence of political, economic, historical, and socio-
cultural processes that influence social actors. Although there is much to be learned from the 
traditional view of policy, positivist approaches too often fail to analyze policy through critical, 
comparative, and interdisciplinary lenses. This dissertation intends to fill that gap. For this 
reason, within the broad co-op development phenomenon, this dissertation pays special attention 
to the dynamic socio-cultural and political-economic process producing public policy and 
legislative instruments to aid the development and growth of the co-operative sector. 
 
Although the study of co-op development factors is undoubtedly important to co-op 
development, the literature fails to analyze institutional frameworks and their impact on co-op 
development. There is no single definition of institutions, but for the social sciences, institutions 
are "social structures that have attained a high degree of resilience . . . ,and . . . are composed of 
cultural-cognitive, normative, and regulative elements that, together with associated activities 
and resources, provide stability and meaning to social life" (Scott, 1995, p. 33). Institutions can 
be as diverse as, for example, the legal system, government, schools, family, marriage, mass 
media, charitable organizations, or businesses. Any type of structure that organizes the behaviour 
of individuals with a specific social goal, whether formal or informal, can be an institution. 
Institutions constrain or enable behaviour as a consequence of their three pillars: the regulative, 
which involves the capacity to establish rules, and formal sanctions; the normative, which 
includes values and norms to guide behaviour through norms of acceptability, morality, and 
ethics; and the cultural-cognitive, which encompasses thought patterns and world views (Scott, 
1995). These three pillars of institutional analysis provide a comprehensive framework for 
understanding the actions and decisions within an institution (Scott, 1995). As themselves social 
constructs, institutional frameworks have cracks or fissures that open up the opportunity to 
challenge the status quo they represent. Those cracks or fissures are the consequence of "the 
erosion of beliefs and rules and their replacement by new models and forms" perhaps "due to 
endogenous strains and conflicts or to the intervention of external forces or actors" that permit 
change (Scott, 2005, p. 414). As Scott (2005) reminds us, "change is often initiated by the 
collective mobilization of disadvantaged actors who challenge existing systems and truths" (p. 
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414). Change can also happen "when boundaries buffering social fields or sectors are breached, 
allowing ideas and actors from one sector to penetrate another" as for example through an 
awareness-raising or conscientization process among social actors (Scott, 2005, p. 414).  
 
As social actors challenge the dominant logic, they remain nevertheless implicated in it and 
reproduce contradictions in the cultural and legal domain while trying to effect change. 
Institutional frameworks are structures or systems that provide stability to social behaviour. 
Some social actors realize that certain goals are better pursued through institutional action and 
construct systems that can constrain their action (Scott, 2005). While stability and conformity are 
elements of institutions, conflict and change are also components of institutions that shape new 
institutional structures and opportunities. Co-operatives are institutions reactionary to the 
dominant logic and will likely reproduce contradictions as they pursue change. Those 
contradictions are overlooked by the co-op development literature, and yet they impact co-
operative development. This dissertation fills this gap in the literature.  
 
 The Spanish experience, for example, makes it clear that the institutional framework had 
fissures that produced an opportunity for social actors to create more advantageous conditions 
(Franco’s Spain was not kind to co-operatives). Similarly, political, social, economic, and 
cultural processes all play roles in co-operative development that are not reducible to the 
economic determinations related to the market (and its failures) as a dominant feature of social 
life.   
 
This dissertation builds on and extends the work of  a considerable number of scholars who agree 
that the Spanish Mondragon Co-operative Corporation is an exceptional example of a co-
operative development system, which features innovative policy and legislative mechanisms that 
need to be better understood (Cornforth & Thomas, 1990; Logue, 2006; MacLeod, 1997; 
Matthews, 1999; Morrison, 1991; Whyte & Whyte, 1991). Their studies, however, do not share 
my emphases on institutional frameworks. Previous studies have explored the internal policy 
mechanisms in Mondragon, but in the context of the co-op development factors (Logue, 2006; 
MacLeod, 1997; Matthews, 1999; Morrison, 1991; Whyte & Whyte, 1991), missing, in that way, 
the underlying taken for granted assumptions of social actors that help produce policy. 
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This dissertation explores the evolution of the Spanish Mondragon Co-operative complex using 
cultural lenses to help us rethink co-op and policy development in a much rehearsed but 
insufficiently understood development process. Since the diffusion of innovative policy 
strategies has been limited by linguistic, geographic, and cultural barriers, the analysis of 
successful (or not) policy strategies applied in this context will highlight important lessons to be 
learned by Canadian audiences. 
 
Due to the complexity of interdisciplinary and comparative research, it is necessary to 
distinguish foreground material treated in depth and background material mentioned only to give 
a meaningful context for central material. Since embeddedness (Polanyi, 1957) of economic 
rationality into the social realm tends to occur from the local to the national and global setting, 
this study addresses only regional co-operative development systems and public policy domains, 
while giving a snapshot of national public policy features that have significant influence in the 
local or regional setting and help put the research in perspective. The Spanish co-op movement is 
located in a unitary state with varying degrees of decentralization that somewhat respected the 
historic regional cultures and peculiarities, and its regions are legal entities similar to provinces 
in Canada. However, the Canadian co-operative movement is situated in a federal state with 
decentralized provinces, and is marked by a great divide between the Anglophone co-op 
movement and the Francophone (namely in the province of Quebec) co-op movement.  
 
For those reasons, in the case of Spain, the research targets the Mondragon co-operative group 
development system in the Basque region along with its development factors and strategies 
without treating individual cases of co-operative failures or successes, but rather addressing 
broad development conditions and issues at the regional level. A 55-year time period will be 
addressed in this dissertation beginning around the founding time of the first Mondragon co-
operative in 1956. Also, it is necessary to review national laws and policies when they affect the 
regional co-operative development realities. As background material, attention is given to 
historical, political, religious, and nationalist contexts of the Mondragon co-operative group in 
the Spanish Basque region to the extent that it helps to situate the research to achieve a more 
accurate and complete picture.  
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1.2 Redefining co-operative identity for the 21
st
 century  
 
The current wave of globalization has created an incentive for co-operative development, as co-
operatives create economic democracy through businesses that are owned and controlled by their 
members for mutual benefit. Governed by the principle of “one member, one vote,” co-operative 
members vote equally based on their individual membership rather than their share of capital 
invested in the enterprise. Participatory democracy and member control of the organization, 
among others, are features coming from the international co-operative principles and values 
building on those of the Rochdale Society of Equitable Pioneers, the first co-operative 
organization constituted in 1844 in England (Fairbairn, 1992) in the socio-economic turmoil 
caused by industrialization and free markets. Britain was hit first by this phenomenon before it 
spread to the rest of the world (Birchall, 1994). Consequently, the Rochdale Society of Equitable 
Pioneers emerged as the first successful co-operative response to globalization. The Rochdale 
Pioneers crafted a set of business practices based on moral rules of conduct “emphasizing 
quality, honesty, market prices, cash trading […] democratic governance, provision of education 
and information to members” (Fairbairn, 1992, p. 18-19). Since the Rochdale Pioneers, co-
operative principles and values have constantly been “redefined to suit the needs and challenges 
of the present” while keeping the original “spirit” (Fairbairn, 1992, p. 49). More recently, the 
international co-operative movement felt the need to re-craft the set of principles and values to 
adapt them to current times, and so the Co-operative Identity Statement was issued at the 
International Co-operative Alliance (ICA) Congress of Manchester, 1995:  
 
Co-operatives are based on the values of self-help, self-responsibility, democracy, 
equality, equity, and solidarity. In the tradition of their founders, co-operative members 
believe in the ethical values of honesty, openness, social responsibility, and caring for 
others. (ICA, 1995) 
 
The ICA co-operative principles are means by which co-ops can apply the co-op values (ICA, 
1995): 
“1st Principle: Voluntary and Open Membership: Co-operatives are voluntary 
organisations, open to all persons able to use their services and willing to accept the 
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responsibilities of membership, without gender, social, racial, political, or religious 
discrimination. 
2
nd
 Principle: Democratic Member Control: Co-operatives are democratic 
organisations controlled by their members, who actively participate in setting their 
policies and making decisions. Men and women serving as elected representatives are 
accountable to the membership. In primary co-operatives, members have equal voting 
rights (one member, one vote), and co-operatives at other levels are also organised in a 
democratic manner. 
3
rd
 Principle: Member Economic Participation: Members contribute equitably to, and 
democratically control, the capital of their co-operative. At least part of that capital is 
usually the common property of the co-operative. Members usually receive limited 
compensation, if any, on capital subscribed as a condition of membership. Members 
allocate surpluses for any or all of the following purposes: developing their co-operative, 
possibly by setting up reserves, part of which at least would be indivisible; benefiting 
members in proportion to their transactions with the co-operative; supporting other 
activities approved by the membership. 
4
th
 Principle: Autonomy and Independence: Co-operatives are autonomous, self-help 
organisations controlled by their members. If they enter into agreements with other 
organisations, including governments, or raise capital from external sources, they do so 
on terms that ensure democratic control by their members and maintain their co-operative 
autonomy. 
5
th
 Principle: Education, Training and Information: Co-operatives provide education 
and training for their members, elected representatives, managers, and employees so they 
can contribute effectively to the development of their cooperatives. They inform the 
general public – particularly young people and opinion leaders – about the nature and 
benefits of co-operation. 
6
th
 Principle: Co-operation Among Co-operatives: Co-operatives serve their members 
most effectively and strengthen the co-operative movement by working together through 
local, national, regional, and international structures. 
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7
th
 Principle: Concern for Community: Co-operatives work for the sustainable 
development of their communities through policies approved by their members.” (ICA, 
1995) 
 
It is important to note that the principle-based structure of co-operatives makes these 
organizations behave differently than other corporate forms since the application of the 
principles materializes in a special legal structure. In Canada, the observance of most of the co-
op principles is legally mandatory whereas in other countries such as Italy and Spain, all of the 
seven principles are legally binding since their non-observance causes the co-operative to lose its 
legal status. The first article of the Spanish General Co-op Law (27/1999) establishes that co-
operatives are "incorporated by associated persons, in free membership and voluntary 
withdrawal, for entrepreneurial activities, designed to meet their needs and economic and social 
aspirations, with democratic structure and functioning, according to the principles of the 
International Cooperative Alliance. " Spanish legislation creates mandatory contributions to a co-
op education and promotion fund of 10 percent of the net profits to make sure co-operatives 
fulfill the last three co-op principles, education, co-operation among co-ops and concern for 
community. In case of failure to assign monies to the mandatory fund, the amount becomes 
public debt and the co-op risks losing its status. Italian co-operatives are subject to annual 
inspections by the National Co-operative Federations, powers conferred on them by the legal 
system. In the case of Manitoba, the Manitoba Cooperatives Act article 4 (1) identifies that 
"membership in the cooperative is open, in a non-discriminatory manner" (first co-op principle), 
"each of its members or each delegate representing a division of its members has only one vote" 
(second co-op principle), "to the extent feasible, its members provide the capital required by the 
cooperative" (third co-op principle), and a co-operative "educates its members, officers, 
employees and the public on the principles and techniques of cooperative enterprise" (fifth co-op 
principle). The Act establishes that "the surplus funds of a co-op arising from the cooperative's 
operations are used (i) to develop its business, (ii) to provide or improve common services to its 
members, (iii) to provide for reserves or the payment of interest on its member loans or 
dividends on its membership shares and investment shares, (iv) for community welfare or the 
propagation of cooperative enterprises" (seventh and sixth co-op principles), "or (v) as a 
distribution among its members as a patronage return based on the business the members have 
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done with the cooperative".  Despite the mention of the sixth and seventh principles, they are not 
strictly mandatory because the law establishes that the surplus should be used first for other 
purposes. The fourth co-op principle, autonomy and independence of the co-operative, is not 
expressly mentioned, but it can be derived from the fact that only members in a co-op can vote 
and control the organization, and the capital of the business is provided by members precluding, 
to a certain extent, external investors that can compromise the autonomy of the co-operative.  
 
Co-operatives have been re-discovering the benefits of observing and promoting all of the co-
operative principles, particularly in the context of the international trend toward corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) and ethical business practices, which are increasingly being followed both 
locally and internationally (Johnson & Turner, 2010). The process of globalization has also 
exposed and highlighted issues of corporate social responsibility since the rapid development of 
globalization has outpaced the ability of government to develop regulatory frameworks to 
legislate those changing business environments, which opens up the possibility for CSR practices 
to fill that legal gap (Johnson & Turner, 2010). Businesses have begun to realize and respond to 
ethical preferences in their customer base (Johnson & Turner, 2010), yet co-operatives have been 
slow to capture this opportunity given that they are precisely the business model that has been 
following social and ethical principles since their inception. Novkovic (2008) notes that co-
operatives are increasingly realizing that the co-operative principles can provide a business 
advantage over privately-owned companies, particularly when they consider the long-standing 
and highly principled cases of Mondragon Co-operative Corporation, producer and worker co-
ops in Northern Italy and the UK (p. 3). Those examples, Novkovic (2008) continues, have listed 
compliance with the co-operative principles as one of the “reasons behind their success” (p. 3).  
Hammond Ketilson (2004) observes that best practices typically include the “ability of 
successful co-operatives to identify a value or set of values” that resonate with the membership 
and the ability to “operationalize” these values in the organization's policy (p. 141). Applying co-
op values and principles in the daily operations of the organization may be the market niche for 
co-operatives to differentiate themselves from other types of organizations, which constitutes the 
co-op advantage and potential for success (Hammond Ketilson, 2004). Therefore, the co-
operative difference and the features of its organizational model uniquely place co-ops to 
effectively meet stakeholders' needs (employees, costumers, etc) in the context of globalization.  
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The dual nature of a co-operative, combining economic and social dimensions, is perhaps the 
primary characteristic of its identity. Italian scholars Zamagni and Zamagni (2010) call this dual 
nature “a genuine two-faced Janus,” or two sides of a coin facing opposite directions. On the one 
hand, co-operatives pursue economic goals, operate in the market economy and “accept its 
logic.” On the other hand, co-operatives seek to attain “meta-economic aims,” adding “positive 
externalities” to their members and the community, thus challenging the logic of the market (p. 
1). While co-operatives serve a wide spectrum of social needs including a sense of belonging, 
“community identity, control over key aspects of everyday life,” to name a few, co-operatives 
are also compelled to succeed and respond to the “pressures and logic of the market” if they are 
to succeed (Fulton & Laycock, 1990, p. 3). If one of those aspects prevails at the expense of the 
other, the co-operative may be “denatured” and risks losing its identity (Zamagni & Zamagni, 
2010, p. 1). In other words, when only the social aspect of the dual nature is pursued, the co-op 
endangers its economic survival, and when the organization concentrates only on the economic 
aspect it can be “crippled by a reluctance to innovate” becoming more like investor-owned firms, 
and it may lose support of stakeholders because it is not upholding the co-operative principles 
(Fairbairn et al., 1991, p. 109). Fairbairn et al. (1991) note that “a one-sided co-op is a one-
legged co-op that can not get anywhere” (p. 109). The dual nature of co-operatives, two sides of 
a coin that strengthen and complement rather than contradict one another, manifests corporate 
social responsibility in practice: a "moral and philosophical perspective about the relationship 
between business and society" sustaining the mutual obligations (Johnson & Turner, 2010, p. 
329).  
 
Co-operatives satisfy the needs of the membership and are rooted locally. A consumer co-op 
provides retail goods and services at competitive prices; a member is a user of the co-op who 
benefits by pooling resources with others to create a democratically owned and controlled local 
business. A worker co-op fulfills the need for more secure employment and better working 
conditions, as the workers are also the owners of the business. A producer co-op guarantees the 
members a market outlet for their produce and allows them to compete at a larger scale than  
individuals could on their own. A credit union provides its members with financial services and 
access to credit. In all these cases, co-operatives are typically local businesses that invest in their 
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communities and keep the control of the organization in local hands. Fairbairn (2004) points out 
that a “co-operative can be flexible, innovative and entrepreneurial because it does not receive 
orders from a far-away corporate head office” disconnected from the local reality for the simple 
reason that “it is locally owned and voluntarily controlled by local people—in other words, 
because of its ownership structure as a co-operative” (p. 19; italics in original). Co-operatives are 
people-driven organizations, not capital-driven organizations. They exist to fulfill the needs of 
their member-owners who contribute capital to the enterprise primarily to “maximize the 
remuneration of the member’s contribution – whether it is labour, asset conferrals or patronage 
of the co-op’s goods and services” depending on the type of co-op (Zamagni & Zamagni, 2010, 
p. 26). 
 
1.2.1 Social cohesion and social capital in co-operatives 
 
The social aspects of co-operatives contribute to social cohesion. In Jenson’s view, social 
cohesion is about “shared values and commitment to a community” (1998, p. 15). Jenson assigns 
five dimensions to the concept: “belonging, inclusion, participation, recognition and legitimacy” 
(1998, p. 15). One can argue that co-operatives, like other civil society organizations, create the 
space for the members to feel inclusion and belonging in a group with shared values and goals. 
In addition, groups or organizations require the “explicit public acceptance” or “recognition” of 
the community and institutions, as well as the “legitimacy” to act as an intermediary to create 
and maintain those spaces (Fairbairn, 2004, p. 24). Co-operatives can constitute a natural fertile 
environment to foster social cohesion. 
 
The concept of social capital is likewise related to co-operatives. Putnam (2000) argues that 
social networks of relationships in a community that are built and maintained by trust generate a 
sense of reciprocity in society that is a valuable resource, or social capital. In his view, a “norm 
of generalized reciprocity—“I’ll do this for you without expecting anything specific back from 
you, in the confident expectation that someone else will do something for me down the road”—
makes for a more efficient and trustworthy society (pp. 20-21). These reciprocal social 
relationships create “mutual obligations” and, consequently, reciprocated co-operation benefits 
people (p. 20). Along those lines, Polanyi (1957) directly challenges classical economic theory 
                                                
 18 
by arguing that economic rationality is “embedded” within social relationships and is thus 
subordinated to culture, politics and religion. What classical economic theory assumes is that 
“economics exists in a sphere of its own, that its laws are complete and sufficient to themselves, 
and that the broader social and human relations. . .  are not only apart from it but should be 
subject to its dictates” (Restakis, 2010, p. 10). Traditional economic theory views the economy 
as an absolute reality that works in the way it has to, and assumes that people should fully 
subject themselves to it (McMurtry, 2009). This traditional view overlooks the fact that human 
beings create their economic relationships and are consequently able to transform these 
relationships and thus change the way the economy works.  
 
In Putnam’s (2000) view, “everyday business and social transactions are less costly” when social 
capital is high in society, resulting also in lower economic transaction costs given that they have 
an element of trust as well (p. 288). A co-operative structure based on equality and the 
implementation of co-op principles and values contributes to the accumulation of social capital 
in these organizations and in the community in which they are located. As an example, Putnam 
emphasizes the high levels of social capital found in the communities of Northern Italy marked 
by high levels of trust, civic participation, solidarity, democracy, and equality. In particular, the 
Emilia-Romagna Region is well known for its vibrant co-operative movement that fosters social 
capital (Putnam, 2000, pp. 345-346). Relationships and trust pave the way for “a model and a 
moral foundation upon which to base further cooperative enterprises,” explains Putnam (2000, p. 
346). Gherardi & Masiero (1990) have also argued that trust and solidarity within co-operatives 
and across co-operative associations protect them from the negative effects of the market, and 
therefore give them a competitive edge.  
 
1.2.2 Co-operatives' dilemmas: principal-agent problem, member conflicts, and 
isomorphism  
 
Co-operatives often suffer from a conflict between democratic control and market 
competitiveness (Fulton & Laycock, 1990). In the first case, the principal-agent dilemma arises 
from conflicts in the relationships between individuals and the social organization, whereas the 
second problem, isomorphism, originates as a consequence of following the rules of the market. 
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Members (principals) often face the principal-agent dilemma as their wishes and needs may not 
be satisfied by their hired managers (agents) because they may undertake actions that are not in 
the principal's best interests (Fulton & Laycock, 1990). At the root of this dilemma we find that 
people pursue their own goals, interests and ideologies; for example, managers’ and employees’ 
goals may be good wages, job security, promotion, etc., which may be in conflict with the 
member-owners’ objectives. Often there are multiple principal-agent relationships in co-
operatives as the problem is also found between board and management, between management 
and employees, and between members and elected boards (Fulton & Laycock, 1990).  The 
principal-agent dilemma reveals two different views of the nature of the co-op activity, or "two 
logics of collective action" (economic versus social) as some members may want to see a priority 
of social goals over market-oriented ones, while agents may believe that succeeding in the 
market should be prevalent (Fulton & Laycock, 1990, p. 6). However, in large groups of 
members, not all may members wish to see social goals prevail, nor do all managers think that 
market goals should be imperative. The complexities of the principal-agent dilemma can lead to 
serious member conflicts, which may render the co-operative dysfunctional if they are not 
properly addressed.  
 
Another layer of the principal-agent dilemma includes the diverse motivations of different 
generations of members. The founding members may have been motivated by a need to enhance 
social relationships while satisfying economic needs, and yet younger and current members may 
not share the same motivations that derived from particular socio-historic circumstances their 
past generation lived (Fulton & Laycock, 1990). Unfortunately, current members may not be 
aware of these two motivations, and they may regard service provision enabled by the market as 
the primary goal of the co-op without realizing the negative effect the economic prevalence may 
have over legitimate social goals the co-op was created to serve in the first place (Fulton & 
Laycock, 1990).  
 
Co-operatives experience pressure to mimic the behaviour of investor owned firms (IOFs) in 
responding to market pressures, which presents challenges and poses questions concerning co-
operative identity. The conformist pressures continue in the market, as Dimaggio and Powell 
(2004) highlight the existence of a process of homogenization or “isomorphism” in 
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organizations, which is the tendency of one organization to emulate the features and behaviour of 
other organizations perceived as successful (p. 114). Because co-operatives operate in the market 
economy and become enmeshed in its logic, they tend to feel isomorphic pressures to emulate 
“the style and strategies” of their IOF competitors (Fulton & Laycock, 1990, p. 7). In fact, as co-
operatives adopt more “market-oriented strategies,” they become more similar to their 
competitors, endangering their unique dual nature and the very reason that justified their 
existence in the first place (Fulton & Laycock, 1990, p. 8). Members and the broader public find 
it more difficult to differentiate co-operatives and IOFs, putting at risk the particular “co-
operative-specific market advantage” they enjoy (p. 8).  This process affects co-operative 
identity when co-operatives are torn between the economic goals of market-oriented strategies 
and the community-rooted social goals.  
 
1.2.3 Co-operatives and investor-owned firms 
 
For the purpose of this study, it is necessary to note some of the main differences between co-
operatives and investor-owned firms (IOFs) as a prelude to elaborating key comparisons and 
distinctions in succeeding chapters. The first difference is in the purpose of these two models. In 
co-operatives, the purpose is to serve the needs and aspirations of the membership. In IOFs, the 
reason for their existence is to maximize shareholder profits. Although co-operatives deploy 
economic tools such as private property, and operate in the market, they do so in order to pursue 
social goals, which are "embedded" in the social dimension of the co-op, and not vice versa 
(McMurtry, 2009, p. 58). This difference comes from the dual nature of co-operatives given that 
they incorporate both the “associationism” and the “entrepreneurship” dimensions (Zamagni & 
Zamagni, 2010, p. 27). The first dimension refers to the social purpose of members freely 
associating in a venture that would enable them to achieve a specific goal, and the second 
dimension requires that the “method” used to achieve that goal be through an economic 
organization operating in the market (p. 27). Charitable organizations lack the second dimension, 
and the investor-owned firms lack the first dimension.  
 
The social dimension of a co-operative, based on a set of co-op principles and values, allows the 
members to control the autonomous enterprise. In fact, those principles and values determine the 
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"corporate" structure and the behaviour of the organization because they insert the economic 
activity of the co-operative within a "social framework" that is different from the IOF model 
(McMurtry, 2009, p. 57, italics in original). In a co-operative, the members exercise positive 
“freedom to” decide the destiny of the organization and achieve their common goals as opposed 
to negative “freedom from” embodied in a capitalist enterprise that implies a lack of constraints 
(Zamagni & Zamagni, 2010, p. 28). Particularly in the case of worker co-ops, the freedom to 
exercise full autonomy enables workers to see labour as “an opportunity for self-realization” and 
not just as an input or factor of production as occurs in the IOF (p. 28). Worker co-operatives and 
IOFs differ in the ends that they pursue and in the nature of their relationships. Typically the co-
operative members will work together towards a common end, whereas IOFs manifest 
conflicting goals, particularly between the shareholders’ desire for profit maximization and the 
employees’ desire for wage betterment. A positive freedom approach to understanding “labour-
as-action” and the inherent human development opportunity, particularly as manifested in worker 
co-operatives, is rarely mentioned in economic literature (Birchall, 1994; Zamagni & Zamagni, 
2010, p. 29).  
 
Another key distinction between co-operatives and IOFs is that the democratic structure of co-
operatives allows members to elect a Board of Directors; each member of a co-operative has one 
vote because votes follow the individual and not the capital invested. Profits are reinvested in the 
co-operative or distributed to members and the community. For these reasons, co-operatives are 
said to embody “economic democracy” because they allow ordinary people to democratically 
and economically control their own destinies (Restakis, 2010, p. 3).  
 
As principle-based organizations, co-operatives tend to “internalize market externalities” and 
“promote social innovation and entrepreneurship” (Novkovic, 2008, p.1). Co-operatives often 
remain in communities providing services even in the case of market failure, whereas IOFs leave 
communities if it is not economically profitable to remain (Fairbairn et al., 1991; Novkovic, 
2008). Guided by their principles, co-operative organizations internalize market externalities as 
they employ people with barriers to employment, “undertake costly practices to care for the 
environment,” provide higher food safety standards absorbing extra costs, and choose to offer 
affordable products to low-income communities (Novkovic, 2008, p.8). In this way, Novkovic 
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(2008) points out that “the supply decisions are fundamentally altered in light of co-operative 
social goals” (p. 6). As democratically controlled enterprises, their “flat management structure,” 
participative nature, and flexible work environments favour social innovation and social 
entrepreneurship (Novkovic, 2008, p. 8).  
 
1.3 Co-operatives, collective action, and responses to globalization 
 
Understanding the nature of co-operatives also requires highlighting their connection to 
collective action. Indeed, Fulton (1990) views co-operatives as “a form of collective action in 
which members participate in order to achieve personal as well as group goals” (p. 103). These 
organizations pool the resources of people who would not be able to achieve their aspirations 
individually. By collectively aggregating market power and resources, they supply the means 
required to address powerlessness and poverty. Harris, Stefanson, & Fulton (1996) explain that 
“at the core of any form of collective action lies a key group of individuals who recognize they 
face a common problem or perceived opportunity, and are prepared to work cooperatively to 
address the common goal” (p. 17). Co-operatives typically “emerge because a group sees a 
benefit from acting together” (Fulton, 2004, p. 12). A World Bank report (2008) highlights the 
case of “India’s success in milk production . . . built on the collective action of marginal farmers 
through the Indian Dairy Cooperatives Network” (p. 258). Indeed, this collective action is 
another core difference between co-operatives and IOFs (particularly small and medium-sized 
enterprises). As Kohn (1992) exhorts us to replace competition with co-operation in order to 
build a better society, he reminds us that "co-operation requires collective action, and collective 
action requires education and organization" (p. 195). Collective action is not only a means to an 
end, but an end in itself because it reinforces relationships, creates identity, and contributes to 
mutual education in the organization’s membership. For that reason, the literature highlights the 
importance of collective action for co-operative development, and agrees that collective action is 
deserving of external assistance and supports in order to build and maintain it (Fulton, 2004; 
Harris, Fulton, Stefanson, & Lysyshyn, 1998; Harris, Stefanson, & Fulton, 1996; McMurtry, 
2009).   
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In the context of economic internationalization, collective action especially prepares co-
operatives to fill gaps left by the market economy, to deliver public services, or simply to satisfy 
the unmet needs of communities. Polanyi (1957) argued that in the early nineteenth century, self-
regulating market agendas were set in motion in some parts of Europe causing the disruption of 
the social structure upon which the economy was built. As explained earlier, the first responses 
to that phenomenon came from co-operatives that emerged in the mid nineteenth century as a 
response to the Industrial Revolution and its socio-economic consequences (Fairbairn et al., 
1991). Workers’ labour became a commodity, sold and bought at the price the market would pay 
for it (Birchall, 1994). The welfare state and consumer protection laws were absent (Birchall, 
1994). The Rochdale Pioneers thought that a shop owned by its customers was the best means of 
consumer protection, and it would also empower the members because profits would go back to 
the customer-members in the form of a dividend rather than going into the pockets of private 
storeowners. 
Along with stressing the pragmatic and material reasons for Rochdale to emerge, others point out 
that the previous half century of working-class activism, social and political ideology, and 
linkages to the labour movement  also constituted necessary external factors for the creation and 
success of the Rochdale co-op experiment (Fairbairn, 2001). Whether it was the consumer co-
operatives in Britain, the agricultural and credit co-operatives in Germany, the dairy co-ops in 
Denmark, or the worker co-ops in France, these first co-operatives sought solutions to the 
“nineteenth century globalization” that left “those with little capital dependent on political and 
economic events elsewhere” and little power to control their own destinies (Fairbairn et al., 
1991, p. 7; italics in original). Socio-economic turmoil, free trade, and international competition 
left communities vulnerable to market and price fluctuations. Local collective action in the form 
of co-operatives prepared communities to weather the negative effects of globalization and 
provided the means to modernize and to adapt to those changes.  
 
Globalization and economic restructuring have laid out a new context for collective action in co-
operatives. In fact, Fairbairn et al. state that “far from being a fundamental threat to co-
operatives, globalization is the original reason for their existence,” because it “creates the need, 
which in turn creates and sustains co-operatives—the need to combine the capital and spending 
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power of many, in order to survive or shape socio-economic change” (1991, p. 8). Globalization 
in the twenty-first century is not a new phenomenon; it periodically goes through waves of 
innovation, adaptation, and moments of destructive crises that hit communities (Kotz, 2009). 
Whether it emerges out of the industrial revolution in the nineteenth century or creates a new 
wave through the information and communication technologies of the twentieth century, 
“globalization is at least two centuries old” (Fairbairn et al., 1991, p. 8). Resilient beyond the 
impacts of economic globalization, co-operatives have gone through several breaking points of 
global crisis, “including two world wars and the great depression, coming out stronger every 
time” (Birchall, 1994; Birchall & Hammond Ketilson, 2009, pp. 6-7). Their capacity to survive, 
thrive, and adapt in these times “shocks,” argue Birchall & Hammond Ketilson (2009), giving 
the example of co-operatives providing a distribution network of food supplies during the 
reconstruction years “in Germany and Japan after the Second World War” (p. 7).  The ability of 
co-operatives to withstand crises is specially noted in some examples of co-ops that have 
celebrated their centenary in Italy (Birchall & Hammond Ketilson, 2009; Zamagni & Zamagni, 
2010). Having survived innumerable crises and two world wars, the Federation of Co-operatives 
of the Trentino-Alto Adige region, Italy, founded in 1895, is still thriving today (Zamagni & 
Zamagni, 2010; p. 48). 
 
The persistent evolution of globalization and the internationalization of the economy “comes in 
waves as the logic of the market works itself out,” explain Fairbairn et al., as globalization is an 
inextricable characteristic “built into the structure of the market economy” (1991, p. 8; Kotz, 
2009). Some of the consequences of this phenomenon include a growing inequality, the 
increasing gap between rich and poor, a financial sector with few restrictions that tends to engage 
in speculative activities, and major "asset bubbles" such as the inflated real estate and securities 
(Kotz, 2009, p. 307). While banks and some private corporations faced bankruptcy and required 
“bail-outs” from governments to survive, co-operatives demonstrated a different solution to the 
crisis. In a report prepared for the International Labour Organization, Birchall & Hammond 
Ketilson (2009) provide evidence of co-operatives and credit unions in different parts of the 
world weathering the crisis and the following recession with hardly any government funding. In 
fact, the report explains that co-operatives “can lessen the impact of the recession by the mere 
fact that they survive and continue to carry out business,” while other businesses close down (p. 
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13). The example of the Trollhattan Co-operative Society in the town of Trollhattan, Sweden, 
founded in 1867 and still operating today is striking (Birchall & Hammond Ketilson, 2009; 
Carson, 1998).  
 
Depending on the type of co-operatives, these organizations hold distinct advantages that have 
been crucial to their resiliency during the global meltdown. For instance, financial co-operatives 
serve costumer-members that are more “risk-averse” and they did not engage in the speculative 
and un-ethical “sub-prime” lending practices found in the banking sector (Birchall & Hammond 
Ketilson, 2009, pp. 13-15). The fundamental difference between financial co-operatives and 
banks lies in the ownership, governance, and the methods of capitalization. As member-owned 
organizations, credit unions and co-operative banks are often more “risk-averse” than banks that 
are compelled by shareholder interests to pursue maximum profits, and as a result they decided 
to stay away from “riskier sub-prime loans” (p. 15). Their democratic governance structure 
enables members to more effectively “scrutinise” the decisions of the organization (p. 15). 
Financial co-operatives are capitalized through member savings and deposits, not through 
speculative markets as in the case of banks, which makes co-operatives more wary when lending 
money as these loans are typically coming from another member’s savings creating a dynamic of 
“moral constraint” (p. 15). As a result, rather than experiencing losses during the financial and 
economic crisis, credit unions and co-operative banks in Canada, the US, and Europe have 
actually increased business in all aspects such as “in assets and deposits; increased volume of 
lending; increase in membership; a better rate of interest; and greater stability (measured by 
capital adequacy ratios, and loan default rates” (p. 16). A similar result is found in “developing 
countries” where credit unions and co-operative banks are almost the only option low income 
sectors have for access to credit, and have also been very resilient during the meltdown (Birchall 
& Hammond Ketilson, 2009, p. 25). According to Birchall & Hammond Ketilson (2009), non-
financial co-operatives also offered advantages during the global economic turmoil. For instance, 
worker co-operatives provided more sustainable employment through labour co-operatives and 
employee buyouts; consumer co-operatives facilitated access to affordable food and other 
supplies; and producer co-operatives enabled members’ businesses to become more relevant and 
effective leading to business growth in the midst of the crisis.  
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Although all types of co-operatives seem to perform well in satisfying unmet needs in times of 
crisis, evidence suggests that co-operatives are not only a sustainable model to be used in crisis. 
Actually, “it is the strength built up by cooperatives during the good times that helps tide them 
over a recession,” according to Birchall & Hammond Ketilson (p. 8). Globalization and the 
economic crisis have revealed that “the individual’s self-interest is best secured by commitment 
to and participation in a group” (Fairbairn et al., 1991, p. 16). In fact, “co-operatives and 
collective action are appropriate responses to globalization and economic restructuring because 
they address the powerlessness created by excessive individualism within a global market” 
(Fairbairn et al., 1991, p. 16). The impact of deregulated markets and, consequently, their social 
dislocation require that communities engage in a new search for humane values, a quest to 
“rediscover and rebuild” a co-operative dream (Fairbairn et al., 1991, p. 18). Whitman (2011) 
points out that "any resilient organization that can weather a recession would seem invaluable in 
the current economic climate" yet co-operatives are not given the proper supports to flourish (p. 
1).While social and economic conditions in current times provide a more intense motivation for 
people to act together and form co-operatives, the resiliency and the sustainable, equitable, and 
democratic nature of this business model demonstrate that co-operative development deserves 
government attention and institutional support.  
 
1.4 Co-operative development 
 
Co-operative development is an area of study that has not been deeply researched (Fairbairn, 
2004). In fact, the U.S. Overseas Cooperative Development Council (2007) found that resources 
to fund research on co-operative development are very scarce as this topic “tends to be a 
secondary area of emphasis under studies on civil society, NGOs, farmer associations, rural 
participation, democracy and poverty alleviation,” a factor that ultimately limits the potential 
impact and results of co-op development (p. 34).Therefore, more investigation on co-operative 
development, successes and barriers, is necessary in order to illuminate new understandings, and 
facilitate the creation of new development strategies. In this context, this research aims to inform 
academics, policy makers, as well as co-operative practitioners and developers.  
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Co-operative development is often pursued by three lead actors: government agencies, co-
operatives, and individual co-operative developers. Empirical and theoretical evidence suggests 
that government agencies may not be the best vehicles to pursue co-operative development as 
grassroots social and collective action is primarily required to start co-operatives, which 
government cannot provide (Pollet & Develtere, 2004). Co-operatives engaging in developing 
other co-operatives seem to be a more appropriate model as it is not a top-down approach as in 
the case of government-led development for political reasons.  Established co-ops have gone 
through the process themselves, can provide first hand technical assistance, support, in some 
cases even financing, and offer a sense of belonging to a movement. In the Spanish and Italian 
examples, co-operative development was pursued by federations of co-operatives or co-operative 
groups, initially with little or no state support, yet proved highly successful in producing an 
enabling environment for co-operative development. Individual co-operative consultants can 
walk groups through the technical assistance, and perhaps even aid those wishing to start co-ops 
in finding financing opportunities; however, co-operative developers can not provide the 
motivation for people to start co-ops, nor can they build grassroots social action and the social 
relations in the group (Pollet & Develtere, 2004). Although these three lead actors may be 
helpful in facilitating the process of co-op development, the dissertation will explore in the 
context of Mondragon what established co-operatives can do in animating co-op development 
and building a movement.  
 
Co-operative development is often understood in two different ways, although its full meaning 
implies both. On the one hand, according to Cornforth & Thomas (1990), co-operative 
development can be understood as “the increase in their number and the growth and social 
development of individual co-operative enterprises” and, on the other hand, as “development 
through cooperatives and cooperative principles – in other words, elevating cooperation to an 
organizing idea that could underlie general social and economic development” (p. 451). The first 
meaning refers to an actual growth in the number and size of enterprises, and the second 
meaning touches on a broader understanding of co-operative community development. In the 
latter sense, co-operatives have played an important role in pursuing sustainable economic 
enterprises “consistent with community’s social goals and vision” (Fairbairn et al., 1991, p. 13).  
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A strong co-operative sector does not rise by chance or coincidence. Empirical research and 
theoretical literature have systematically agreed that a healthy co-operative sector is unlikely to 
develop or even be maintained unless it has its own supportive organizational infrastructure 
(Cornforth, 1988; Cornforth & Thomas, 1990; Fairbairn et al., 1993; Harris et al., 1998; Harris, 
Stefanson, & Fulton, 1996;  Morrison, 1991; Whyte & Whyte, 1991). Along those lines, 
Fairbairn et al. (1993) stressed the existence of a “gap, generally, in the infrastructure to serve 
new co-operatives” in Canada that needs to be addressed (p. 6). Harris, Stefanson, & Fulton 
(1996) state that “although common economic or social issues represent necessary conditions for 
cooperative development, they do not appear to be sufficient conditions” for co-operative 
formation, as the group will likely need as well “outside institutional support” (p. 17). One form 
of organizational infrastructure to support co-operative development takes the form of “co-
operative support organizations” that try to alleviate some of the external and internal pressures 
that co-ops confront and the usual barriers that they face (Cornforth & Thomas, 1990, p. 453). 
The authors identify two ideal roles those organizations should play in addressing typical 
obstacles: one is economic and the other political. The economic function is extensive as it seeks 
to provide financing to co-ops; provide training in areas not covered by traditional educational 
institutions such as co-operative management; and “compensate for the alleged reluctance of 
individual entrepreneurs to start cooperatives” (Cornforth & Thomas, 1990, p. 453). The political 
function includes lobbying on behalf of co-operatives in order to obtain equal rights with IOFs 
on simplifying co-operative “taxation and legal matters”; acting as a bridge between co-
operatives and government or other institutions to advocate for co-operatives' interests; and 
working towards building a “dynamic social movement” among co-operative members and 
activists (pp. 453-454). The usual barriers and constraints that co-operatives face are mostly 
agreed in the literature and empirical research: a dearth of funding adequate to the special needs 
of co-operatives, a lack of knowledge of the co-operative model and specific managerial and 
entrepreneurial skills, a lack of adequate policies and legislation that ensures an equal playing 
field for co-operatives, and a lack of coordinated efforts from the sector to lobby governments 
(Cornforth & Thomas, 1990; Fairbairn et al., 1993; Pollet & Develtere, 2004). The form or 
structure that the supportive organizational infrastructure takes for co-op development varies 
considerably depending on the country, and even the region. There is no “one size fits all” recipe 
as to the most effective mechanisms to influence co-op formation and growth. Further studies 
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that address those barriers are required in order to better understand the process of co-operative 
formation, resilience/sustainability, and growth.    
 
The 1970s and 1980s did see a revival in co-operative development in most “Western” countries 
(Cornforth & Thomas, 1990, p. 452), particularly in France and Italy, countries characterized by 
“established federations and networks of support” for co-operatives. Other countries, such as the 
UK and the US, saw a resurgence of worker co-operatives in particular. For example, a lot of the 
worker co-op development in Britain in the 1960s and 1970s was heavily assisted by local “co-
operative support organizations” (Cornforth & Thomas, 1990, p. 453). Cornforth & Thomas 
(1990) called this co-operative revival a “new wave” of co-operatives linked to the students’ 
movements of the 1960s and 1970s that reacted to unemployment and inequalities in modern 
industrial society, and later were related to “women’s, peace and environmental movements” (p. 
453).  
 
One important aspect of co-operative development, often insufficiently studied, is the role played 
by social movements in the growth of the sector (Cornforth & Thomas, 1990; Fairbairn, 2001). 
McMurtry (2009) points out that the set of co-operative principles and values that determine their 
behaviour constitutes "a shared platform of social, economic, and political analysis" that unites 
these organizations into a movement across the globe (p. 57). Defined as "a loosely organised 
effort by a broad group of people to change the culture of the dominant society" or to resist 
change, a social movement develops shared values in its membership, and is often sparked by 
sentiments of injustice, marginalization, and exclusion (Fairbairn, 2001, p. 28). Shared values 
form the norms of the movement that bind the members and strengthen the identity of the 
movement at the same time as they "provide a framework for action" (Craig, 1993, p. 21). 
Shared values of equality and democracy in a social movement, for example, would likely 
establish structures that allow for equal member participation in decision-making (Craig, 1993). 
Social movements propose a particular ideal for society that often entails a practical means by 
which the desired vision will be implemented and enable members to formally join the 
movement (Fairbairn, 2001). Every social movement is sustained by a particular ideology, and 
the co-operative movement has adopted a set of values as its social philosophy that "emphasize 
co-operative action in the solution of economic and social problems" (Craig, 1993, p. 23). 
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Through cross-memberships in different social movements, "cross-movement networks" are 
established that aid in shaping common identities of resistance and struggle (Carroll & Ratner, 
1996, p. 601). Such was the case of the Italian co-op movement as cross-memberships and 
networks between the trade union movement and the socialist movement were instrumental in 
forging common identities for the three movements in the early days, a process that contributed 
to the strength of the co-operative movement (Hancock, 2007).  
 
Social movements, such as "labour movements, farmers’ and rural movements, religious and 
ethnic-nationalists, women’s and temperance movements" and more recently the fair trade 
movement, have promoted co-operative development to support their members' goals, (Fairbairn, 
2001, p. 28; Pollet & Develtere, 2004). The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions 
and the World Confederation of Labour have actively been promoting worker co-operatives 
internationally (Pollet & Develtere, 2004, p. 33). The International Federation of Agricultural 
Producers has been linked to the development of co-operatives among farmers, mostly in Third 
World countries (Pollet & Develtere, 2004). Oikocredit deploys the investment capital of 
churches to promote international co-operative development, and the Fair Trade Labeling 
Organization has been instrumental in developing producer co-ops in the Third World by 
allowing them to benefit from labeled fair trade products and collaborating with some of their 
technical assistance needs (Pollet & Develtere, 2004).  
 
Institutions are not rigid structures, but rather flexible, ever changing, and connected to 
historical, socio-cultural, political, and economic processes (Putnam, 1994). Therefore, studying 
co-operative institutions requires an understanding of these dynamic processes, their connections 
to other social movements, and their ties to the sustained ideologies within co-operatives that are 
embedded in social movements. Understanding co-operatives as flexible institutions within a 
broader system highlights the importance of "the culture of co-operatives and of their 
movements" (Fairbairn, 2001, p. 32). Cornforth & Thomas (1990) remind us that looking at the 
broader meaning of co-op development lets us discover “cultural and ideological factors” in each 
co-operative movement that, in turn, deepens our understanding of why certain supportive 
development infrastructures are successful in “regenerating cooperative ideals” while others in 
different contexts with similar mechanisms are not (p. 459). Understanding the connections 
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between co-operatives and society, culture and politics, that affect these organizations will shed 
light on the successes and failures of development strategies (Fairbairn, 2001). The most 
impalpable components of cultural factors, trust and solidarity within co-operative organizations 
and across co-operative networks, are key features that determined the success of development in 
the Italian co-op movement, because they operate as a “non-material productive factor” that 
helps co-operatives weather negative effects of the market (Gherardi & Masiero, 1990, p. 571). 
Similarly, the Mondragon development system realized the importance of addressing not only 
the usual development barriers co-operatives face, but also creating the mechanisms to 
regenerate a culture of co-operative ideals for future generations through training and education 
(Meek & Woodworth, 1990; Whyte & Whyte, 1991). Indeed, effective co-operative 
development requires addressing technical needs, and also understanding the role and 
connections of co-operatives within a broader context. 
 
Co-operative development has been understood in different ways. Historically the Rochdale 
Pioneers understood co-op development as a grassroots solution initiated and controlled by the 
community it affects (Fairbairn, 1992). Pollet & Develtere (2004) remind us that much of the co-
operative development pursued in Southern countries had a "colonial cooperative paternalism" 
lens that resulted in failure (p. 67). Once the colonies achieved independence, new governments 
imposed a "state-led" top-down development approach for political reasons that did not work 
either (p. 67). In light of recent global economic crises, and these past co-operative development 
failures, a "new development agenda" has emerged that relies on co-operative development 
agencies and emphasizes 1) a "multistakeholder" approach involving non-government actors 
such as civil society organizations and businesses, 2) "decentralization and privatization" with 
less government intervention that involves private actors, 3) the use of local entrepreneurship in 
the process, 4) poverty reduction goals, and 5) the requirement of specialized and professional 
services (Pollet & Develtere, 2004, p. 12).   
 
In Canada, the co-operative practitioner-led development framework is the seven pillar model 
designed by the Co-operative Development Strategy Council and approved at the 2007 Annual 
General Meeting of the Canadian Co-operative Association (CCA). See Table 1.1. CCA, as the 
apex co-operative organization representing English-speaking co-operatives in Canada along 
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with its provincial and sectoral affiliates, sets the development agenda and provides guidance on 
the co-operative movement’s mission, vision and practices. The seven pillar model is useful as a 
conceptual framework for guiding federal and provincial co-op development efforts.  
 
Table 1.1 The Canadian Co-operative Association’s Strategic Pillar Model    
  
1. Co-operative sector leadership & support 
2. Outreach & promotion 
3. Public policy/ program funding/ legislation 
4. Capitalization 
5. Technical assistance 
6. Sector development 
7. Research* 
 
Source: CCA (2007a). AGM Handbook, 8-10. *This strategic pillar was recently added by the 
Strategy Council at its second meeting and has not had significant discussion yet. 
 
Pillar 1: Co-operative sector leadership and support 
This pillar speaks to the fundamental need for co-operative development to be directed and 
driven by the co-op sector itself, as opposed to being led by the government or other actors. 
Acknowledging the sixth co-op principle of “co-operation among co-operatives,” this pillar calls 
for the co-op movement to take direct action and ownership of the development process. 
Increasingly, co-operative associations and federations are becoming aware of the need for them 
to take a leadership role in co-op development (Fairbairn et al., 1993). The CCA and the Conseil 
de la Coopération du Canada (CCC), representing the Francophone co-operatives in the country, 
“are in the best position to facilitate discussion and to encourage concrete initiatives” for 
development (Fairbairn et al., 1993, p. 50). The literature is clear that “for co-op development 
efforts to be successful, ownership of the problem and its solution must rest with the co-
operatives and people in each of the regions” (Fairbairn et al., 1993, p. 57).  
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Pillar 2: Outreach and promotion 
This pillar articulates the importance of increasing promotion of the co-op model as a viable 
option to business developers, professionals, and communities involved in all possible sectors 
(i.e. bio-fuel; wind energy; social co-ops). By identifying sector needs and opportunities, this 
strategic pillar intends to reach beyond the existing co-operative sector in promoting the model to 
the general public through media, Internet, and other sources.  The development of the Co-op 
Zone website is an example of a widely available and promoted information tool.  
 
Pillar 3: Public policy / program funding/ legislation 
Favourable co-op policies can create the necessary mechanisms for co-op creation and expansion 
(Loxley and Simpson, 2007; Adeler, 2009). Apex organizations and co-operative associations 
need to play an important role in lobbying for a supportive policy framework for development 
because enabling policies can highly influence the success of co-op development (Adeler, 2009; 
Fairbairn et al., 1993; Laycock, 1987; Loxley & Simpson, 2007).  One recent example of 
successful lobbying by the sector in Canada is the Co-operative Development Initiative (CDI), a 
federal program funded by the state and managed by the co-op sector. The CDI provided start-
up, capacity building, and research grants through the CCA and CCC to support co-operative 
development (the program was cancelled in federal budgetary cuts, 2012).   
 
Pillar 4: Capitalization 
The literature (both theoretical research and empirical studies) has consistently pointed out the 
key role of capitalization for co-operative formation and expansion, and the systemic problems 
co-operatives suffer as a consequence of the scarcity of capital (Adeler, 2009; Cornforth & 
Thomas, 1990; Fairbairn et al., 1993; Quarter & Wilkinson, 1990). The CCA recognizes the 
crucial need of capitalization in the forms of grants, loans, patient capital, venture capital, and 
tax credits and the intent to work toward finding long term funding and financing solutions.   
 
Pillar 5: Technical assistance 
This pillar addresses the demand for technical assistance, particularly for emerging co-
operatives. Education and training are generally deemed to be very important in building the co-
op movement; increased demand for co-operative development advisory services is also 
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specifically noted (Cornforth & Thomas, 1990; Fairbairn et al. 1993; Meek & Woodworth, 
1990). Different types of co-operatives (i.e. housing, consumer, worker, producer, 
multistakeholder, credit union) require specialized training as well as available co-op developers 
who have the expertise required. Availability and affordability of these services is also a high 
concern.  
 
Pillar 6: Sector development 
This pillar notes that increased support to co-operatives through the building of strong sector 
federations is an important component in understanding and addressing the specific sectoral 
issues that co-operatives face. Individual sectors (i.e. energy, bio-fuel and value-added 
agriculture, childcare, funeral, First Nations, housing, ambulance, worker, etc) require their own 
sector federations and networks to assess their priorities and to identify opportunities for joint 
lobbying and collaboration.  
 
Pillar 7: Research 
Not discussed in the first meeting, this pillar was added at the Council’s second meeting. 
Although the role of research in advancing the co-op movement has sometimes been overlooked, 
academic investigation has indeed helped co-ops to identify effective practices, explore emerging 
market opportunities, and “build their case” by demonstrating the socio-economic impact of co-
operatives (Meek & Woodworth, 1990). Progress in this regard has been made with the recent 
partnership between CCA and academia to work on a Community-University Research Alliance, 
“Measuring the Co-operative Difference” project.   
 
Writing in Canada, and for the Canadian public, makes the seven pillar model to co-operative 
development designed by the Canadian apex co-op organization a useful framework as a 
measure of sector interests, insights, and blind spots.  For instance, the value of research for co-
op development has not always been noted. Proof of this blind spot is the fact that research was 
added as an afterthought when developing the seven pillar model. 
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1.4.1 Public policy 
 
The relevance of policy as a key instrument to stimulate (or not) co-operative development has 
repeatedly been highlighted in the literature. It has been argued that “one of the greatest 
challenges to successful cooperative development is creating an enabling legal and regulatory 
environment – adequate laws, regulations and supportive institutions that promote cooperatives 
as private sector businesses,” emphasizing the need for research on policy impacting co-op 
development (U.S. Overseas Cooperative Development Council, 2007, p. 24). Public policies 
can be used as a mechanism to create the favourable legislation, taxation, government 
programming, funding instruments and co-operative models necessary for development and 
innovation that address major development barriers (Adeler, 2009). Loxley & Simpson (2007) 
have also highlighted the need for favourable policies and legislation that can support co-
operative development in Canada. Pollet & Develtere (2004) identified the "poor enabling 
environment with restrictive laws and regulations" as a major barrier to co-operative 
development worldwide (p.45). Government commitment toward that supportive environment, 
as well as the involvement of the co-operative leaders in the process of lobbying and co-
construction of policy, has been deemed to be essential in building a better future for the co-
operative movement (Adeler, 2009; Axworthy & Perry, 1988; Fairbairn et al.,1993; Laycock, 
1987; Loxley & Simpson, 2007; Vaillancourt, 2008). Although the literature stresses the 
importance of policy and legislation for co-op development, it is unfortunate that 
interdisciplinary, critical, and comparative research has not been done on the public policy and 
legislation as a support for co-operative development. This dissertation intends to explore the 
topic and address this identified research gap.  
 
Conversely, the “uncertainty of government programs, inappropriate government legislation, 
complexity of programs, a planning process not sympathetic to co-operatives, and inequitable 
treatment compared to corporate forms” are all important concerns of the co-operative sector in 
Canada (Fairbairn et al., 1993, p. 24). Public policy impacts co-operative development and the 
role of government in this regard should be revisited (Fairbairn, 2004). Therefore, Fairbairn et al. 
(1993) noted that “government has a substantial influence on co-operative development” (p. 24) 
and that “governments, or at least certain arms of governments, are also increasingly interested in 
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co-operative development” as they see their potential role in this field, which opens up the 
possibility of ongoing dialogue with the co-op sector to facilitate the process of co-op 
development (p. 7). Government may act as an “advocate” to support co-op development “by 
helping to remove some of the barriers” (Harris et al., 1998, p. 132). Therefore, it is critically 
important to explore the role governments can play in this regard, and the relationship 
governments and the co-operative movement can build in order to support co-operative 
development through legislation, policies, and funding.  
 
Torjman (2005) differentiates “substantive” and “administrative” policy, and explains that “the 
first is concerned with the legislation, programs and practices that govern the substantive aspects 
of community work” including “for example, income security, employment initiatives, child care 
services and social exclusion;” while “the second type of policy focuses largely upon 
administrative procedures” involving, for example, “the collection of statistical information on 
neighbourhoods and the evaluation of complex community programs” (p. 2; italics in original). 
As Torjman (2005) explains, policy is a “decision” resulting in an action or plan that tries “to 
achieve a desired goal” deemed valuable that will benefit all or some groups in society (p. 4). 
Because “policy development entails the selection of a destination or desired objective,” it 
assigns value to the goal considered deserving by policy makers (Torjman, 2005, p. 4).  
 
Co-operative policy and legislation need to preserve autonomy and democratic member control 
of co-operatives. Hoyt (1989) identified a framework to analyze policy based on the degree of 
government intervention and the support provided to co-operatives, which can be useful in 
exploring the role of government in co-operative development. She finds "destructive policies" 
when government has tried to restrict, outlaw, or forbid co-operatives because it identified them 
as enemies of the regime (p. 89). Examples include the Fascist period in Italy (1922-1945), and 
the Franco dictatorship in Spain (1939-1975). "Neutral policies," says Hoyt (1989), typical of 
industrialized countries, apply to permissive states that do not actively destroy nor do they favour 
co-operatives (p. 89). This approach is observed in Britain, France, and Sweden, as co-operatives 
were the product of early popular movements based on self-help, and autonomy (p. 89). 
"Supportive policies" have been passed where governments showed a positive attitude toward 
co-operatives because they understand the value of co-operatives for communities (p. 90). The 
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state removes "artificial barriers to cooperative operations" by passing legislation that facilitates 
the organization and operation of co-ops, and it also provides access to education, research and 
technical assistance to encourage co-operative creation and expansion, but it does so respecting 
co-op autonomy and democracy as it does not get involved in the day-to-day affairs of the 
business (p. 90). Examples include Italy after World War II and Spain after Franco's dictatorship. 
A fourth type of policy towards co-operatives is "participating policies," which involves direct 
government participation in organizing co-ops by supplying capital, and management assistance 
(p. 90). This situation often found in developing countries has ended up in failures as it does not 
allow for spontaneous popular collective action to form co-operatives, and it tries to impose 
foreign models without recognizing the local identity and needs (p. 91). The last type of policy 
Hoyt calls "controlling" as governments take direct control of co-operatives to implement 
particular state policy agendas, thus dominating the board of directors, management, and 
dictating production, pricing, and marketing as it was often the case in ex-soviet countries (p. 
92). The fourth and fifth types of policy may not lead to co-operative development as the strong 
involvement of the state in co-op formation and daily affairs seriously compromises the 
autonomy and independence of these organizations. Those interested in co-operative 
development should identify neutral or supportive policies as the most appropriate ways to 
encourage co-op growth.  
 
Beyond the content of policy, there is also the matter of the policy process. According to 
Vaillancourt (2008), there is a distinction between "co-construction" and "co-production" of 
public policy, with the former referring to the process of crafting and elaborating the policy and 
the later referring to the implementation of the already created policy (p. 12). The literature 
highlights the positive results of a "democratic, solidarity-based" process of public policy 
creation and implementation, which requires involving several parties in the process of 
elaborating and producing policy including "collective and individual stakeholders from the 
market and civil society" acting on an equal basis (Vaillancourt, 2008, pp. 23, 12). Communities 
usually have few economic and political resources to influence the definition and implementation 
of the public policies that affect them, and this leads to a feeling of powerlessness that raises 
questions about the legitimacy of existing democratic institutions (Wharf, 1992). Not only do co-
construction and co-production of public policy address this democratic deficit, but they are 
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likely to result in more effective policy given that the "flexibility of the co-operative and 
association-based" approaches leads to "innovations" and more effective outcomes (Vaillancourt, 
2008, p. 36). 
 
The traditional "monoconstruction model" was based on the sole responsibility of the state to 
define policy without the intervention of other stakeholders (Vaillancourt, 2008, p. 23). In the 
"neo-liberal" approach, the state constructs public policy by partnering with the private sector, 
"the dominant socio-economic agents in the market economy," which leads to an abandonment 
of the public interest (Vaillancourt, 2008, p. 25).  The "corporatist co-construction" model 
incorporates the participation of the state, labour market, and civil society in the creation of 
policy, but it is anchored in non-egalitarian representation that causes some sectors to have more 
weight than others in the decision-making process (Vaillancourt, 2008, p. 25). These models 
understood the elaboration of public policy as a linear, objective, and neutral process, but in fact 
"the state is not neutral" because it tends to favour certain private interests and social forces more 
than others, sacrificing the public interest in the process of policy elaboration (Vaillancourt, 
2008, p. 25; Schneider & Ingram, 2008). For that reason, this dissertation stays away from the 
traditional view of policy and follows Polanyi’s (1957) framework, which argues that economic 
rationality is embedded in and subordinated to the social relations within which it rests. Along 
those lines, policy is an action or plan resulting from the social, economic, political, and cultural 
processes within which social actors or policy makers participate, shaping and being shaped by 
them. "Supportive" public policy in Hoyt's (1989) terminology that encourages co-operative 
development tends to be the result of democratic, solidarity-based creation processes that involve 
the interested stakeholders whose relationships are anchored in equality and fairness. For 
example, the co-operative development tax credit approved by the Manitoba government in 2010 
was the result of democratic consultations and egalitarian working partnerships between the state 
and the co-operative sector affected by the policy (MCA, 2010).   
 
1.5  Research Relevance  
 
Promoting the formation of new co-operative enterprises is important to the fate of communities. 
In fact, Fairbairn et al. (1993) strongly emphasized the need for co-operative development in 
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Canada as a way to attenuate the socio-economic repercussions of globalization, periodic 
recessions (i.e. 1981-82, 1990-93) and now 2008-10, structural adjustments, and the retreat of the 
state that limits the capacity of government to respond appropriately. Co-operatives are present 
in a whole range of economic and social activities providing often indispensable services to 
communities; for example, “specialty food stores,” “communications,” “environmental 
industries,” “health services,” “housing,” etc. (Fairbairn et al., 1993, p. 9).  
 
The focus of this dissertation on comparative co-operative development and public policy 
mechanisms to promote co-op creation and growth is timely in light of current socio-economic 
upheaval in Canada and around the world. Indeed, prominent Canadian scholars have long 
agreed that “[a] growing consciousness of this gap” in supportive co-op infrastructure “and of the 
unmet needs of new co-operatives lies behind the feeling that something special needs to be done 
to support co-operative enterprise development” (Fairbairn et al. 1993, p. 7). Twenty years ago, 
Fairbairn et al. (1993) were already urging “established co-operatives, governments, and new co-
operatives to review successful models and discuss strategies for mutually beneficial 
partnerships” to promote co-operative development (p. 7). 
 
Comparative research facilitates the transfer of innovative co-op development solutions and 
institutional designs from different contexts. Learning from international and local experiences, 
this dissertation compares solutions to co-operative development issues in different co-operative 
movements with diverse cultural settings, histories, political contexts, and regulatory 
environments. By studying the Mondragon group example in all its complexity and 
contradictions, this research can inform and inspire new solutions and understandings of how 
institutions are crafted and how they change. Comparative research on successful models plays 
an important role in transferring information, strategies, and innovations and helps address 
movement “isolation” (Fairbairn et al., 1993, p. 53). It can also assist us in re-thinking a better 
co-operative future (Findlay, 2004). Due to the comparative nature of this dissertation, 
navigating linguistic, cultural, political, and geographic obstacles is important in order to allow 
Canadian audiences to learn from what other countries and/or regions in the world have 
achieved. One of the author's methodological strengths is her ability to cross the linguistic, legal, 
and cultural boundaries to engage with and learn from practices in Spain.  
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This dissertation includes five chapters. Chapter two outlines the theoretical and methodological 
approach to the research. Chapters three and four address the Mondragon co-operative 
development system, its institutional contradictions and policy domains, in the Basque region of 
Spain. Chapter five concludes with an analysis of the implications of the Mondragon example for 
co-operative development in the context of Manitoba.   
  
    
  
    
 
 
                                                
 41 
CHAPTER II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK & METHODOLOGY               
 
 
As established in Chapter I, globalization is an important context for and cause of the co-
operative movement in the nineteenth century (Fairbairn et al., 1991), as it is in the twenty-first 
century’s renewed interest in co-operative development. The global economic downturn of 2008 
reminded us that co-operatives are well suited to find responses to some of the negative 
consequences of globalization since they are collectively owned and democratically controlled 
enterprises (Birchall & Hammond Ketilson, 2009). In collectively aggregating resources and 
market power, co-ops allow ordinary people to address powerlessness and poverty (McMurtry, 
2009; Restakis, 2010). By pursuing economic and social goals, co-ops operate in the market 
using economic tools, which are "embedded" within the social dimension of the co-op 
(McMurtry, 2009, p. 58). This dual nature and principle-based structure prepares co-ops to face 
the impact of government retreat, increasingly deregulated markets, and the social dislocation 
produced by economic globalization (Fairbairn et al., 1991). Promotion of co-operatives and 
adequate supports for their development are important to the economic and social development 
of communities around the world (UN, 2000, 2001, 2010; ILO, 2002).   
 
Against this background, this chapter elaborates the research questions, epistemological 
assumptions, theoretical perspective, and methods of the dissertation, according to Crotty's 
(1998) framework for the research process.  
 
2.1 Research Questions 
 
Having established the importance of co-operative development in Chapter I, it is relevant to 
highlight that it is often pursued by three lead actors: government agencies, co-operatives, and 
individual co-operative developers. The second case, co-operatives developing other co-
operatives, is the model followed by the Mondragon example that successfully created an 
enabling environment for co-op development through its institutionalization. The literature and 
empirical research agree that co-operatives need their own supportive organizational 
infrastructure to develop (Cornforth, 1988; Cornforth & Thomas, 1990; Fairbairn et al., 1993; 
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Harris et al., 1998; Harris, Stefanson & Fulton, 1996; Morrison, 1991; UN, 2000, 2001; Whyte & 
Whyte, 1991). The literature and empirical research likewise agree on the typical obstacles that 
co-operatives face: a lack of funding adequate to the special needs of co-operatives, a lack of 
knowledge of the co-operative model and specific managerial and entrepreneurial skills, a lack of 
adequate policy and legislation, and a lack of coordinated efforts from the sector to lobby 
governments (Birchall & Hammond Ketilson, 2009; Cornforth & Thomas, 1990; Fairbairn et al., 
1993; Pollet & Develtere, 2004). Since co-operatives are institutions connected to their local 
context, and hence a result of historical, economic, political, and socio-cultural processes, co-op 
development formulas can not be easily transplanted from one region or country to another. 
Development strategies are highly dependent not only on pragmatic reasons but also on 
sustaining ideologies and social movements that give co-operatives cohesion, strength, and 
identity (Cornforth, 1990; Fairbairn, 2001; Pollet & Develtere, 2004). Despite the uniqueness of 
co-operative development systems tied to local history, socio-economic, political, and legal 
factors, they share commonalities from which we can learn.  
 
The previous chapter stressed that a crucial component of the necessary supportive environment 
for co-operative development is the role of public policy and legislation in creating the 
mechanisms co-ops need to grow ( Adeler, 2009; Fairbairn et al., 1993; Loxley & Simpson, 
2007). Government participation in that supportive environment as well as the involvement of 
co-operative leaders in the process of lobbying and co-construction of policy has been important 
in developing the co-operative movement (Adeler, 2009; Axworthy & Perry, 1988; Fairbairn et 
al.,1993; Laycock, 1987; Loxley & Simpson, 2007; Vaillancourt, 2008). Whereas traditional 
public policy commentary sees the process as linear, objective, and neutral,  others point to the 
evidence that policy makers tend to favour certain private interests and social groups more than 
others, rendering the policy-making process far from values-free (Schneider & Ingram, 2008; 
Vaillancourt, 2008, p. 25). For that reason, this study follows Polanyi’s (1957) framework, which 
argues that economic rationality is embedded in and subordinated to the social relations within 
which the economic realm rests. Development is not reduced to the economic determinations of 
the market (and its failures) as a dominant feature of social life as the economic represents but 
one of the factors of the social realm. By recognizing the social, economic, political, legal, and 
cultural processes of co-op development, this dissertation understands policy not as separate 
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from the agency of social actors but as produced by the processes within which the actors play a 
part. In this way, policy results from the social, economic, political, and cultural processes within 
which social actors or policy makers participate, shaping and being shaped by those processes.   
 
The literature review establishes the logic of the research focus on co-operative development, 
and the role of public policy and legislation in particular, a focus that leads to the following 
research questions:  
 
 What are the various factors that contribute to the development of the co-operative 
sector? 
 What role does technical assistance and education play in assisting co-op development? 
 What are the impacts of public policy on co-op development? 
 What are the socio-cultural and economic factors that encourage innovative policy and 
support co-op development? 
 What financing mechanisms enable co-operative development? How?  
 What role does organizational infrastructure play in supporting co-operative 
development? 
 
Although these development components listed in the research questions are crucial, they will be 
studied here to a minor extent and in relation to  the institutional frameworks long overlooked by 
the co-op development literature. The cracks or fissures in institutional frameworks both open 
possibilities and reproduce contradictions as co-operatives seek change. This focus leads to the 
central research question of this study:  
 
 What are the impacts of institutional frameworks and their contradictions on co-operative 
development?  
 
This research requires a multi-lingual, intercontinental, cross-cultural, comparative and 
interdisciplinary approach. Studying within these frames diverse co-operative development 
systems in different countries is crucial to share lessons learned with Canadian audiences.  
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In methodological terms, one of the author's strengths is her capacity to work across linguistic, 
cultural, and legal boundaries to engage with and understand practices in Spain and link that 
learning to Canadian opportunities and challenges. In this way, this study addresses the 
significant geographical, linguistic, cultural, political, and legal barriers that separate Canada 
from other places and the potential to learn across our differences. Similarly, the legal and 
business training of the author of this dissertation has taken her from a highly technical, positivist 
training in law and business to the interdisciplinary, comparative, and critical re-understanding of 
public policy and legislation.  
 
2.2 Epistemology 
 
An important part of any research project is to reflect on its purposes (and questions) and the 
justification of choices of methodology and methods. Such justification entails sharing explicitly 
assumptions about reality and the researcher’s relation to it—and hence about our 
epistemological and theoretical perspectives. How does the researcher understand knowledge 
and how we come to know and understand what we do? Why should readers take the research 
seriously? (Crotty, 1998). 
   
Social Constructionism: This research commits to study social phenomena from a constructionist 
perspective. As individuals interact, making meaning for themselves and the world surrounding 
them, there is no single regime of “truth,” but rather multiple ones (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005, p. 
189). In reacting to a positivist paradigm that takes for granted only one universal and objective 
truth, social constructionism teaches us to see the world in different colours, and engages in self-
reflective, critical consciousness of co-produced empirical realities. For positivism, truth is 
objective, neutral, impartial, and awaits discovery as it is taken to be independent of the observer 
who does not assign meaning to the object of study since its meaning exists a priori, and is 
independent of any consciousness of it (Crotty, 1998). Positivism privileges science and views 
social and human disciplines as not truly scientific because their objects of study are not 
objective and empirically verifiable but subjective, unverifiable and values-based (Crotty, 1998). 
In this way, positivism claims to uphold an absolute truth and pursues a "values-neutral" 
approach to science (Crotty, 1998, p. 27).  
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However, social constructionism challenges this view arguing that the observer is not a passive 
component absorbing the truth already existing in the object of study but rather an active 
participant engaging in the process of constructing meaning of it, and hence, creating the reality 
a posteriori (Weinberg, 2008). The search for "universal truths" in which the positivist scientist 
engages can be "harmful" because it acts to reify things that are, perhaps, only mere observations 
and to convert them into universal concepts of the social life, but those definitions are not 
inevitable, should be questioned and, perhaps, even changed (Weinberg, 2008, p. 15). Indeed, 
studying co-operatives, their development and public policies, calls for a constructionist 
epistemology because those phenomena are part of the social world; their truths are not absolute 
and universal but ever changing and subject to diverse interpretations. Weinberg (2008) argues 
that "social constructionist researchers can benefit from a more sustained consideration of the 
intellectual legitimacy and/or social value of our own research as such," which would involve not 
pursuing objective truths as positivists do, but rather engaging in conscious critical approaches to 
deconstruct and unmask the claims of objectivity and of mainstream disciplines (p. 15). This 
critical stance of social constructionist researchers has shaped the "intellectual identity" of their 
critical constructionist work creating a necessary role for them in academic discussions 
(Weinberg, 2008). Social constructionist research acknowledges fallibility and the almost 
inevitable "embeddedness" of the researcher in certain socio-historical pasts, and by doing so, 
constructionism becomes critical and seeks to dialogue constructively with other intellectual 
disciplines to better understand the world (Weinberg, 2008, p. 35). An epistemology of the 
"ethics of truth," social constructionism exhorts us not to presume or desire objectivity but to 
acknowledge our values base, subjectivity and fallibility first, to then pursue change to make the 
world a better place (Weinberg, 2008, p. 35). Indeed, coming out of the critiques of their reality, 
the early Mondragon and North Italian co-op movements actively sought social, political, and 
economic change through the development of self-help, values-based and democratic 
organizations, which makes a non-positivist and social constructionist epistemology the 
appropriate approach to study them.  
 
Since social constructionism engages in conscious critical dialogues with academic disciplines 
(Weinberg, 2008), a critical interdisciplinary approach to research is best suited to deconstruct 
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and then reconstruct the traditional philosophical partitions between academic disciplines and do 
some justice to the  co-operative development phenomenon. The dual nature of co-operatives, 
combining an economic and a social dimension, is best understood using an interdisciplinary 
approach. In the words of Fairbairn (2007), conceptual, critical, or full interdisciplinarity “allows 
for conscious critiques of disciplines and of their forms of knowledge.”(p. 15). According to 
Fairbairn & Fulton (2000), "concepts are borrowed from the assembled disciplines to tackle a 
particular research topic in integrated rather than parallel fashion” (p. 5). In a traditional 
disciplinary approach, concepts and problems are defined within the frame of a particular 
discipline whereas an interdisciplinary research proposes to define the problem or the object of 
study outside the disciplines involved (Fairbairn & Fulton, 2000). Understanding 
interdisciplinarity as "a problem-based approach" or "an object-based approach" lets us bring 
different disciplines' knowledge and methods to examine a research object or to solve a problem 
of study (Fairbairn & Fulton, 2000, p. 4). As an interdisciplinary dissertation committed to a 
cohesive, holistic, and integrated piece of knowledge, this study intends to connect and integrate 
diverse disciplines, bridging theory and practice, while remaining committed to critical analyses 
of the disciplines and their entrenched frames. In this way, by acknowledging the role of the 
historical, the political, the social, the economic, and the cultural realms, this interdisciplinary 
study does not see co-op development as reducible to the economic determinations of the market, 
but rather places the co-op development and policy phenomena within the social, economic, 
political, and cultural processes within which they participate. Borrowing from a sociological 
approach, this dissertation acknowledges the “embeddedness” of the economic realm within 
social relations (Polanyi, 1957; Granovetter, 1985).  
 
A legal approach is necessary to disclose values and co-op development mechanisms embedded 
in the legislation. Although a legal positivist approach has produced some useful results, its 
frame of reference excludes the larger socio-cultural processes of which it is a part. An 
interdisciplinary and critical approach to the law understands policy and legislation not as 
separate from the agency of social actors, but as a result of the processes within which social 
actors shape the content and meaning of the letter of the law. A critical historical lens lets us 
place co-operative movements in their particular historical backgrounds and meaningful 
contexts.  
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The dual nature of co-operatives requires bringing into dialogue both economic and sociological 
analyses. Economics is important to understand specific dilemmas co-operatives face while 
competing in the market economy. Political Science can help unpack and deconstruct power 
relations behind the public policy domain that serve or hinder co-op development purposes. 
Finally, cultural studies, an interdisciplinary initiative that investigates the production, reception, 
and reproduction of institutions, practices, products, and processes (Hall, 1980), can unpack the 
influence of different cultures on policy makers, legislation, and innovative responses of co-
operative institutions. Indeed, only an interdisciplinary research approach can make sense of the 
complexity of the co-operative development phenomenon and the issues it faces.                          
 
Social constructionism plays a decisive role in “understanding how it is that public policy treats 
some people [and groups] so much better (or worse) than others” (Schneider & Ingram, 2008, p. 
189). The social constructionist approach has influenced the study and understanding of public 
policy because this epistemology focuses on "symbols, interpretation, and discourse" of policy 
(Schneider & Ingram, 2008, p. 190). Public policy reflects predominant social constructions of 
certain groups in society, usually of those in power. However, public policy can sometimes act as 
a vehicle for change of those predominant constructions, inverting the beneficiary groups in 
society. Groups can influence the policy making process to benefit themselves, and policy 
makers can tacitly state that the targeted population of the policy is deserving by assigning 
legislative value to it. Social constructions are captured, created, “used,” and “manipulated for 
political gain” in the policy making process as they participate in the dynamic process of change 
(pp. 207-208). Policies in place in various provinces or regions reflect that province or region's 
history, the policy making process, and echo social constructions of groups with political 
influence.  
 
The history of public policy and legislation studies followed a very strong positivist tradition as 
policy makers were convinced of the rationality, and objectivity of policy, designing policies to 
achieve certain stated goals by using scientific analysis (Schneider & Ingram, 2008). The policy 
making process was supposedly objective and neutral, and the conceptual laws were claimed to 
be perfect; thereby a positivist scientific method was applied to fill legal voids when laws could 
                                                
 48 
not cover all the existing and new real life situations. Concerned with the quest to discover what 
law is as opposed to what it ought to be, the positivist philosophy of law sees the normative 
essence of law coming from the commands of a sovereign power, which is rooted in the theory 
of Jeremy Bentham, the father of modern legal positivism (Campbell, 2004). Law is valid and 
enforceable because it is put forward by a sovereign power and not because it derives from a 
moral source (Capps, 2004). Legal positivists insisted that the legal realm is an abstraction 
completely separated from the moral world, thus treating law as devoid of ethics because law 
exists independent of its merits or demerits (Conklin, 2001). Therefore, substantive law is not 
connected to morality or ethics, which, some critics argue, leads to abuse of power by judges 
who may be following their own clouded personal or political views of the public interest 
perhaps "unaware of the political contestability of their social and economic assumptions," thus 
perpetuating class dominance (Campbell, 2004, p. 69). This separation of the legal and the moral 
worlds actually created a disconnection between the two realms and led to extensive criticism on 
the morality of applying substantive law that may not be ethical, and, thus, may create social 
injustice or inequality (Campbell, 2004).  
 
Although still a predominant theory in Anglophone countries, legal positivism has been heavily 
criticized for its potential to disguise unjust power relations behind the mask of objectivity as the 
jurists and judges too often have represented the interests of "privileged men" instead of 
including gender, ethnic, and other minorities in the laws and their application (Conklin, 2001, p. 
3). Based on these critiques, policy and legislation are not objective, neutral, and perfect 
abstractions, free of biases and prejudices, and completely devoid of humanity and ethics. This 
research complements the positivist view of policy and legislation with the analysis of the legal 
realm as part of the socio-cultural, economic, political and historical processes the legislator is 
engaged in, recognizing policy’s embeddedness (Polanyi, 1957; Granovetter, 1985).  
 
Co-operatives are social constructions based on inter-subjectivity; a reality that is created and 
shaped by the members in everyday life experiences through a social, economic, political, and 
cultural process that enables people to meet common needs and aspirations. In pursuing certain 
co-operative development strategies over others, the co-operative movement reveals its own 
socially constructed set of values. Using the social constructionist epistemology will help us to 
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unpack and understand the discourses deployed by the movements and, possibly, answer 
questions about what co-operative development mechanisms were most critical and how 
movement actors undertook co-op development in an effective manner. A reflective and critical 
view will assist us in making sense of the reasons that led policy makers and the co-operative 
movement to pursue co-op formation and development in a specific way and at a particular time 
in a certain country or region. Social constructionism is the appropriate epistemology to study 
this inter-subjective co-operative phenomenon as it derives knowledge from human 
understanding, social experience, and conventions. In contrast to a traditional objectivist view, 
this research understands policy in a constructionist and critical manner, exploring how policy 
both reflects and is reflected in its socio-cultural environment. 
 
2.3 Theoretical Perspective 
 
Elaborating a theoretical position is a matter of spelling out our perspective on the social world 
and grounding our assumptions about language, communication, and individual and community 
identity (Crotty, 1998). 
 
Critical Theory, Critical Legal studies, and Cultural Studies: Critical Theory, and critical legal 
studies with an emphasis on cultural studies, will be the theoretical lens of this research. There 
are multiple critical theories as this current line of thought is continuously evolving, adapting to 
new times, re-conceptualizing itself, and remaining open to disagreements (Kincheloe & 
McLaren, 2005). Despite the difficulties in conceptualizing critical theory, constructions such as 
power, class, freedom, equality, independence and justice lie at the core of this theory. Critical 
researchers claim that societies in the West are not “unproblematically democratic and free,” 
because individuals get subtly accustomed to living in “domination” and submissiveness rather 
than “equality and independence” (p. 303).  Questioning economic determinism, this posture 
proposes the production of practical and cultural knowledge, and deconstructs power relations 
that are socially and historically constructed in action.  
 
Economic determinism holds the supremacy of the economic structure over politics; thus social 
and political change, and the course of history are determined by economic forces of supply and 
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demand, and therefore, subject to the dictates of economic relations (Restakis, 2010). However, 
critical theory challenges this view arguing that it misses the fact that economic rationality is 
“embedded” within social relationships and is thus subordinated to the social realm (Polanyi, 
1957; Kincheloe & McLaren, 2005). Adam Smith (1801) held that the individual desire to 
improve one’s condition in life would lead the economy to prosper with foods, products, and 
employment available to everyone, because farmers, labourers and business people would 
benefit the economy and society by striving for their own wealth. In their pursuit of 
accumulation of richness, farmers, for example, would sell some of their crops to others and 
would hire workers to produce more food, leading to some people having jobs and the many 
having plenty of food (Smith, 1801). Thus, those individual efforts of rational individual actors 
are the invisible hand that turns self-guided gain into social and economic benefits for everyone, 
according to Smith (1801). However, he assumed that "as people became wealthier, they would 
reach out to help the less fortunate in the community", which has not necessarily happened 
because self-centred gain does not protect the public interest (Nickels, McHugh, McHugh, Cossa 
& Sproule, 2010, p. 47). Smith is often interpreted only selectively to confirm the view of 
economic rationality. He was not, however, a laissez-faire economist but a professor of moral 
philosophy, and more interested in ethics and the justice needed to balance self-interest: 
“Society, however, cannot subsist among those who are at all times ready to hurt and injure one 
another” (Smith, 1759, p. 147). He also warned in the Wealth of Nations that because managers 
could not be trusted to steward “other people’s money, . . . negligence, profusion and 
malversation” would inevitably result within corporations (Smith, 1801, p. 259,264). Critical 
theory challenges the consequences of economic determinism in that it causes inequalities, social 
injustice, widens the gap between the rich and the poor, and accentuates class differences, and by 
doing so critical theory proposes to deconstruct constructions such as class, power, and freedom. 
 
As opposed to legal positivism, critical legal studies (CLS) is a legal school of thought born out 
of American legal realism, and a consequence of the critical social movements of the 1960s and 
1970s in the U.S, namely the civil rights movement, the women's movement, and the anti-war 
movement (Engle, 2010). Legal realism was sparked by the "failure of capitalism" experienced 
in the great depression of the 1930s; thus it denounced the cyclical crises of capitalism, and 
challenged mass unemployment and the social upheaval caused by it (Engle, 2010, p. 276). 
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Following that line of thought, critical legal studies questioned the economic status quo, 
capitalism, for it seems to encourage "wars for profit" as happened with the Vietnam war rooted 
in the pursuit of raw materials, i.e. oil and rubber, according to Engle (2010, p. 276). Picking up 
where legal realism left off, CLS started as an attempt to demystify the positivistic legal myths or 
determinations created by mainstream Western legal thought, myths such as the complete 
separation of law and politics, the absolute objectivity of the law, the abstraction of the legal 
realm and its claims of disconnection from morality, and the autonomy of the individual (Engle, 
2010).  
 
This CLS school of thought views laws as arbitrary because they perpetuate class differences; 
therefore, it questions policy makers, legislators, lawyers, and judges for "failing to understand 
the social and political content of law, its reflection of inequalities, and its potential for injustice" 
(Goodrich, Douzinas & Hachamovitch, 1994, p. 4). While the law claims to hold individuals 
equally, they are, in reality, not free and autonomous actors because they are determined by the 
social and political environment around them which limits their choices and determines their 
circumstances (Goodrich, Douzinas & Hachamovitch, 1994). By linking the reason of law to the 
politics of the legal institution, critical legal theory exposes the connections between law and 
politics, both of which are interconnected and embedded in the social world and participate in the 
construction of the social realm (Goodrich, Douzinas & Hachamovitch, 1994). Although 
reminiscent of the ideology of the European critical theory, specially the Frankfurt School and its 
proponents, no formal linkage has been established between that school of thought and critical 
legal theory (Bauman, 2002). Critical legal studies scholars intend to unveil the underlying 
assumptions in the legal text and in the legal institutions to expose their ideological content and 
the ways that current legal structures stall social and political progress (Bauman, 2002). This 
philosophy of law proposed emancipatory, critical, and self-reflective analyses of the legal status 
quo to achieve "radical legal" and social change (Bauman, 2002, p. 4). By exploring how "legal 
consciousness," the beliefs and assumptions responsible for shaping the law and its institutions, 
is created, defined, reproduced and changed, it is possible to unravel the often hidden process of 
development, interpretation, and application of the law as it is determined by the "mind-set of the 
participants in the legal process" (Bauman, 2002, p. 45). In this way, law becomes an instrument 
to aid certain economic arrangements, thus legitimating questionable economic and political 
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forms of domination from which people could get liberated if they critically questioned the status 
quo (Bauman, 2002). Once citizens become aware of the dominant "consciousness," they can 
choose between maintaining that consciousness or, as critical legal proponents hope, breaking 
with it to pursue social transformation (Bauman, 2002, p. 45).  
 
Research on cultural studies emphasizes critical historical, political, economic and cultural 
discourses considering how lived experiences are the consequences of structures that are a legacy 
of the past (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005). For Stuart Hall (1980), culture is not to be observed or 
studied passively, but it is a "critical site of social action and intervention, where power relations 
are both established and potentially unsettled" (Procter, 2004, p. 1). People are producers and 
consumers of culture, and for that reason, culture and language operate within a framework of 
power, institutions, and politics that views culture as the space at which every day struggles 
between dominant and subordinate groups in society happen (Procter, 2004; Hall, 1980). In this 
sense, Hall (1980) takes the Gramscian concept of "hegemony" referring to domination through 
consent and coercion whereby power is negotiated between dominant and subordinate classes as 
"members of a class are able to persuade other classes that they share the same class interests" in 
order to gain and maintain power (Davis, 2004, p. 46). The power of hegemonic groups may be 
present in laws, regulations, social norms, customs, etc, and may not be highly visible but rather 
subtle, taken for granted, and thus accepted as natural (van Dijk, 2003). In this scenario, 
domination occurs through ideology and discourse, and culture acts as a vehicle to consent (or 
not) to the dominant power, and eventually to resist it as well. For instance, the way that media 
consistently reinforce the status quo reveals a class struggle in a "dialectical relationship" that 
allows the dominant class "to maintain power while apparently giving the people exactly what 
they want" (Davis, 2004, p. 47). 
 
 Grounded in critical theory, cultural studies is an interdisciplinary approach that analyzes how 
meaning is created, disseminated, and reproduced through cultural practices, beliefs, institutions, 
and political, economic, or social structures (Hall, 1980). Cultural studies concerns itself with the 
study of the meaning people attribute to certain objects, practices or phenomena, as, for example, 
the study of recent local and global resistance movements opposing capitalist hegemony. In the 
same way, using a cultural studies lens lets us study the early co-operative movement of Spain to 
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discover how meaning was created and reproduced through social, political, and economic 
institutions to express resistance, or consent, to dominant power structures. 
 
By studying the co-operative movement, this dissertation explores the influence of such 
institutions on politics, since institutions "shape actors' identities, power and strategies" (Putnam, 
1994, p. 8). In turn, "institutions are shaped by history," for "individuals do not choose them 
under circumstances of their own making," and individuals' "choices in turn influence the rules 
within which their successors choose" later on (p. 8). The way institutions act and respond to 
change and challenges "is shaped by the social context within which they operate" (p. 8). An 
example of this phenomenon is the British "Westminster-style" constitution imposed on imperial 
colonies, which yielded very different outcomes in different parts of the world (Putnam, 1994, p. 
8). Or the case of the Italian regional governments created in 1970s that produced very different 
outcomes for similar organizational structures, because institutional trajectories and performance 
were shaped by their different local socio-cultural environments in every region (Putnam, 1994). 
Cultural studies let us discover and deconstruct the trajectory of the policy making process and 
the role institutions play in it, shaping and being shaped by it. As well, public policy is, to some 
extent, the result of the interplay of determining historical, political, social and economic 
components. And those factors profoundly condition the effectiveness of public policy in its 
application. 
 
Co-operatives are fundamentally linked to efforts to reduce socio-economic inequality in society 
and they are capable of providing an "alternative" economic model to "humanize" the current 
economic system (Craig, 1993; Restakis, 2010, p. 3). Democratic decision-making, collective 
ownership of the means of production, empowerment of ordinary people, and equal distribution 
of profits are central features of the co-operative model that captured the imagination of many 
communities around the world. In fact, the founders of the co-operative sector in Spain (as in 
Italy and elsewhere) were committed to social criticism, democracy, equality and the 
empowerment of individuals, and understood (or realized) that co-operatives were the type of 
organizations that that gave them the greatest control over their social and economic fates.  
Critical theory, critical legal studies, and cultural studies provide the tools for understanding how 
those co-operative movements in Spain grew so strongly, how they were able to influence the 
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social constructs of policy makers and achieve constitutional recognition, and all the subsequent 
regulations and policies that contributed to co-operative growth. As well, cultural studies provide 
the appropriate lens by which to place the co-op movement and its co-operative development 
strategies in a meaningful historical, socio-cultural, political and economic context.  
 
Institutional theory: Institutional theory helps keep visible the social constructions and 
discourses involved in creating, maintaining, and changing organizations and their behaviours, 
and in accessing understanding of strategic alternatives (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Greenwood, 
et al., 2008; Scott, 1995). The institutional logic is a matter of “the socially constructed, 
historical patterns of material practices, assumptions, values, beliefs, and rules by which 
individuals produce and reproduce their material subsistence, organize time and space, and 
provide meaning to their social reality” (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999, p. 804). It helps explain the 
micro and macro organizational processes and constructions.  If an organization is to legitimize 
an organizational form different from the dominant logic, it “involves modifying or displacing 
that logic in order to establish new legitimacy criteria” (Suddeby & Greenwood, 2005, p. 36).  
 
This theoretical perspective is crucial to study institutional frameworks and their influence on co-
operative development. This theory helps test how change in institutions happens and the role of 
people inside and outside organizations advocating for change and building legitimacy by 
establishing new discourses to the point where new goals and practices become the taken-for–
granted way organizations work.  This institutional theory aids in laying out the discursive 
strategies of institutional players (consciously and unconsciously) reshaping the logics and 
replacing the dominant economic lens with socio-cultural ones, for instance, that respond to 
different notions of responsibility to community.  Changes in both the broader environment and 
within groups create pressure for change as people try to make sense of the complexities and 
contradictions of emergent and other issues in their worlds. The taken-for-granted becomes more 
visible and thus contested by those with the resources to do so.  
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2.4 Methods 
 
Mixed methods: The literature review is complemented by document analysis and semi-
structured interviews. The existing literature is limited in two important ways. First, it is far from 
extensive or comprehensive. Second, it often perpetuates positivistic views of the policy and 
other environments traditionally taken for granted without a sufficiently critical reading of the 
policy and other sources. By contrast, this dissertation follows a social constructionist 
epistemology and a theoretical framework informed by critical legal theory, institutional theory, 
and cultural studies; all of which complement and even challenge the positivistic view, arguing 
that the observer does not passively absorb truths already existing in the object of study but 
rather actively participates in the process of constructing meaning, and, hence, creating the 
reality a posteriori (Weinberg, 2008). The interdisciplinary, comparative, and critical re-reading 
of the co-operative movement will fill a gap in the research literature, which insufficiently 
understood, persistently undervalued, or even rendered co-operatives invisible in mainstream 
institutions.  
 
For this reason, this research invests in critical document analysis including organizational 
literature, legislation, federal and provincial legislation, and the annual reports of co-operatives. 
Often constructionist critical researchers share a commitment to “documenting how some aspect 
of reality is constructed through the efforts of social actors” (Linders, 2008, p. 468). Although 
the literature is rather scarce, the fact that the author studied law in Spain and Argentina is 
helpful. The author is able to understand and interpret policy and legislation within the civil law 
tradition. In methodological terms, working across linguistic, cultural, and legal boundaries to 
engage with and understand practices in Spain serves as an aid to counter the geographical, 
linguistic, cultural, political and legal barriers that separate Canada from other places. This is a 
major contribution of this dissertation in both complementing and complicating the positivist 
literature in the field and bringing into dialogue the literature and public policies of the different 
jurisdictions, regions, and nations that are not well known to one another due to geographical, 
linguistic, cultural, political and legal divides .  
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Semi-structured interviews with co-operative leaders, practitioners, and policy-makers are 
necessary in order to complement the literature and fill in gaps in the archive and in 
understanding of processes and outcomes. Interviews allow the researcher to access a part of 
reality that otherwise would not be available “such as people’s subjective experiences and 
attitudes” (Perakyla, 2008, p. 869). Key informant interviews, using an indirect snowball 
technique, helped complement the written data and provide more comprehensive insight into 
what have been the most effective co-op development strategies. Consistent with indirect 
snowball sampling techniques, participants were encouraged to pass along researcher contact 
information to other potential participants rather than passing their contact information along 
directly to the researcher. Participant observation, such as attending meetings and other 
community events, was useful in understanding the way organizations work. The interview 
questionnaire used is in Appendix 1. The consent forms in Appendices 2 and 3 were used to 
gather informed consent from interview participants and the Transcript Release Form was used 
to help ensure that when attributed quotations are to be used, participants approve the transcribed 
version of data they provided (Appendix 4).  
 
The key informants in the research are the co-operative leaders, practitioners, and academics in 
compared settings. This Question Template provides the content for semi-structured interviews, 
with the researcher adding questions as required and letting interviewees expand the responses as 
necessary.  Interviewees were asked to share their experiences and visions on the factors that 
encouraged the development of their co-operative organizations with an emphasis on the policy 
contexts, and to identify documents that should be consulted to confirm (or not) their perceptions 
(Linders, 2008). The questions were intended to guide the participants and to generate thoughtful 
responses. In some cases, depending on the nature of the response, the discussion went outside 
the expected scope of the interview. The respondents were allowed, even encouraged, to tell the 
stories they thought most important. It has to be noted that the views, perceptions, and comments 
of the Mondragon (and Manitoba) interviewees, are personal and subjective, though no less 
meaningful and valuable for this study. 
 
Eight interviews in the Basque region (Spain) were done in Spanish, as that was the most 
familiar language of the interviewees. Since that is also the author’s mother tongue, interviews 
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were easily translated into English. The interviewees in Mondragon belonged to co-operative 
apex organizations, such as the Mondragon Co-operative Corporation (MCC), and the Executive 
Council of Co-operatives of the Basque Country, the highest public organ to advise Basque 
public authorities on all matters affecting co-operatives, as well as legal experts, academics of 
the Mondragon University, and a co-operative founder. 
  
Building on the author’s previous research experience, nearly 35 interviews were conducted by 
telephone, by email and in person. Key informants had been identified by the author of this 
dissertation for a previous research project in the Emilia-Romagna and Trentino regions of Italy, 
the Mondragon region of Spain, and Manitoba. Although anonymity and confidentiality was 
assured to all of the interviewees, those from Mondragon have chosen not to remain anonymous. 
For that reason, many of the interviewees in this dissertation are identified by their actual name 
and title, and their opinions quoted to preserve accuracy of their thoughts and views. Canadian 
interviewees preferred to remain anonymous. In those cases, positions are used, such as a 
government spokesperson, a co-operative manager, a co-operative board member, and a co-
operative founder.   
 
2.4.1 A personal reflection note on methodology 
 
The process of developing this dissertation has been a major intellectual undertaking. Having 
been trained in traditionally empiricist disciplines such as law and business, interdisciplinary 
practices were unknown to me, and entailed a discovery as they opened up a new world of 
critical self-reflection and analysis to approach and complement positivistic subjects. Precisely, 
as "discourses constitute perceptual lenses through which realities are understood," dominant 
legal and business discourses offer a limited perception of reality (Findlay, 2002). 
Interdisciplinary studies guided me to understand that there are other realities outside set 
frameworks that question the legitimacy of the dominant by "demystifying prevailing 
orthodoxies" (Findlay, 2002). Doing critical and comparative research has allowed me to pursue 
depth and academic rigour to study multiple disciplines as I never did before.  
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At the personal level, my relationship with Brendan Reimer, a key community economic 
development figure in the Manitoba CED and co-op scene, opened up doors for me to get 
immersed in the co-operative sector of the province. That facilitated my personal development 
and growth as I worked as a research intern developing the novel co-operative development tax 
credit for the Manitoba co-op sector. In that context of self-immersion in the Manitoba co-op 
scene, studying the development of the Mondragon group gave me the critical distance to 
analyze and reflect more rigorously on how and why institutional change was possible. In this 
way, by "making visible the invisible" (Findlay, 2002), the interdisciplinary, critical and 
comparative approach has allowed me to reflect on the process of institutional change in the co-
op sector in Manitoba.  
 
2.5 Conclusion 
 
By reflecting on the research purposes, questions, and the choices of epistemology, theory, 
methodology and methods, this chapter establishes an interdisciplinary and critical theoretical 
framework for the dissertation. Co-operatives, their development and public policies, are part of 
the social realm requiring a constructionist epistemology to make sense of them. Studying public 
policies and legislation requires a CLS approach to understand them as a consequence of social, 
economic, political and historical factors that shape them, that  participate in the creation, 
interpretation and application of laws, and reinforce constructions such as class, power, freedom 
(Goodrich, Douzinas & Hachamovitch, 1994). This theory helps test how change happens and 
the role of people inside and outside organizations advocating for change and building 
legitimacy by establishing new discourses to the point where new goals and practices become the 
taken-for–granted way organizations work.  This institutional theory aids in laying out the 
discursive strategies of institutional players (consciously and unconsciously) reshaping the logics 
and replacing the dominant economic lens with socio-cultural ones, for instance, that respond to 
different notions of responsibility to community.  Changes in both the broader environment and 
within groups create pressure for change as people try to make sense of the complexities and 
achieve change. 
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Along those lines, institutional theory will help this study to test how change happens in the 
external environment and within organizations to modify the internal logic of institutions 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1991). Using institutional theory to study the role of social actors to seek 
change within organizations and institutional frameworks will aid this research to understand the 
evolution of co-operatives as they adapt to the external environment, shedding light on the co-
operative development process in Mondragon and Manitoba. Finally, mixed methods, including 
literature review and a critical reading of literature and policy, are complemented with semi-
structured interviews with co-operative leaders, practitioners, and policy-makers to fill the gaps 
in the literature. 
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CHAPTER III. CO-OPERATIVE DEVELOPMENT OF MONDRAGON IN THE 
BASQUE REGION (SPAIN)  
 
The literature review established a gap in understanding of co-operative development with a 
particular emphasis on the role of public policy and legislation in the development of the co-
operative movement. Drawing on a social constructionist epistemology, critical legal theory, 
cultural studies, and institutional theory to set an interdisciplinary and critical theoretical 
framework, this chapter (and the larger dissertation) uncovers the socio-cultural factors 
associated with the development path of the co-operative movement and its meanings assigned in 
legal and other discourse. This chapter traces how discourses produce meanings that help or 
hinder co-operative development, and how dominant meanings compare with meanings assigned 
by members. 
 
Within this framework, this chapter traces the historical, political, economic and socio-cultural 
production of the co-op movement in the Basque country up until ULGOR, the first Mondragon 
worker co-op, was created in 1959. Mixed methods, including literature review and a critical 
reading of literature and policy, are complemented by semi-structured interviews with 
Mondragon co-operative leaders, practitioners, and policy experts to aid the understanding of the 
emergence of the development path. How and why Mondragon emerged as it did and what 
lessons we can learn from the particular convergences of structural factors and the initiatives of 
social actors will be discussed in this chapter. While chapter III analyzes the external 
environment and conditions that led to the creation of ULGOR in 1956 (as a worker co-operative 
in 1959), chapter IV picks up the story and elaborates in detail the internal particularities of 
Mondragon development that helped reshape that external environment, the key role of Caja 
Laboral Popular (the credit union) and other co-op support organizations, financing mechanisms, 
as well as Spanish and Basque legislation and policy development. The strategic co-op 
development choices social actors made and the institutions they created given the external 
historical, social, political, and economic conditions will be studied in chapter IV. Although the 
dominant emphases of the chapters are respectively the external and internal factors, it is 
important to acknowledge that those external and internal factors are not discrete realms but are 
systematically connected and mutually shaped.  
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3.1 Historical context: Role of the Spanish dictatorship and socio-economic depression 
 
To understand what the Mondragon Group is and how co-operative development unfolded, we 
must first understand the historical context of the co-operative complex and the socio-cultural, 
economic, legal, and political conditions that caused social actors to seek a different destiny, one 
that nurtured co-op development and policies in the Basque region and led to the current 
situation where the co-operative model is now deeply ingrained in all aspects of Basque life and 
culture. The region is home to a total population of 2,162,944 in three provinces (Alava, Bizkaia, 
and Gipuzkoa) within a larger population of 42 million, according to the official government 
statistics published by the Basque Institute of Statistics (Eustat, 2010).  Supporting over 1,800 
co-operatives (see Table 3.1), people shop in co-operative supermarkets, offering products from 
agricultural and manufacturing co-ops; make travel arrangements in co-op travel agencies; send 
their children to co-op kindergartens, elementary, and secondary schools; prepare for the work 
life in a co-op technical college or university; and satisfy their banking needs at the local credit 
union (Mathews, 1999).   
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Table 3.1 Number and Type of Co-operatives in the Basque Country 
 
TYPE Total Alava  
Province 
Bizkaia 
Province 
Gipuzkoa 
Province 
Agricultural Co-ops 97 49 24 24 
Co-op Groups 1 1   
Consumer 34 4 16 14 
Co-op Corporations 1   1 
Credit co-ops or credit unions 1  1  
Second tier and further 48 10 12 26 
School co-ops (all levels) 94 11 44 39 
Communal exploitation of land 6 2 2 2 
Mixed co-ops 27 4 3 20 
Business Services Co-ops 36 5 8 23 
Professional Services Co-ops 45 7 22 16 
Worker co-ops 1072 147 464 461 
Housing co-ops 251 106 74 71 
Small-sized worker co-ops 92 13 44 35 
TOTAL 1805 359 714 732 
 
Source: Executive Council of Co-operatives of the Basque Country Annual Report (2009, p. 35). 
  
If the co-operative model is now at the heart of their quality of life, the Basques had to go 
through a lengthy and turbulent process to achieve that quality of life in a stable political 
environment and relatively prosperous regional economy. In fact, the history of Spain in the 20
th
 
century was plagued by political, social, and economic upheavals and monarchic crises. King 
Alfonso XIII held power precariously as popular support gradually decreased in the first two 
decades of the 20th century. Constant social, political, and military unrest was, in part, a 
consequence of military discontent, and a grassroots socialist movement threatening to 
overthrow the monarchy. An important part of the historical context is the existence of socialist 
elements opposing the monarchic system and the strong power conferred on the military. The 
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socialist movement mobilized people in common cause in ways that recall the convergence of 
movements (for instance, women and labour resisting socio-economic, educational, and political 
exclusion) in the nineteenth century that gave rise to the co-op movement in England. This 
resistance to the monarchy and the military precipitated a movement consciousness around 
structural barriers and the need for a system that better represented popular needs and ambitions 
of the Basques. That socialist popular movement gave rise to a series of democratically elected 
municipal governments in 1931, fruit of "the spread of republican and anti-monarchist 
sentiments in Spain", and military pressure led Alfonso XIII to flee the country and seek exile 
abroad (Forrest, 2000, p. 7). According to Preston (2006), "the attitude of the military reflected 
the hope of a significant section of the upper classes that, by sacrificing the King, it would be 
possible to contain the desires for change of both the progressive bourgeoisie and the left" (p. 
36). However, that desire did not materialize because the Republican Popular Front, which 
enjoyed the support of most of the parties of the left and was opposed by the parties of the right 
and the centre, was brought to power in the elections of February 1936 (Forrest, 2000). The 
country was deeply divided. The right represented most of the military, the Church, upper class 
businessmen, bankers, and landowners, while the left was represented by the Republicans 
supported by agricultural and urban workers, most of the educated middle class, and many 
intellectuals.  
 
Although elected by popular vote, the Republican government was not easily accepted by the 
right. In July 1936, a military uprising led by General Francisco Franco unleashed a three-year 
civil war leaving the country socially and economically devastated. Across Spain the working 
class took arms to keep the elected Republican government in power and fought against the 
Nationalist forces but the Republicans were brutally overpowered. General Franco leading the 
Nationalist forces and the fascist Phalanx or “Falange,” defeated the Republicans who stood for 
democratic values and proposed a republic respecting regional self-determination and local 
autonomies (Mathews, 1999). There is no absolute certainty regarding the human cost of the civil 
war. One account of the casualties mentions at least 50,000 executions during the civil war 
whereas more recent estimates are around 500,000 including executions and deaths in 
concentration camps, not considering deaths by malnutrition, starvation, and war-engendered 
diseases (Roberts, 2006).  
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The Spanish Civil War precipitated the onset of World War II and acted as a mirror of the 
confrontation between the “progressive and democratic forces of Spain” and the “evil of the 
time,” fascism, Nazism, and right-wing ideologies that did not want the liberal and progressive 
policies established by the Spanish Republican government, according to Johns Hopkins 
University political science and public policy scholar, Vicente Navarro (2006, p. 1). Both 
opposing groups in the civil war, the Nationalist forces and the Republicans, counted on 
international assistance. Hitler’s and Mussolini’s troops, tanks, and equipment assisted General 
Francisco Franco in the fascist coup and subsequent civil war whereas the Soviet Union and 
Mexico contributed with supplies to the Republicans (Navarro, 2006). International support for 
the regime and the opposing groups is also noted throughout Franco's dictatorship after the civil 
war ended (1939). The Spanish Republican forces collaborated with the allies in defeating the 
Nazis in Europe; for instance, "the first battalion to liberate Paris in 1945 consisted of Spanish 
republicans." Naturally they hoped that at the end of World War II, the allies would aid in 
overpowering one of Hitler's ideological collaborators in Europe, the Franco regime, but those 
hopes proved to be in vain (Navarro, 2007, p. 1).  
 
The end of World War II, however, left the U.S. positioned as the victorious international leader 
in need of strategic military bases abroad. Spain was one of the countries that provided the U.S. 
with that possibility as Franco’s anticommunist position was viewed positively by the American 
government (Navarro, 2007). After the war, Navarro (2006) explains, “the U.S. and the Vatican 
became the major supporters of the dictatorship" (p. 1). Not that Franco had changed his long 
pro-Hitler stance, but in the aftermath of World War II, he desperately needed international 
acceptance for his dictatorial regime and was willing to please the allies to “make them forget his 
support for Hitler” (Navarro, 2007, p. 1). And so six American military bases were established in 
Spain, according to a 1945 Pentagon study (Navarro, 2007). The Franco dictatorship was one of 
the “most hated” in Europe for its brutality and cruelty, yet the Truman administration gave 
Franco the acceptance he needed when Eisenhower visited Spain to give that regime 
international recognition (Navarro, 2007, p. 1). The U.S. even proposed that the Franco regime 
join NATO, but the European allies rejected the proposal (Navarro, 2007). 
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Nationalist forces opposed reforms such as “women’s suffrage, land reform, expansion of labor 
union rights, and establishment of the public school system” that eliminated religious content of 
programs as well as suspending government subsidies to the Catholic Church, among others 
(Navarro, 2006, p. 1; Torres Gutierrez, 2002). The elite affected by those reforms, "the Church, 
large landowners, banking interests, and large employers,” supported the military (Navarro, 
2006, p. 1). The rights of women acknowledged by the Republican constitution of 1931 were 
annulled. Women could not become university professors or judges, testify at trial, or manage 
their own property (which was the domain of their husbands or fathers).  Franco restored the 
privileges that the Catholic Church had before the Republican government and that were 
abolished by the constitution of 1931 during the Second Republic. The Concordat of 1953 
established state salaries for Catholic priests, a special tax regime for the Catholic Church, and 
made Catholic marriage “compulsory for all baptized citizens”; “divorce was outlawed, and all 
books, magazines and newspapers were censored by the Catholic Church” (Torres Gutierrez, 
2002, p. 1). The Concordat also gave to the Catholic Church control over “the cinema, television, 
and radio industries, and all the educational system” (Torres Gutierrez, 2002, p. 1). 
 
As explained in chapter II, public policy and legislation reflect predominant social constructions 
of powerful groups in society (Schneider & Ingram, 2008). Such a pattern is observed in Franco's 
legal changes. That Franco controlled the media and educational system added to the capacity to 
naturalize the underlying assumptions in Franco's legal reforms and in the legal institutions, 
masking elite interests and their ideological content as those legal structures became an 
instrument to legitimate questionable economic and political forms of domination (Bauman, 
2002). Critical legal studies, critical theory, and cultural studies let us unveil discourses of 
national unity (the vision of a Catholic Spain) or religious ethic (and specifically the redemptive 
qualities of hard work) that further rationalized and legitimized uneven development, involving 
privilege for some and disadvantage for others. Franco's speech on June 24, 1938, stated his 
vision for the motherland or “patria”; after the vision of a “Catholic Spain,” people were divided 
into “Spain” and “anti-Spain”, his allies (the military, the Church, large landowners, and the 
elite) and his opponents (the working class and the intellectuals) respectively (Richards, 1996, p. 
150). Popular opposition by those disadvantaged by the reforms, who felt the injustice and 
inequality, persisted throughout the years of the dictatorship.   
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The result of the civil war (1936-1939) was a dictatorship that lasted until 1975 and was 
characterized by oppression, massive killings, and denial of the Spanish regional nationalisms 
and local identities. Even a couple of months before Franco’s death in November 1975, he 
signed “execution orders for five of his political opponents” (Navarro, 2006, p. 1). Franco 
imposed a “policy of terror” with the purpose of spreading fear to deter resistance beginning with 
the military coup d'état, continuing in the civil war, extending throughout the years of his 
dictatorship (1939-1975), and reaching “genocidal proportions” (Navarro, 2006, p. 1). This 
political iron cage plus the socio-economic devastation of the country created the appropriate 
convergence of structural factors that led grassroots social actors to imagine and pursue a 
different destiny. As Foucault (1978) reminds us, domination breeds resistance and the 
possibility of self-transformation.  
 
Not only did Franco use incarceration, death, and concentration camps to stifle opposition, but he 
also applied unfair food rationing to an already severely impoverished population. The early 
years of the regime (1940s) are commonly known as the “Hunger Years” when thousands died of 
starvation, malnutrition and war-engendered diseases. The regime had control over the food 
distribution to the population through local authorities, who decided who was deserving (or not) 
of food based on political factors (Richards, 1996). Between 1939 and 1944, some accounts 
revealed approximately 200,000 deaths as a result of food scarcity and diseases on top of the war 
casualties (Richards, 1996, p. 161).  
 
Opponents of Franco’s rule and policies who had not died during the civil war saw their property 
confiscated, and had to flee the country or suffer incarceration, forced labour, execution, or death 
in concentration camps. Many lawyers, doctors, politicians, university professors, journalists, 
and skilled workers went into exile causing a brain drain to an already broken and devastated 
economy. Having most infrastructure destroyed in the civil war, and skilled labour mostly gone 
or assassinated, Franco imposed a policy of “autarky” or economic self-sufficiency for Spain 
which cut off almost all international trade (Richards, 1996, p.150). The economic isolation of 
Spain made sense in the light of the extreme nationalism he was pursuing, but it proved to have 
disastrous consequences for the country.  
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Autarkic economic policy and industrialization were pursued at the expense of the working class. 
Redemption through hard work, a Catholic notion, was the justification the regime used for the 
desired industrialization to take place on the shoulders of the peasants without the need for 
international trade or financing. For instance, depending on the area of the country, peasants’ 
wages were as little as 3 or 4 pesetas/day for men and 1.25 pesetas for women while the working 
day extended from 6:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m. (Richards, 1996). Cultural legitimation of oppression 
using religious arguments (sins committed against the regime had to be punished) was used to 
manufacture consent to domination and legitimize the exploitation of the working class to benefit 
the regime and its elite supporters (Richards, 1996). The peasantry had the responsibility to make 
economic development happen to redeem the sins committed against the regime during the civil 
war (Richards, 1996).  Large landowners and industrialists principally benefited from the official 
lowering of agricultural wages (Richards, 1996). Eventually, the exploitation paid for the 
financing of industrialization in the mid-late years of the regime as the country saw some 
economic recovery in 1960s. It was no coincidence that the main six banks in Spain were closely 
tied to agricultural investments, which saw significant profits achieved mainly through the 
exploitation of the peasantry (Richards, 1996). Collective sacrifice in the name of patriotism was 
unevenly applied since it mainly assisted the enrichment of the existing elite and the further 
correction and impoverishment of the working population. For example, Franco's speech on June 
24, 1938, stated that his ideal of “spiritual unity, social unity, and historic unity” for the 
motherland or “patria”, had to be achieved through “disciplin[ing]” its people (as cited in 
Richards, 1996, p. 150). 
 
3.1.1 Manufacturing consent to domination during the dictatorship years 
 
Domination and power occur through policy and law but also require support from cultural 
practices that legitimate and reinforce that domination (Gramsci, 1978; Herman & Chomsky, 
1988). The civil war and the dictatorship years were harsh on Spain. Government banned trade 
unions, associations of workers, and political parties such as the PSOE Socialist Party, the 
Esquerra Republicana of Catalunya or Leftist Republican of Catalonia, the Communist Party of 
Spain, and the Basque Nationalist Party. All this domination was rationalized in terms of 
Franco’s vision of Spanish national identity: a nationalist construction of Spain that proclaimed 
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unity at the expense of all dissenting voices. His speech on June 24, 1938, stated the essence of 
his ideal of “spiritual unity, social unity, and historic unity” for the motherland or “patria,” so 
that the nation was to be “remade” after the vision of a “Catholic Spain,” and its citizens 
“disciplined” (as cited in Richards, 1996, p. 150). Franco's discourse of Spanish identity as unity 
and tradition underpinned the social and political domination of his regime. By pursuing his iron 
unity, people were divided into “Spain” and “anti-Spain”, those for his regime and those who 
should be eliminated (Richards, 1996, p. 150). It was a “blending of Catholic and fascist” 
ideologies that led the reorganization of society under the patriotic, nationalist discourse that 
justified also economic domination by sacrificing and exploiting the working class to the benefit 
of the regime and major land owners (Richards, 1996, p. 156).  
 
Although the law and policy enforced the dominant ideology, speeches and cultural practices 
were needed to mask the force and encourage consent on the part of the people, as Gramscian 
(1978) hegemony makes clear. Culture is always needed to supplement and support the work of 
the law; culture is the space in which every day struggles between dominant and subordinate 
groups in society happen (Procter, 2004; Hall, 1980). The unwritten or unspoken cultural values 
embedded in legal and other systems and priorities become visible when groups confront 
inequality, injustice, and oppression. Although elite prestige ensured that elite views and values 
came across as common sense, as the only or natural order of things, such consent could not be 
assumed. In the contested terrain of social experience, Fiske (1992) reminds us, “Consent must 
be constantly won and rewon” to keep resistance and struggle in check (p. 291).  
 
National unity continued to be created, disseminated, and reproduced through cultural practices, 
beliefs, institutions, and political, economic, or social structures (Hall, 1980), as instruments of 
power for the Franco regime. From Andalusia (south Spain), flamenco and bullfights were 
promoted as the national tradition to enforce cultural unity while regional cultural difference was 
severely suppressed. Although several regions in Spain, such as Catalonia, the Basque Country, 
Galicia, Valencia, and Baleares, had their own language and culture, Castilian Spanish was the 
only language people were allowed to speak. All others were prohibited and eliminated from 
government and commercial documents, media, and school system. However, such nationalist 
attempts to impose “one nation, one people, one language” produced resistance (MacClancy, 
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1996, p. 207). Constructing a linguistic, cultural, and national unity appealed to Franco’s ideal of 
Spain. And yet, he unwittingly collaborated not in creating that cultural unity, but in originating 
“divisive conflict and plurality” while accentuating regional nationalist sentiments, for instance, 
the Basque terrorist group ETA (MacClancy, 1996, p. 207). Ironically, Franco himself came 
from Galicia, a region with its own language and culture different from the rest of Spain.  
 
In relation to regionalisms, the regime’s goal was to eradicate different identities, cultures, and 
languages that had sustained people and their traditions for centuries. The Basque Country’s, 
Catalonia’s, and, to a lesser degree, Galicia’s claims to self-determination, autonomy, freedom to 
speak their own language, to choose local and regional governments, and to celebrate their 
distinctive identity had no room in the dictator's plan. Franco’s speech on March 18, 1940, in 
Jaen (Andalusia) outlined his centralist nationalist framework: “the suffering of a nation at a 
particular point in history is no caprice; it is spiritual punishment, the punishment which God 
imposes over a distorted life, upon an unclean history . . . to develop a purified nation” (as cited 
in Richards, 1996, p. 153). He imposed the idea that only Andalusian and Castilian traditions 
were representative of the true essence of “Spanishness (or Hispanidad)” (Richards, 1996, p. 
151). All the other culturally different regions had to be “purified” and so they felt the iron 
repression through physical and ideological terror (p. 153). The nationalist discourse was an 
instrument for socio-economic and political domination. Despite Franco’s best efforts to further 
consolidate social power in text and talk (van Dijk, 2003), the singular construction of Spain 
failed to persuade a diverse Spanish population. The Basque and other regions developed, as a 
consequence, anarchist and syndicalist sentiments.  
 
3.2 Basque uniqueness and a culture of resistance 
 
Among the Spanish peoples, the Basques, particularly, are a different ethnic group that inhabited 
the region for millennia before the Roman and Visigoth invasions to the Iberian peninsula. Their 
language, Euskera, is today the only remaining “non-indo European language spoken in Western 
Europe” (MacClancy, 1996, p. 208).  According to German linguist Von Humboldt, Euskera 
may have been, or at least been connected to, Iberian, the ancient language of the peninsula 
spoken 2,500 years ago (MacClancy, 1996). However, that possibility may never be fully proved 
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since there is no present knowledge of the forms of Basque language 2,500 years ago although 
there might be some philological and phonological similarities between Iberian and Basque due 
to geographical closeness of the West Pyrenean Mountains (MacClancy, 1996, p. 208). Lack of 
scholars’ agreement on the certainty of the origin of the Basque language and ethnicity does not 
deny the fact that a group of people, perhaps defined as “proto-Basques,” have lived in the 
region, and preserved their language and culture for, at least, millennia until today (MacClancy, 
1993, as cited in MacClancy, 1996, p. 209). 
 
Following European anthropologists of the late nineteenth century, nationalisms were justified 
on racial grounds, and so Sabino Arana, the founder and leader of the Basque Nationalist Party 
concluded that the relative lack of “contamination” of the Basque language spoke to its pure race 
(MacClancy, 1996, p. 209-210). By early twentieth century other nationalists were more worried 
about the relative loss of the language since the Spanish government had established by late 
nineteenth century primary schools whose instruction programs were in Castilian Spanish 
(MacClancy, 1996). Afraid for their language, Basque authorities opened in 1920 the first 
“ikastolas” or “schools using Euskera as the primary medium of instruction” (MacClancy, 1996, 
p. 210). Such cultural revitalization was a key part of the Basque resistance movement much as 
the cultural renaissance of Aboriginal people in Canada supported their social, political, and 
economic resurgence from the late sixties (Battiste and Berman, 1995) .   
 
These attempts to preserve language and self-determination came to an end with the military 
coup of 1936 and the subsequent military regime. Until that moment, the Basque region enjoyed 
political and fiscal autonomy based on thirteenth- and fourteenth-century laws, which were 
recognized by the constitution of 1931 (Heidberg, 1989).The Basque government elected in 1936 
went into exile during the civil war, the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) hid underground, and 
the speaking of Euskera in public settings was forbidden and “brutally repressed” (MacClancy, 
1996, p. 210; Richards, 1996; Mathews, 1999). As a consequence of Franco’s oppression, 
anarchist sentiments flourished principally among the youth, who decided to form ETA (Euskadi 
ta askatasuna, “The Basque Country and Freedom”) in the early years of the dictatorship 
(MacClancy, 1996, p. 210). A cultural and humanist movement in the beginning (late 1950s), 
ETA turned into an armed, separatist, revolutionary, and terrorist organization. 
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Unlike the national Catholic Church, the Basque clergy together with the locals supported the 
republican forces against Franco in the outbreak of the civil war (1936). Nationalist sentiments 
and political motivation united the local church and the Basques to confront Franco’s legion 
(Mathews, 1999). Values such as “democracy, equality and social solidarity” were evident in the 
representative system of local, provincial, and regional government the Basques achieved under 
the Second Republic (1931-1936) (Mathews, 1999, p. 184). As committed supporters of their 
trade unions and guilds of professions and skilled crafts, the Basques developed “anarcho-
syndicalist agricultural and industrial” organizations in the same period, giving institutional 
shape to their democratic and egalitarian values (Mathews, 1999, p. 184).  
 
The moral and economic devastation of the Basque region together with the military occupation 
allowed nationalist sentiments to grow strongly against the Franco dictatorship. The infamous 
“Years of Hunger” affected the area as the regime’s economic policy, political reprisals, and 
destruction of some of the infrastructure caused severe poverty, emigrations, and “massive 
unemployment” (Mathews, 1999, p. 184). One of the exceptions to such destruction was the 
Basque industry as Franco knew it would be important if there was going to be an economic 
recovery for Spain (Heidberg, 1989). Not only was the economy and the socio-cultural and 
political make-up of the region devastated, but also the local institutions and community 
organizations were torn down, and the small local industry that remained ended up under the 
regime's control. In the words of Father Arizmendiarrieta, “we lost the civil war and we became 
an occupied region” (as cited in Whyte & Whyte, 1991, p. 242).  Yet, the experience of 
occupation would fuel autonomy sentiments and lead to a stronger stand on Basque cultural 
identity. 
 
Above all, in the light of the progressive Basque ideology and unique identity, their history has 
to be read as a continuous effort to defend their cultural identity and socio-economic autonomy 
in the face of the central Spanish government’s attempts to assimilate them (Mathews, 1999). 
Following institutional theory (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991), the emergence of co-operatives in 
the Basque region can be understood as a product of the social constructions and discourses 
involved in creating, maintaining, and changing organizations to craft a new model that fit with 
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the people’s beliefs, assumptions, and values in a context of oppression. According to 
institutional theory, how change happens is a consequence of the role of people inside and 
outside organizations establishing new discourses, replacing the dominant structures with new 
ones that respond to their socio-cultural identity and needs, and building legitimacy to the point 
where new goals and practices become engraved in organizations. It is not surprising that co-
operatives were so appealing to the Basques because they represented the opportunity of freedom 
from socio-cultural, economic and political domination.  Strong desires of autonomy, self-
determination, equality, democracy, and horizontal approaches to enterprises and society to 
correct the class division were captured in co-operative forms of socio-economic organization.  
Co-operatives were understood as a natural place to claim Basque ethnicity, values, and cultural 
identity and at the same time to answer economic questions of autonomy and self-determination 
(Interviewee and a founder in 1963 and CEO of the tools co-op COPRECI Pedro Mendieta; 
Mathews, 1999). The fact that Mondragon, a small town in the Guipuzcoa province of the 
Basque region, became the epitome of the Basque nationalist movement is in part due to the 
establishment of the co-operatives and the leadership of Father Arizmendiarrieta in that regard.  
 
3.3 Father Jose Maria Arizmendiarrieta and Catholic Social Doctrine  
 
The striking “Years of Hunger” made no exception of the town of Mondragon. It suffered the 
same wave of devastation experienced by the rest of the region and the country in the aftermath 
of the civil war.  In this context, Jose Maria Arizmendiarrieta
1, “an innovative social thinker” 
with the sort of “distinctively hands-on approach” associated with Jimmy Tompkins and Moses 
Coady in Eastern Canada, arrived in Mondragon to be the parish priest and counsellor for the 
Church’s lay social and cultural arm, “Accion Catolica” or Catholic Action in 1941 (Mathews, 
1999, pp.185,192). The previous parish priest had been shot by Franco's forces. The son of a 
farmer of modest means, Arizmendiarrieta was born in the village of Marquina, located  twenty-
five kilometers from Mondragon in 1915. The oldest son of four, he lost one eye due to a 
childhood accident, which prevented military service and led to a career as a priest. During his 
                                                 
1
 The priest’s full name is Jose Maria Arizmendiarrieta. However, his disciples and 
acquaintances used to call him Don Jose Maria, and others used Arizmendi as a short version of 
his last name. This dissertation uses all of them interchangeably.  
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young years at the Catholic seminary of Vitoria, “he became known for his love for the Basque 
language and culture” (Mathews, 1999. p. 191).  
 
Arizmendiarrieta interrupted his seminary studies to join the Republican forces as a writer and 
editor of its trade union newspaper Eguna in 1936 during the civil war years (Mathews, 1999, p. 
191). Unfortunately, he was captured by Franco’s army and had an execution order pending in 
1937. In those years, many Basque priests were executed, hundreds were incarcerated in 
concentration camps, and others went into exile (Morrison, 1991). Among other things, the 
museum of the Otalora Institute in Mondragon exhibits today a list with the names of the 
executed prisoners crossed out. Fortunately, due to an administrative oversight, his execution 
order was lifted, and Arizmendiarrieta went back to finish his seminary studies (Mathews, 1999). 
The Basque clergy was typically allied with the Republicans because of their community roots. 
Usually, local priests in the region would be Basques sharing the same identity and culture, 
coming from rural areas, and preaching in Euskera (Clamp, 2003). For that reason, Franco 
viewed the Basque clergy as enemies opposed to his rule and the occupation of the Basque 
region.  
 
Co-operatives helped empower a devastated population and regain lost confidence, voice, and 
decision-making power. Arizmendiarrieta was struck by the situation in Mondragon on his 
arrival in 1941. An extensive interview with him by Whyte & Whyte (1991) before his death in 
1976 details: “in the postwar period the people of Mondragon suffered severely in the repression. 
I had known some people in Mondragon but when I came back they all had either died, or were 
in gaol, or in exile” (p. 242). As the counsellor of Accion Catolica, he set to the task of 
empowering the local people to restore their self-esteem and confidence, and to heal their 
spiritual and moral lives. First, he concentrated on the youth. “These young people,” explained 
Jose Maria Ormaechea (1993), one of the five “pioneers” and founder of the first co-operative 
ULGOR, were “full of religious fervour, had been born in very humble families in years of social 
collapse and were on the verge of pathological hunger” (p. 15). Government had rationed the 
most basic foods: “bread, cooking oil, vegetables and meat” (p. 15). And the authorities tended 
to assign food based on political orientations as a reward or punishment (Richards, 1996). 
Arizmendiarrieta found a morally and economically devastated town in need of solutions to a 
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repressive government. Therefore, it is not surprising that the teachings of Arizmendi would 
capture the imagination of youth, thirsty for hope and opportunities (Ormaechea, 1993). In this 
context, co-operatives awoke sentiments of hope, opened up socio-economic opportunities, and 
provided a safe space to practice democracy, self-determination, and autonomy.  
 
To call Don Jose Maria, as he was often called among his parishioners, an “innovative social 
thinker” falls short of the truth (Mathews, 1999, p. 192).  His philosophy and thought were the 
driving force behind the establishment of the largest worker co-op group in the world. For him, 
private property had a "functional value" as it allows common people to access ownership of the 
means of production, which would lead to empowerment of workers (Whyte & Whyte, 1991, p.  
253).Therefore, Arizmendiarrieta led a shift in the traditional paradigm of sovereignty of capital 
over labour, as he educated young minds in the possibility of sovereignty of labour instead. 
Collective ownership of private property was connected to co-operativism because the 
dispossessed could imagine collective ownership as a way to uplift their precarious socio-
economic and political situations. This paradigm shift that he proposed can be understood in 
terms of institutional theory (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991) because he replaced the dominant 
economic lens with socio-cultural ones that responded to a notion of social responsibility and 
values more adequate to the situation of the Basque community. Changes in both the broader 
environment and within groups created pressure for change as social actors tried to make sense 
of the complexities and contradictions of emergent issues and realities in their worlds. That 
which had been taken-for-granted became visible and thus contested by those with increasing 
will and resources to do so. 
 
Having studied classical economic theory in the seminary days, Arizmendiarrieta was very 
disenchanted with capitalism, which led him to imagine and craft a different paradigm. In an 
interview with Whyte and Whyte (1991), he said this of capitalism: “a social monstrosity that a 
system of social organization is tolerated in which some can take advantage of the work of others 
for their exclusive personal profit” (p. 254). Arizmendi drew a distinction between the capitalist 
and the co-operativist in that the first “utilizes capital in order to make people serve him," 
whereas the second "uses it to make more gratifying and uplifting the working life of the people” 
(as cited in Whyte & Whyte, 1991, p. 254). Jose Maria Ormaechea (1993) recalls that Don Jose 
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Maria always insisted that the solution would be found in structural reforms rather than casual 
ones, in the sense that it was necessary to change the sovereignty of capital to sovereignty of 
labour over capital. Although he was convinced of the need for structural reforms in society, 
violence and revolution were not in his mind the wisest ways to proceed.  
 
State socialism and capitalism reproduce the same social monstrosity that Arizmendi thought 
was unjust and incompatible with human values (Whyte & Whyte, 1991). In both systems there 
is “a minority of the strong in power exploiting the others for their own benefit…the same greed, 
the same cruelty, the same lust, the same ambition, the same hypocrisy and avarice,” Arizmendi 
concluded (as cited in Whyte & Whyte, 1991, p. 258). Following Catholic French philosophers 
of his time, Jacques Maritain and Emmanuel Mounier, Arizmendiarrieta was of the view that the 
revolution to take place should not be confronting the systems in place but rather planting the 
seeds of a new civilization in them through education to provide the professional and ideological 
skills necessary to encourage the development of new co-operators (Ormaechea, 1993).   
 
Social transformation was his goal and the co-operative model the vehicle to achieve a new just 
social order. Arizmendiarrieta embraced co-operativism because in his vision co-operatives are 
schools and centres of training and maturation of the people that will achieve a new social order 
(Mathews, 1999). In that sense, co-operatives would assist people to become masters of their 
own destiny, as Evangeline leaders Moses Coady and Jimmy Tompkins thought (Mathews, 
1999). And for that end, work was not a punishment but the realization of the Creation of God 
and collaboration with the plan of God (Ormaechea, 1993).  
 
The roots of Don Jose Maria’s thought and teachings are to be found in Catholic Social Doctrine. 
The papal encyclical, “Rerum Novarum” (Of New Things--On Capital and Labour), written by 
Pope Leo XIII in 1891, is considered the foundation of the Catholic Social Thought. The 
encyclical officially started the Catholic Social Doctrine and provided the basis for a deeper 
analysis of social problems emphasizing social justice (Damberg, Hiepel & Canavero, 2005). 
The document was crafted under the strong influence of the prominent English Cardinal Henry 
Manning and the German Bishop Wilhelm Emmanuel von Ketteler (Mathews, 1999). In large 
measure, this encyclical came as a response to the extreme poverty and exploitation of the 
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working class as well as the social and economic inequalities caused by the Industrial Revolution 
(Curran, 2002). The Catholic Church understood liberalism and socialism as threats to itself and 
the people. Liberalism captured the ideals of the Reformation, the Enlightenment, and the 
capitalist underpinnings of the Industrial Revolution that were often seen by Catholics as 
responsible for the Church losing ground. Such loss of ground the Church associated with the 
related “evils” of rationalism, individualism, secularism and the unscrupulous quest for profits 
exploiting human beings with no labour rights (Curran, 2002). Although the Church agreed with 
Karl Marx’s claim regarding the disastrous consequences of capitalism’s Industrial Revolution 
for the urban poor and the workers, the Catholic Church did not align itself with socialism 
because of its association with atheism, materialism, determinism, and the subordination of the 
individual to the totalitarian state (Curran, 2002). The Rerum Novarum proposed, to some extent, 
a middle ground position between the extremes of capitalism and state socialism although that 
view is contested by those who see the Church’s complicity with violent repression at home and 
abroad.  
 
The encyclical also urged remediating the abuses of unfettered capitalism with worker 
organizations such as trade unions and collective bargaining bodies while recognizing “the 
legitimacy of and need for greater participation of all people in private property,” and calling for 
“limited state intervention,” defending the right to private property against the claim that the 
state should own all things (Curran, 2002, p. 9). Private property, in this view, also helps to 
secure human freedom because without possessions of any kind, a person can be reduced to a 
kind of slavery in which labour is not rewarded. However, individual rights bring also a 
responsibility to care for and promote the common good (Damberg, Hiepel & Canavero, 2005). 
The encyclical opened the door to legitimate collective associations as a natural right and 
collective ownership of property whether it was the right of workers to form trade unions, 
workers' associations, or the right to own property collectively as in the case of co-operatives. 
This papal letter called for Catholics’ commitment to more active involvement in the co-
operative sector as well as in labour associations in order to improve the socio-economic 
situation of the working classes, and the most disadvantaged in rural and urban groups 
(Damberg, Hiepel & Canavero, 2005). These teachings gave Arizmendi the idea of empowering 
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ordinary people through their participation in private property in a collective form, the co-
operative model. 
 
Building on Rerum Novarum, Pope Pius XI issued an encyclical forty years later in 1931, 
“Quadragesimo Anno” (The Fortieth Year-- About the Social Order), further stressing the 
condemnation of the extremes of communism and capitalism and the social inequalities of the 
time.  As had Arizmendiarrieta, the encyclical letter assigned a social function to private property 
considering it central to freedom and development of the human being (Curran, 2002; Mathews, 
1999). Quadragesimo Anno warned of the dangers of international capital to states which could 
lose autonomy, at the same time as small-medium size businesses lacking access to capital could 
be engulfed by larger companies. Above all, the papal letter called for solidarity and subsidiarity 
embodied in self-governing civic institutions and work places to reconstruct the social order in a 
fairer manner (Mathews, 1999). Indeed, self-governing work places, such as the Mondragon co-
operatives based on solidarity, are practical examples of what Quadragesimo Anno considered 
requirements for the new social order (Mathews, 1999). In fact, Herrera (2004) argues that Don 
Jose Maria crafted the Mondragon co-operatives’ principles and values after Catholic social 
principles such as “social justice, economic justice, the dignity of persons and their work, and 
solidarity” (p. 57). 
 
Even though Arizmendiarrieta was profoundly influenced by the Catholic Social Doctrine, 
Mathews (1999) has suggested that he had read and understood  distributism, a political 
philosophy of the late nineteenth century proposed by prominent thinkers of that time such as 
Hillaire Belloc, Cecil and Gilbert Chesterton, Cardinal Henry Manning, and Bernard Shaw 
among others. Like the Catholic Church, these thinkers were deeply affected by inequalities 
caused by class divisions, including the widespread poverty of late-Victorian and Edwardian 
Britain. They condemned employers who exploited their workers, treating labour as a mere 
commodity, and placed an emphasis on the social purpose of private property. Distributism went 
further, though, to suggest that ownership of private property and the means of production should 
be in the hands of the majority rather than the few to achieve a fairer social order (Mathews, 
1999). A “society of owners,” writes Mathews, proposes a distribution of property as widespread 
as possible, opposing “the concentration of property in the hands either of the rich, as under 
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capitalism, or of the state, as advocated by some socialists” leading to a more just social order (p.  
2).  
 
These ideas made sense to Arizmendiarrieta because he sought to empower the poor of 
Mondragon through the creation of a new type of enterprise that blended Catholic social 
principles with distributist thought and provided solutions to the impoverished community. 
Following institutional theory, the institutional logic of organizations involves “the socially 
constructed, historical patterns of material practices, assumptions, values, beliefs, and rules" by 
which social actors create organizations that conform to their reality and desires (Thornton & 
Ocasio, 1999, p. 804; DiMaggio & Powell, 1991). Institutional theory helps explain the process 
and constructions of Arizmendiarrieta at the micro and macro organizational level.  Drawing on 
strands of different logics, different ideas and meaning making, he sought to create a new type of 
organization that amalgamated different social and political ideologies of the time while fitting 
with the local needs of his parishioners. In this sense, Jose Luis del Arco Alvarez (1983), head of 
the Syndicate of Co-operation, a public administration department under the Ministry of Labour, 
described Don Jose Maria's character in this way: "the greatness of Father Arizmendi rests in his 
prodigiously creative mind and the clarity of his vision that put him ahead of his time to translate 
into reality his utopias, and in his leadership to create from zero an endeavour in a hostile 
political and economic environment to achieve the impossible in less than three decades" (p. 30).  
That is, Don Jose Maria is an “institutional entrepreneur” with the resources and capacity to 
translate interpretive frameworks and create new institutional forms (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991).  
 
The theoretical framework advocated by distributists saw a blending of the practical approach of 
the Antigonish Movement in Canada, and a more developed form of distributism in the 
Mondragon co-operatives (Matthews, 1999). The breakthrough of Father Arizmendi in keeping 
the co-op spirit alive was to find the perfect balance between the interest of the individual 
member and the interest of the co-op as well as the interest of the worker members and their 
agents, solving in this way the principal-agent dilemma, according to Mathews (1999). The 
employees and their agents are all member-owners of the business, which may prevent the 
representatives from acting against or outside the interests of the worker-members. 
Arizmendiarrieta devised the concept of individual capital accounts that members own and can 
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pull out upon leaving the enterprise or in the case of retirement which created a real economic 
incentive for individuals that translated into continual member support for the co-op. He also 
crafted the policy of reinvesting around 45% of the net profits into the indivisible reserves to 
preserve/enhance the financial strength of the enterprise. According to Mathews (1999), it is in 
those policies where the Mondragon worker co-ops seem to have an advantage in relation to 
consumer co-ops as the loyalty of the consumer members to the co-op appears to be more 
volatile than the commitment of the worker members to the organization.  
 
As Antigonish Catholic priests Moses Coady and Jimmy Tompkins did in Atlantic Canada, 
Arizmendiarrieta committed to community development through adult education by creating first 
the Polytechnic or Trades School in 1943, institutions necessary to build the co-operative 
experience in 1956 (Mathews, 1999). Out of that significant creativity described by del Arco 
(1983), Arizmendi came to the conclusion that the two pillars to a genuinely strong co-operative 
movement are "education and credit" toward which he dedicated his efforts as soon as he arrived 
to Mondragon (p. 31). The Mondragon co-operatives are, among other factors, a product of the 
process of adult education, and the crucial leadership of Arizmendi who understood education as 
critical to human development, and the socio-cultural environment necessary for co-operative 
development. Highly committed to the community, Don Jose Maria started study groups, raised 
funds for a sports club with a soccer field, and established a medical clinic in Mondragon. 
Concerned with the lack of education opportunities for young people, he proposed that his new 
trades school be independent of Union Cerrajera, the existing largest employer in town and a 
metal foundry company that already hosted a trade school mostly for the children of the 
employees (Whyte & Whyte, 1991).  
 
Arizmendi mobilized the parishioners by creating a parents’ association to fundraise for a 
technical school by placing boxes around Mondragon town to receive donations. Mobilizing 
parents and students was important in building a grassroots community development initiative 
that opened doors to local people living in poverty in an isolated town where youth had no 
opportunities. Finally, the “Escuela Profesional” school opened in 1943 with twenty students and 
the numbers increased steadily as more places were made available (Ormaechea, 1993, p. 18). 
One of the interviewees for this dissertation, Jose Ramon Elortza, a former professor at the 
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Polytechnic College, recalled “at fourteen years old I was the ‘errands boy’ of Don Jose Maria; 
my brother at seventeen was a student and already a teacher at the technical school. Don Jose 
Maria created the school in the framework of open accessibility to the community. Students had 
to help the school doing active fund raising, and that is how I could afford to study which opened 
up my future career.” 
 
The content of the school curricula went beyond technical subjects such as mathematics, physics, 
mechanics, chemistry, and electricity necessary to form engineers and mechanics. Subjects such 
as religion, sociology, humanities, democracy in the workplace, self-management, conflicts 
between labour and capital, and the reform of private enterprise were also taught (Ormaechea, 
1993; Mathews, 1999). The school thus provided a well-rounded formation based on critical 
thinking and the sort of conscientization commended by Freire (1970). This education was the 
foundation of co-operative development providing both technical knowledge and the critical 
thinking skills that gave students the tools to question their socio-economic and political 
situation and imagine a different future. Another interviewee, Pedro Mendieta, a founder of 
COPRECI, one of the first co-operatives, mentioned that “Don Jose Maria was very adamant in 
seeding values and skills at the school to make us become agents of change, ‘social 
entrepreneurs’ as it is known nowadays. He stirred up our minds in class to the point of us being 
ready to change our society.” His persuasive powers precipitated a consciousness around 
structural barriers and the need for a system that better represented the values and ambitions of 
the Basques. His sermons would be filled with catholic social teachings in mass, and in the 
classroom his critical discourse would plant the seeds of the new social order, so that after 13 
years, the technical school spawned the first co-operative in 1956, the creation of some of the 
school graduates. Arizemendi’s leadership—as a priest in the community and as an educator in 
the school—was crucially instigated social change and garnered support from the community. 
An innovative social thinker with a hands-on approach, he guided his disciples to construct a 
new type of economic enterprise, based on older consumer and agricultural co-op precedents in 
the Basque region. The worker co-op model embodied social teachings, Basque values, and 
religious beliefs adequate to the needs, social imaginary of the community, and political reality 
of oppression.  
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As truly collective action organizations, the co-operatives were the perfect fit for disempowered 
people living in a dictatorship with their ethnic identity denied and language and culture 
forbidden. The co-operatives provided them with the vehicle to regain lost autonomy, self-
determination, and freedom from social, economic, and political domination. The commitment to 
education remained paramount. The initial school graduates who wanted to pursue further 
studies did so taking up distance classes on engineering at the University of Zaragoza. After 
decades of the co-operative experience, the Mondragon University was established in 1997 by 
amalgamating the existing trade schools and research centres. 
 
3.4 Mondragon co-operative development, 1956-1959 
 
Having invested years in adult education and community development in Mondragon, 
Arizmendi's discourse instigated a consciousness around the structural barriers people lived with, 
and convinced them of the need for a system that better represented the aspirations of the 
parishioners. Arizmendi came to the conclusion that "to achieve social change, the best way was 
to reform the investor owned firm model and replace it with a business model incarnating social 
justice, equality, and fairness" (Interviewee Jesus Goienetxe). Five of the first eleven graduates 
of the Polytechnic School decided to start their own venture following Arizmendi’s suggestions. 
The existing metal foundry factory of the town, Union Cerrajera, would not allow for worker 
participation in the decision-making; nor would it let workers become shareholders (Mathews, 
1999). The top management and the board of the company considered Don Jose Maria a negative 
influence on the workers and did not approve of the ideas he was seeding in the workers at his 
classes (Ormaechea, 1993). Realizing that the “structural reform” of the company they were 
dreaming of was not going to take place, the young graduates were eager to start “a new business 
that could lead to social transformation,” explained key informant Pedro Mendieta. Thus, Luis 
Usatorre, Jesus Larranaga, Alfonso Gorronogoitia, Jose Maria Ormaechea, and Jose Ortubay 
whose first or second letter of their last names came to form the acronym “ULGOR,” as they 
called the newly created enterprise, left Union Cerrajera where they were working to become the 
pioneers of a new endeavour in 1956.  
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The beginnings were not easy as the five pioneers did not have the capital necessary to start the 
new business. The fact that the Provincial Savings Bank ignored Arizmendi’s business plan to 
start a “malleable cast iron foundry” did not discourage him and his disciples (Ormaechea, 1993, 
p. 20). The five pioneers had to look for other avenues to secure the initial capital needed for the 
venture. Thus, pooling their own savings plus community loans, they reached $361,604, a sum 
considered an enormous amount of money at the time in a poor town within a depressed 
economy (Whyte & Whyte, 1991, p. 34). The loans had no guarantees other than the integrity of 
the pioneers and their friendships showing the support of the community and the value of their 
social capital (Morrison, 1991). They needed the industrial equipment, tools, and the building to 
start their own business. An opportunity arose in 1955 to manufacture oil stoves since a retiring 
industrialist advertised the sale of his business dedicated to the art of metal spinning to make 
brass stove tanks (Ormaechea, 1993). Once they bought the company in 1956, finding an 
appropriate business legal structure was the next challenge so first they had to incorporate the 
business as an investor owned firm.  
 
Several interviewees noted that the existing co-operative law of the time did not provide for the 
type of business, the worker co-op model, that Arizmendi envisioned. As a result of the centralist 
dictatorship, Spanish regions were not permitted to have their own democratically elected 
provincial or state legislative bodies, as a federal system allows. Legislative powers were 
concentrated in the dictator’s hands, which meant that the laws were crafted in Madrid, the 
capital of Spain, far from the communities where they would be applied, and did not represent 
popular interests. The co-operators did not have the opportunity to deal with their own legislative 
authorities in the Basque region that could have been more sensitive to their needs and closer to 
work with. The existing federal Co-operative Act of 1942 was designed for agricultural co-ops 
and agricultural credit or rural banks, and submitted those organizations to the authority and 
intervention of the government which banned their autonomy (Atienza Mazias, Merino Mar & 
Ruiz Huydobro, 2004). Worker co-op legislation did not exist at the time. For lack of a better 
legal model, Don Jose Maria pursued an initial incorporation of the enterprise as a traditional 
investor owned firm to get the production going, and so ULGOR opened its doors on November 
12, 1956, with 24 workers to manufacture British-designed Aladdin paraffin stoves (MacLeod, 
1997; Mathews, 1999; Whyte & Whyte, 1991). Don Jose Maria kept looking for a legal form 
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that would allow for worker ownership, sovereignty of labour over capital, and economic 
democracy. Since such a legal figure did not exist yet, he was determined to find alternatives.  
 
3.4.1 Legal origins of the co-operative figure in Spanish legislation, 1906-1942 
 
To understand the legal reality at the time of the creation of ULGOR (1956), it is necessary to 
explain from historical, social, political, and economic points of view the evolution of co-
operative legislation in Spain. Historically, the Agricultural Syndicates Act of 1906 allowed for 
the creation of agricultural co-ops as one form of agricultural association, as well as agricultural 
or rural banks to provide credit to agricultural associations. Its article 1 explained that 
"agricultural associations are the ones created by people dedicated to any agricultural profession 
or with a special interest in agriculture or animal production, whether they be owners, renters of 
land, or simple labourers." It also allowed for the creation of agricultural co-ops with the goal of 
sharing crops, seeds, grain, machinery and tools. Article 1, Section 8, of the law stated that those 
"rural cooperative institutions involved in agricultural activities which adopted the agrarian 
syndicate as their legal form" would be entitled to a variety of tax benefits, as well as legal 
personality as defined in Article 38 of the 1889 Civil Code. The law also regulated the figure of 
rural banks inspired by the Raiffeisen credit union model to provide access to credit to develop 
the farming industry. According to Zaar (2010), the rural banks and agricultural associations 
were heavily influenced by the Catholic Church, as they would often be managed by the priest of 
the local parish. The effectiveness of the credit activity of the rural banks is questioned as the 
social, religious, and political objectives were more important than the rural development since 
ideologically the banks supported the small farming production in a system of harmonic 
relationships religiously legitimated, and the subordination of the small farmers to the interests of 
the large producers and the Church (Zaar, 2010). Since the law had only eight articles, the 
description of agricultural co-ops was not fully developed, which led in practice to difficulties in 
differentiating agricultural societies or associations and co-ops (Zaar, 2010). Despite the 
setbacks, these organizations, associations, and banks were an important learning space that gave 
communities familiarity with and experience of working collectively in co-operatives or 
associations for mutual benefit, and set the precedent for beneficial tax exemptions.  
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The first co-operative law of Spain was passed by the progressive Second Republic in 1931. The 
Co-operative Act of 1931 sought to harmonize the underdeveloped definition of co-operatives 
that previous legal norms contained.  Article 1 stated, "a Cooperative Society shall be understood 
as an Association of natural or legal persons, which in its organization and operation abides by 
the terms of the present Decree and does not seek profit, with the object of satisfying a common 
need for the social and economic betterment of all its members through joint action in a 
collective endeavour.”  According to Guinnane and Martinez-Rodriguez (2010), the law was 
inspired by the Rochdale principles and for the first time in Spanish legislation, it introduced the 
democratic principle of one member one vote and open-door policy, granting autonomy and 
control of the enterprise to its members, circumventing in this way the usual intervention of 
government and Church in the affairs of business. The creation of a reserve fund and a 
compulsory social fund was a novelty. Article 13 established that 10% of a co-operative’s annual 
returns had to be set aside as part of a reserve fund, up to the point where the amount in this fund 
was equal to the total capital stock, a requirement that favoured the capitalization of the business. 
The mandatory social fund consisted of earnings set aside to contribute to the local public good 
or community projects, for example, a school (art. 27). The law aimed to favour the 
capitalization of the enterprise by using a mandatory reserve fund, and established the social 
purpose of the co-op by creating a social fund to benefit the community. This progressive 
legislation was not favourably received by those groups—for instance, the military, the Church 
and the large landowners—that considered dangerous the freedom of association, democratic 
principles, and autonomy of popular organizations (Zaar, 2010). The proliferation of socialist 
ideas among the working classes and the peasants, as well as the trade union movement, proved 
serious threats to those in power (Zaar, 2010). This law followed the same progressive spirit of 
many other legal changes—women’s suffrage, land reform, freedom of speech and association, 
expansion of trade union rights, and a public school system eliminating the privileges of the 
Church—pursued by the democratically elected Republican government. This change in rights 
and reductions in elite privileges enjoyed before 1931 resulted in the military coup of 1936 led 
by Franco, as explained above. Naturally, the Franco dictatorship abolished the Co-operative Act 
of 1931 because the co-operative principles were not aligned with Franco’s ideology, especially 
democratic participation and the autonomy of business. 
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The co-operative law of 1938 passed under the Franco regime had the goal of intervening in co-
operatives to submit them to the authority of the government (Trujillo Diez, 2005; Aymerich 
Cruells, 2008). In its preamble, the law laid out its dictatorial intention: "the norms under which 
the direction of co-operatives is developed are not in harmony with the orientation of the New 
State; it is necessary to inspire the principle of authority in the functions of the co-operatives, 
which requires authoritarian governing organs that are competent and responsible." This law 
replaced the democratic governance principle of the co-operatives achieved by the Republican 
law of 1931 with an authoritarian system (Aymerich Cruells, 2008). Members of the co-
operative would elect the president of the Board of Directors in the General Assembly, but the 
election had to be communicated to and confirmed by the Ministry of Public Works with the 
right of veto (Articles 5 and 6). Therefore, this legal precept intervened in the democratic process 
of the election of the Board and also in the autonomy of the organization, which ultimately 
violated the freedom of the members to associate and decide the direction of the enterprise.  
Uneven development was thus a product of the letter of the law that privileged some and 
disadvantaged others. Discourses of responsible and competent authoritarian bodies in co-
operatives were used to rationalize and legitimize oppression. Public interest justified the heavy 
control of co-operatives by the Ministry of Public Works as they were considered dangerous 
organizations capable of letting people exercise democracy, and incubate communist socio-
political ideas contrary to the regime's interests (Zaar, 2010).  
 
After the co-operative law of 1938, approved by Franco in haste control and subordinate the co-
op movement to his rule, a new and more complete law was passed in 1942. The General Law of 
Co-operation of 1942 aimed to deepen government control over these organizations. Article 3 
established that "co-operatives will have their own by-laws but they will always be disciplined 
by the Syndicate of Co-operation under the Ministry of Labour." Further, the election of board 
members and president had to be approved by the Syndicate of Co-operation, a public 
administration organ with the authority to veto, annul, or confirm the appointments as well as 
any decision made in relation to the internal affairs of the co-operative (Article 26). It was 
mandatory that the Board members were militants of the Spanish Phalanx, Franco's Catholic 
fascist political party (Article 63). Every co-operative needed to have a Catholic chaplain 
appointed by the bishop, and a Surveillance Council appointed by the Syndicate of Co-operation 
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(Articles 60 and 27). According to Aymerich Cruells (2008), this law did not have the intention 
of supporting the spread and development of the co-operative movement; nor did it incorporate 
the co-operative principles, but rather controlled the co-operatives as ideologically dangerous 
organizations.  
 
The Mondragon co-ops developed under the co-operative law of 1942, which remained in legal 
force for almost three decades until a new co-operative law was passed in 1974, a year before 
Franco's death. As is now clear, this law was not adequate to the co-operative identity and 
principles in forcing co-operatives to be under government control (Atienza Mazias, Merino Mar 
& Ruiz Huydobro, 2004). This legislation was "destructive" toward co-operatives as government 
aimed to restrict them because it identified them as enemies of the regime (Hoyt, 1989, p. 89). 
This legal insufficiency and socio-cultural discrepancy led to a disconnection between the legal 
realm and the practical world, creating two different and parallel realities, one where co-
operatives acted internally following principles and values, and another one where they were 
subjected to the exigencies of the legal reality (Atienza Mazias, Merino Mar & Ruiz Huydobro, 
2004). Jesus Goienetxe, a former president of Lagun-Aro, the social insurance co-op of the 
Mondragon Group, described Don Jose Maria’s tenacity to pursue his vision as “endless,” and 
his personality as “overpowering, capable of moving mountains”; “dressed in his usual religious 
robes, he would hitchhike all the way to Madrid (400 km approximately) to talk to Franco’s 
government officials at the Ministry of Labour to ask them for a new legal framework that would 
fit with what he and the workers envisioned.” The co-op legislation of the time did not fit with 
the worker ownership model the workers wanted for the enterprise they started. 
 
In 1959, after three years of the industrial company, ULGOR, Arizmendiarrieta achieved the 
approval of the public administration to incorporate the already existing private business as a 
worker co-op.  A crucial part of his success in dealing with the dictatorship was the relationship 
he built with government after many trips to Madrid and much insistence.  Jose Luis del Arco 
Alvarez, “an official advisor to the government department responsible for the regulation of co-
operatives,”, eventually became a supporter of Don Jose Maria and guided him through the 
process of policy development (Mathews, 1999, p. 196). A lawyer by training and head of the 
Syndicate of Co-operation, the public administration department responsible for overseeing, 
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controlling, intervening, and registering co-operatives, del Arco became a friend and supporter of 
Don Jose Maria's ideas about the meaning and internal structure of worker co-ops. That much is 
evident in the accounts of Jose Luis del Arco (1983) himself: "Don Jose Maria came to me 
several times to discuss problems of the enterprise that the law did not give answers for, and I 
gave him the solutions because the letter of the law should be interpreted in its spirit, which goes 
beyond the simple letter" (p. 19). Those solutions were found in the crafting of the bylaws of the 
first industrial worker co-op, ULGOR. The fact that del Arco had the authority to grant or reject 
the incorporation of a co-operative was key to the legal change. A mere authorization of a co-op 
could be classified as a "neutral" policy because government did not attempt to destroy ULGOR, 
and it allowed the co-op to operate in the same climate as all other businesses without any 
advantages (Hoyt, 1989, p. 89). Del Arco's example and efficacy confirm that the law is not a 
neutral and objective institution whose truth waits to be discovered, as the legal positivists claim, 
but, on the contrary, is a product and consequence of socio-cultural, political, and economic 
processes within which social actors forge their own realities. A growing consciousness around 
structural barriers, precipitated by Arizmendi's discourse with Jose Luis del Arco, opened up the 
possibility for change to create a legal precedent more in tune with popular needs.  
 
Aymerich Cruells (2008) wonders how it was possible in those years to create a worker co-op 
whose main activity was the manufacture and sale of appliances (paraffin heaters and oil stoves 
initially) to third parties non-members, with an evident for-profit motive. The law of 1942 did 
not recognize worker co-ops; nor did it allow for economic activities of co-ops with third party 
non-members; a co-operative was to do business with its own members without a profit motive 
(art. 15). Co-ops were  permitted to keep only a small margin coming from the difference of the 
products or services sold to members and the costs of the inputs, a margin that was supposed to 
be kept as an indivisible reserve or reserve fund (art. 15). Yet ULGOR was permitted to 
incorporate as a for-profit worker co-op, and to do business with non-members. The answer to 
the question of Aymerich Cruells is located in innovation as the convergence of structural faults 
with social actors motivated to seek change that fits with their values and realities. 
 
Officials legitimated the new legal figure, and also turned a blind eye to internal democratic 
practices once they were convinced that they were not a political threat to the regime; nor were 
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co-operators "red communists" (Aymerich Cruells, 2008, p. 416). “We saw Don Jose Maria go to 
the capital hundreds of times,” interviewee Goienetxe commented.  “Although he found initial 
resistance in the administration, he was not going to take ‘no’ for an answer and his 
determination and vision were so strong that eventually he convinced the officials that his ideas 
were worth pursuing, not a threat to the government, and very much needed by the community of 
Mondragon, and we could incorporate as a worker co-op with the permission of the 
administration.” Even before its official incorporation, ULGOR was functioning internally as a 
worker co-op, though legally existing as an investor-owned firm. After the creation of this 
worker co-op, other industrial worker co-ops were created based on the legal precedent of the 
first incorporation, which will be explained in chapter IV.  
 
3.5 Conclusion 
 
Drawing on a cultural and critical lens, this chapter has traced the legitimation strategies of 
Franco's regime, and especially discourses of national unity or "Spanishness" and the cultural 
celebration of bull fights and flamenco music from South Spain that simultaneously denied the 
cultural identity of diverse regions of the country. Cultural legitimation of oppression using 
religious arguments manufactured consent to domination and legitimized the exploitation of the 
working class. While laws enforced the dominant ideology, cultural practices remained 
necessary supplements to keep the masses in check. Yet such legitimation strategies, or what 
Foucault (1991) calls “regimes of truth,” have their limits and simultaneously produce 
resistances.  
 
According to institutional theory (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991), change happens when the role of 
people inside and outside organizations establishes new discourses, replacing the dominant 
structures with new ones that respond to their socio-cultural identity and needs, and building 
legitimacy to the point where new goals and practices become engraved in organizations. New 
educational practices involving a process of conscientization allowed Arizmendi and his 
followers to craft a new type of organization embedded within and responding to their socio-
cultural needs and identity in a context of domination. The emergence of the Mondragon co-
operatives in the Basque region was a product of their social constructions and meaning making, 
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creating new enterprises and producing the legislative framework to allow them to function 
optimally. The autarkic economic policy imposed by Franco (Richards, 1996) benefitted the 
growth of the co-ops as it closed the doors to international trade, and in this way, it provided an 
internal market for the co-ops' products. In this context, the institutional entrepreneur, 
Arizmendi, was able to see and take advantage of the opportunities within a hostile external 
environment to develop the organizations.  
 
An analysis of co-operative laws and their evolution underlines the embeddedness of policy and 
legislation in the social realm, the legal instruments a product of historical, socio-cultural, 
political, and economic processes shaping social actors, including policy makers. The result was 
the rewriting of legislation that privileged the groups in power and disadvantaged the rest. In this 
work, the convergence of structural factors and social actors, the persistence of Father 
Arizmendiarrieta and the authority and insight of Jose Luis del Arco, found a solution to the 
legal limbo facing the first co-op, ULGOR. They were not to be undone by the letter of the law, 
but found creative ways to align the spirit of the law with the interests of the worker co-op. In 
other words, co-op development was not a consequence of favourable policies that supported the 
growth of the sector; rather social groups had to come together and put pressure on individuals 
and institutions to make the legal changes necessary for a worker co-op to exist legally in the 
first place. In this sense, Mondragon is an example of organizational and legal innovation that 
paved the way for further co-operative development.    
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CHAPTER IV. CO-OPERATIVE DEVELOPMENT OF MONDRAGON IN THE 
BASQUE REGION (SPAIN): A VALUES-BASED APPROACH 
 
 
This dissertation intends to show the Mondragon group development, an already well-known 
story, in a new light, using different lenses to help rethink co-operative development and policy 
development. With this end in mind, chapter III analyzed socio-cultural, economic, political, and 
legal factors related to the development path of the Mondragon co-operative movement and the 
meaning making of key players, tracing how their discourses produced new meanings and 
material practices in the context of co-operative development. By unfolding how and why 
Mondragon emerged as it did and what lessons we can learn from the particular convergences of 
structural factors and the initiatives of social actors, chapter III emphasized the external 
environment and the conditions that led to the creation of ULGOR in 1956 (a worker co-
operative in 1959).  Chapter IV uncovers the strategic co-op development choices social actors 
made and the institutions they created given the external social, political, and economic 
conditions they faced.  
 
Within this framework, the internal particularities of Mondragon development strategies, 
featuring the key role of Caja Laboral Popular (the credit union) and educational co-op support 
organizations, will be explored. Using the lenses of institutional theory and cultural studies,  the 
development model of "co-operatives developing other co-operatives" (Pollet & Develtere, 2004) 
will be studied. Spanish and Basque legislation and policy development are important co-
operative development tools that will be studied in this chapter as well. Again mixed methods, 
including literature review, a critical reading of literature and policy complemented by semi-
structured interviews with Mondragon co-operative leaders, practitioners, and policy experts aid 
the understanding of the development path. How and why social actors successfully adapted in 
response to external changes and what lessons we can learn from their particular decisions and 
initiatives will be reviewed. In this way, this chapter will shed light on institutional frameworks 
using the Mondragon group example.   
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4.1 Caja Laboral Popular: The cultural influence in institutional forms 
 
After the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939), the country faced a serious economic and social 
depression. Inspired by Catholic Social Thought, Jose Maria Arizmendiarrieta, a priest with 
insight and considerable power, started a vocational school in 1943 in Mondragon which would 
in turn lead to the creation of the first worker co-operative ULGOR, with 24 workers 
manufacturing oil stoves and paraffin heaters  (Herrera, 2004). After Father Arizmendi's 
perseverance in seeking the support of government officials, the administration granted the 
incorporation of ULGOR as a worker co-op on April 14th, 1959. ULGOR had 170 worker-
owners by 1959 and plans for the creation of new co-operatives in the industrial sector were 
underway. From those humble beginnings, today the Mondragon Co-operative Corporation 
(MCC) is a third-tier co-operative business group made up of 281 firms (mostly co-operatives 
and joint ventures with for-profit companies and with state-owned firms overseas) organized into 
sectors: financial, industrial, distribution, and research and training. The sectoral groups are 
independent entities, yet they function within a comprehensive strategy coordinated by MCC. In 
2011, the group consisted of 83,569 worker-owners, 43.6 percent women, total assets of 32.4 
billion euros, and total revenue of 14.83 billion euros (MCC annual report, 2011).  
 
Soon after ULGOR was in operation, Father Arizmendiarrieta realized it was necessary to have a 
source of capital to satisfy the financial needs of the expanding industrial business. Credit co-
operatives, such as the German Raiffeisen movement and the Italian rural credit union 
movement, were known but credit co-operatives did not have a solid image among the financial 
institutions in Spain (Ormaechea, 1993). The Ministry of Public Works through the Syndicate of 
Co-operation, responsible for the oversight of these entities, lacked resources and a coherent set 
of regulations to assist credit unions in correcting internal problems rendering them weak 
(Ormaechea, 1993). After suggestions of the Syndicate of Co-operation, the National Bank of 
Spain became responsible for the inspection of credit unions in 1971. The National Bank of 
Spain was an appropriate institution to regulate credit unions because it possessed the resources 
and technical expertise necessary to advise them (Ormaechea, 1993). Don Jose Maria created the 
concept of a co-operative bank or credit union in 1959 to provide capital for the expanding co-
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ops, where Mondragon residents would deposit their savings, which would, in turn, be invested 
in local co-operatives (Cheney, 1999).  
 
Values-based collective ownership was linked to discourses of ethics, fairness, and justice 
strengthened by appeals to popular Basque pride and independence. By living up to the co-op 
principles and engendering loyalty to the co-operatives in this way, the credit union, known as 
Caja Laboral Popular (CLP), provided financial and technical assistance for the creation of new 
co-operatives as well as funds for a co-operative social security system as the government did 
not provide social services such as health care, and pensions (Cheney, 1999; Whyte & Whyte, 
1991). The Spanish Social Security System denied the co-op workers coverage, considering them 
self-employed independent owners (Ormaechea, 1993). That put a burden on the newly created 
credit union that had to assume the responsibility of insuring essential sickness, work accidents, 
widower’s compensation as well as pension plans. Caja Laboral's statement of identity declares 
that it was "born in Arrasate - Mondragon as an instrument to attract popular savings and use 
these savings to finance the needs of the co-operatives of the group." Its "values" as an institution 
were "ethically committed to social projects, identifying opportunities for social intervention that 
encourage a fairer distribution of wealth". (Caja Laboral Popular, 2012, p. 1).  Like the co-
operatives and their founders, the credit union was committed to achieving a more just social 
order through a fairer distribution of wealth, addressing socio-economic inequalities through 
member ownership of the means of production. Between 1961 and 1976 the financial institution 
funded an average of four to five start-ups per year (Cheney, 1999). In 2008, CLP had 13.98 
billion euros in assets and ranked among the largest financial institutions in Spain (MCC annual 
report, 2008). According to interviewee Jesus Goienetxe, "Caja played a crucial role in 
sustaining and co-ordinating strategies of the Mondragon co-ops in the first decades, and helped 
us during the harsh recession Spain suffered in the 1980s by being patient regarding the timing of 
loan payments and even forgiving some loans in special cases."    
 
From its inception, the credit union Caja Laboral Popular rapidly became the core and heart of 
the Mondragon co-operatives. Arizmendi conceived the idea of a co-operative bank that could 
provide the capital required for start-ups and expansions in affordable terms, as well as the 
technical assistance needed to create and expand co-operatives. As a secondary goal, the credit 
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union would satisfy financial needs of the community. “Don Jose Maria’s brainchild was the 
engine of the co-operatives,” explained key informant Pedro Mendieta. “Caja Laboral was our 
backbone for decades,” he added. "Together with the Polytechnical School, Caja Laboral is the 
most important institution created by Don Jose Maria." The polytechnic school provided a cadre 
of technicians to work in the industrial co-ops developing oil stoves and paraffin heaters. The 
credit union supplied capital on affordable terms to the expanding industrial businesses. Both are 
important pieces of the co-op development process stressed by the literature and the interviews 
(Canadian Co-op Association, 2007; Cornforth & Thomas, 1990; Fairbairn, Fulton, Hammond-
Ketilson, Krebs, & Goldblatt, 1993; Harris, Stefanson & Fulton, 1996; Meek & Woodworth, 
1990; Pollet & Develtere, 2004).  
 
4.1.1 Bringing to life a democratic ideal of co-operation through some undemocratic 
means: forgery of documents, charismatic inculcation of young minds, and the innovative, 
legal but undemocratic structure of Caja that does not allow for town residents' 
membership   
 
The initial economic success of the co-operatives encouraged the co-operators to think it 
unnecessary to create a financial entity as a source of capital and means of “social intervention.” 
"Today, it does not make sense to conceive of Mondragon's co-op development experience 
without Caja Laboral, but the idea did not sink in among us at first" (Pedro Mendieta). As we 
have seen, Franco’s autarkic economic policy had closed the country’s doors to foreign products 
which opened up an internal market for the co-operatives’ products. The Spanish economy was 
also expanding after twenty years of protectionism even though the state’s budget was in a 
deficit position and the National Bank of Spain had restricted access to credit (Ormaechea, 
1993). Those promising economic conditions (despite government deficits and limited credit) led 
many co-operative members to judge it unnecessary to create their own financial organization. 
However, Arizmendi's vision and leadership shed light on the need for their own credit 
institution, which would provide financial and technical independence from outside institutions. 
As Pedro Mendieta recalls, "Don Jose Maria's vision was to create our own support institutions 
to be self-sufficient from government and the private sector." Besides plain economic reasons of 
capitalization and access to knowledge and technical services, the creation of the credit union 
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was fuelled by Basque pride and autonomy, even though the idea was initially rejected by the 
workers. Interviewee Jose Ramon Elotza points out, "having our own financial institution was a 
light of pride in the midst of the severe poverty the community was suffering after the civil war." 
Following institutional theory (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991), the vision of the leader learning 
within and beyond the organization was decisive in creating, maintaining, and changing 
organizations to adapt to the external environment and its socio-economic, political, and other 
challenges.  
 
Not only could the co-operators rely on a booming internal Spanish market for the co-ops’ 
products thanks to the autarkic policy of Franco, which deterred them from starting other 
ventures, but they were also unfamiliar with financial concepts; both proved important 
impediments to starting up a co-operative bank (Ormaechea, 1993). “We felt a mix of impotence, 
lack of confidence and we totally rejected Father Arizmendi’s idea,” recalls Pedro Mendieta. 
“Please, imagine us 50 years ago,” continues Mendieta. “We were modest and humble working 
class rural people in a small town of a depressed economy coming out of a civil war, barely 
becoming foremen, mechanics, engineers, and Don Jose Maria insisting that we turn into bankers 
overnight on top of that, well, we sent him packing.” It is important to highlight that the workers 
were in their early twenties, some even teenagers, as opposed to Don Jose Maria, who was their 
teacher, an educated leader in his mid forties, and a priest in a deeply religious community. 
These different realities added authority to his figure  contributed to an unbalanced power 
relationship.  
 
Arizmendi did not give up and persisted with the idea of a credit union. The persuasive actions of 
an institutional entrepreneur, Father Arizmendi, are important in the development of the financial 
institution. Indeed, still fresh in people’s minds today is the story of the first official meeting to 
discuss the creation of a credit union. Pedro Mendieta recalls, "It was early 1959, back then I was 
only a teenager and Don Jose Maria would try to convince us of the need for a credit union but 
financial concepts were too abstract for us; we couldn't grasp the importance of his ideas at first, 
but he kept insisting and calling meetings to explain to us how it would work." On March 15
th
, 
1959, minutes to a meeting required by law to establish a credit union registered that the bylaws 
had been approved, and a provisional Governing Council and a board of auditors had been 
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appointed (Ormaechea, 1993). Although the official meeting never actually happened and the 
signatures on the document were forged by Don Jose Maria, the Ministry of Public Works 
authorized the creation of the credit union on July 28
th
, 1959. The co-operators whose signatures 
were forged seemed at first not really concerned because they did not think that "the credit union 
would ever become a real business, and we did not find it worth worrying about," recalls Pedro 
Mendieta.  
 
The members' consent to a leader that could behave undemocratically on such occasions, can be 
explained within a cultural studies framework (Hall, 1980). The interviewees openly spoke of the 
forgery, and did not seem embarrassed or ashamed by Don Jose Maria's illegal actions. Once the 
organization succeeded with the support of the co-ops, it is plausible that members would have 
agreed that the leader was right in insisting on the creation of the financial institution. Although 
the bylaws of the existing co-operative, ULGOR, and the credit union outlined a democratic 
structure respecting equality values, in practice, the leader could impose his views on his teenage 
students at the Polytechnic School and young adults working in the co-operative. It is hardly 
arguable that the co-op functioned internally on a democratic and equal basis, but this unequal 
power relationship made sense in  Spain’s culture at the time. On the one hand, part of the 
country fought in the civil war against a dictatorship to defend regional autonomy, and to 
preserve the democratic government of 1936, as explained in Chapter 3.On the other hand, the 
fact that the dictatorship survived for almost forty years (1939-1975) means that it enjoyed 
popular consent among certain sectors. Spaniards lived a contradiction of hoping for democracy 
and equality, while remaining accustomed to top-down structures reproducing inequality at the 
institutional level. In this sense, the initial development of the Mondragon co-ops was a 
reflection of that cultural contradiction.   
 
A charismatic but at times undemocratic leader, Arizmendi, could unilaterally impose his vision 
on his disciples without respecting the democracy and equality principles that he advocated. 
Education was the vehicle to indoctrinate youth into his world vision. He was of course trained 
in and habituated to the centralist and hierarchical structure of the Catholic Church. That fact 
added to the cultural habit of reproducing top-down structures. Despite his questionable methods, 
Arizmendi is an important example of an institutional entrepreneur that did what he thought was 
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necessary to forge change within organizations at the cost of illegal and undemocratic means, 
and perhaps, internal tensions. As the majority of the members do not see the need for change, 
imposing a certain course of action on to them would have created tensions and the possibility of 
failure of the venture.  
 
However, Don Jose Maria persuaded his disciples to embark on such a venture by the end of that 
year. On December 24
th
, 1959, the first formal meeting was held in the headquarters of ULGOR, 
and the credit union was formally established (Ormaechea, 1993). Jesus Goienetxe described 
Don Jose Maria as "a leader with a future perspective" because "without the financial co-
operation and expertise of the credit institution, it would not have been possible to develop the 
social experience that incarnates the Mondragon group today; time proved that he was right." 
Indeed, the credit union was the driving force shaping the development of new co-operatives and 
the glue holding them together (del Arco, 1983; MacLeod, 1997; Ormaechea, 1993).  
 
The initial capital required to start up a credit union was obtained by Arizmendi from the four 
founding co-operatives and community support. Despite the fact that the “co-operativisation of 
money” was a novel concept in the town, Don Jose Maria would actually knock on people’s 
doors to entice them to deposit their savings in the credit union, the success of which speaks to 
the cohesion and social capital of that community (Ormaechea, 1993, p. 43). Using the slogan he 
created, "bankbook or suitcase," to market the need for a local financial institution in the 
community, "Don Jose Maria appealed to the Mondragon residents insisting that they should 
invest in enterprise development through the industrial co-ops or poverty would lead to rural 
exodus to look for better opportunities elsewhere" (interviewee Jesus Goienetxe). In September, 
1960, Arizmendi started a journal, Trabajo y Union (Labour and Union), published out of 
ULGOR, to disseminate news on the co-operative and reflections on the co-operative culture, 
which acted as a medium to raise awareness in the community while fulfilling an educational 
role (Ormaechea, 1983).  
 
His slogan “bankbook or suitcase” was premonitory, as time showed. The oil crisis of the 1970s 
shook the Basque manufacturing sector and left high unemployment. Pedro Mendieta recalls the 
discourse Arizmendi used to convince residents to deposit their savings in the financial 
                                                
 97 
institution: "The savings will contribute to modernize the local industry and will prepare the 
entry of Spain in the European Common Market, so we need to create more enterprises in the 
region to absorb the population growth and to avoid the emigration. . . . Savings and 
capitalization will be channeled to invest locally in the promotion of our industry and in the 
creation of co-operative employment." Arizmendi's discourse had a convincing logic although 
"people had to trust that Don Jose Maria would know how to materialize the proposal through a 
bank," according to Pedro Mendieta. Interviewee Jesus Goienetxe reminds us, "In a Catholic 
community the figure of a priest carried a certain social prestige and a level of trust in those 
days, which encouraged people to support the local venture." Arizmendi constructed a discourse 
combining equal measures of social vision and pragmatism that would appeal to the Mondragon 
residents to deposit their savings in the credit union.  
 
The institutional entrepreneur Arizmendi's innovation and creativity are behind the design of 
policy mechanisms and new institutional forms. Under Spanish co-operative law, the credit 
union fell under the type of “second degree co-operative” because it is a co-operative of co-
operatives or second tier co-op, and it also included the workers of the bank as owners 
(Morrison, 1991, p. 50). Chosen by Arizmendi, the credit union adopted a hybrid legal form 
blending worker co-op features in a second tier co-op completely novel to the Spain of those 
times. Article 42 of the Law of Co-operatives of 1942 established that "credit co-operatives can 
be constituted by other co-operatives with the object to provide services to the individual 
members of the co-operatives forming the credit co-operative." The law was silent on allowing 
the workers of a credit union to become worker-members of the organization, although non-
financial co-operatives could be constituted by physical persons and legal persons (art. 1). Don 
Jose Maria's commitment to the participation of labour in the ownership of the enterprise led him 
to devise the bylaws of Caja Laboral Popular with two types of membership (the founding co-
ops and the workers), according to interviewee Pedro Mendieta. He presented the idea to Jose 
Luis del Arco, the head of the Syndicate of Co-operation, the responsible public administration 
department. He understood that the law did not forbid workers to become members of credit 
unions, but did not expressly allow it either, and by interpreting the law in its spirit, del Arco 
authorized Caja Laboral Popular to incorporate with a hybrid legal form (interviewee Pedro 
Mendieta) as he had in the same year the incorporation of ULGOR as a worker co-op creating a 
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legal precedent  in Spanish law. Arizmendi's persuasive discourse  was likely well received as a 
result of the relationship he developed with Jose Luis del Arco, inclining him to interpret the law 
in a creative way to benefit Mondragon initiatives.  
 
As stated previously, the law is not so much an objective institution whose truths await discovery 
but a result of the convergence of structural faults and social actors seeking change. Arizmendi’s 
discourse precipitated a growing consciousness around structural barriers in Jose Luis del Arco, 
which opened up the possibility for change to create a legal precedent more in tune with populist 
needs. Certainly, the Spain of 1960s made it possible to have government officials with a lot of 
power, capable of overriding written laws based on friendships and relationships. That made the 
change of policy easier than in other places and times where more formal processes are  
followed. 
 
The governance of the credit union was designed to produce commitment and loyalty among all 
the co-operatives of the group. The co-ops associated with the credit union had the right to vote 
and sit at its Governing Council or Board of Directors. The General Assembly was attended by 
all the co-ops and the credit union worker-owners where a twelve-member Board or Governing 
Council was elected. The co-ops held 58 percent of the votes whereas the worker members of the 
credit union held 42 percent of the votes. The Board or Governing Council was formed with 
seven seats for the co-ops, four seats for the worker members, and one for the Congress Board 
(MacLeod, 1997). The distribution of voting power actually shows that the main objective of the 
credit union was to support the associated co-ops. In this formula, community depositors’ 
participation is absent. 
 
The design of the credit union did not allow for the community residents to become members of 
the organization as its workers and the co-ops were. The Caja devised a model of return on 
savings controlled by Local Assemblies where savers participated and voiced their opinion, 
giving the credit union a “strong popular feeling,” according to Ormaechea (1993), one of its 
founders and a former CEO (p. 50). That sentiment was rooted in the knowledge that the credit 
union was their own banking institution, and their deposits would be working toward community 
development that would personally benefit the community members (Mathews, 1999). Indeed, 
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the concepts of co-operative labour exemplified in the worker co-ops, consumption illustrated in 
the consumer co-op, and money represented by the credit union, as the way to distribute 
ownership and wealth more equally to achieve a new social order were embraced by many in 
Mondragon town (interviewee Pedro Mendieta). Arizmendi’s discourse of employment creation, 
local industry development, and education likely reached community members through the 
polytechnic school and parish work—all teaching that the co-operatives would lead to, create, 
and develop the well-being of society. By raising awareness around structural barriers faced by 
the residents and promoting co-operative enterprise, Arizmendi proposed a way to address those 
challenges and create a fairer society. However, to this day community depositors cannot be 
members of the credit union, which raises questions about democracy and participation on an 
equal basis in a supposedly co-operative organization.  
 
The credit union had to find a way to avoid conflict of interests while engaging consent and 
identification with the goals of the organization. Although the Caja had a democratic internal 
structure, community savers as non-members had no voting rights, which differs from Canadian 
credit unions where an individual opening an account becomes a member with voting rights. 
Arizmendi, who designed the bylaws, and the founders missed the opportunity to be truly 
inclusive by allowing every depositor to become a member of the credit union. Letting residents 
become members could have occasioned a conflict of interest between the savers and the goals 
of the credit union which involved “taking risks for the co-ops such as reducing interest rates or 
forgiving loans to co-ops” in trouble (Morrison, 1991, p. 96). Depositors would have made 
different investment decisions as they may have been more risk averse and less willing to invest 
in the co-ops. Conflict of interest is inherent to any type of organization, not only co-ops. Having 
associated co-ops and the workers as members can cause conflict of interest, yet the organization 
functioned in that way and still exists today. Local assemblies held annually were designed to 
inform savers of the policies and directions of the institution, giving them the chance to voice 
their opinions and raise their concerns (Morrison, 1991; Ormaechea, 1993). However weak an 
attempt by the co-ops to be inclusive, local assemblies helped gather "consent and build the trust 
of the savers in the credit union, which contributed to popular identification with the 
organization," recalls Pedro Mendieta. "There was", he continues, "a clear consciousness that the 
credit union was 'laboral' (of labour) in the sense that labour is the cornerstone of society's well-
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being, and its 'popular' character stemmed from its community roots, its return to community in 
social contributions, co-operative employment, and community wealth." Such community 
support is crucial to co-operative development as community-based collective action. Building 
trust and consent among the savers to a financial organization that not even the founding co-
operatives believed in at first, was crucial in the process of community education and 
conscientization.  If we compare the community participation in the credit union to the 
participation in other banking institutions, we can see the value of local assemblies to give savers 
a chance to voice their opinions. However, for a co-operative attempt, it seems patronizing to so 
impede community memberships and inform residents only once a year without giving them a 
real ownership stake. Drawing on institutional theory (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991), there is a 
replication within society of the dominant hierarchical institutions. Under a dictatorship, it may 
be expected that strong figures such as Arizmendi, and top-down institutions such as the 
Mondragon co-ops would be replicated. 
 
4.1.2 A centralist and hierarchical vertical integration of the co-operative group: Caja as 
the hub organization, the contract of association, and the unusual harmonization of profits 
and losses among the associated co-ops 
 
The Caja Laboral Popular was the answer to several problems enterprises usually face in a 
capitalist economy. The typical barriers to co-op development widely stressed in the economic 
literature are undercapitalization and a lack of access to financial markets, which normally 
restricts co-ops to a marginal role in a world of large corporations (Cornforth & Thomas, 1990; 
Morrison, 1991; Zamagni & Zamagni, 2010). The Mondragon worker co-operatives deposited 
their indivisible reserves, the workers' individual capital accounts, and the workers' contribution 
to the social insurance in the credit union, and in turn, the credit union reinvested their capital in 
co-operative operations (Morrison, 1991). In this way, the credit union used productively the 
results of the co-operators’ labour and provided capital to the organizations.   
 
As a way to grow the asset base of the co-operatives, and at the same time, build assets for the 
worker-owners, Father Arizmendi devised the Individualized Capital Accounts (ICAs) in the 
internal structure of the co-operatives. The ICAs were an attempt to solve the traditional 
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principal-agent dilemma haunting co-operatives (Fulton & Laycock, 1990) as they try to keep the 
interest of the individual member aligned with the interest of the organization (Matthews, 1999). 
New members in any co-op contribute a “threshold payment” equivalent to one year of minimum 
salary ($12,000 in 1997) that is deposited in their own personal account, which is adjusted 
upwards for inflation each year as well as grown by an average interest rate of about 6 percent 
(Lutz, 1997, p. 5). Of the threshold payment, 15 – 25 percent is a non-refundable contribution to 
the co-operative’s indivisible reserves. New members who cannot afford the threshold payment 
up front can pay through a salary deduction plan over a three-year period (Lutz, 1997, p. 5). As 
well, each year a significant portion of the co-operative’s net surplus is allocated to the ICAs in 
proportion to the hours worked by each worker-owner. The ICA remains in the co-operative until 
the member retires or leaves the business. Co-operatives borrow money from the credit union on 
more affordable terms: “at interest rates 3 to 4 percent below those” of traditional banks 
(Mathews, 1999, p. 206). Overall, Caja liberated co-operatives from the traditional capital 
restrictions common to all businesses and even more acutely suffered by industrial companies 
requiring large investments in machinery and technology.  
 
If co-operatives suffer from lack of access to affordable technical assistance, legal and financial 
advisory services, and co-operative education more broadly (Adeler, 2009; Cornforth & Thomas, 
1990), the credit union was designed to address these needs (Cornforth & Thomas, 1990; 
Matthews, 1999; Morrison, 1991; Zamagni & Zamagni, 2010 ). Not only did Arizmendi realize 
early on that the co-operatives needed to be close to one another to share knowledge, resources, 
and workers, but he also concluded that without capital and support organizations around, the 
future would be plagued with difficulties. Caja Laboral Popular was his solution to these 
challenges haunting co-operative development.  
 
To overcome the twin dangers of isolation and competition, Father Arizmendi purposely devised 
networks among the co-ops, the credit union, and the school (interviewee Jose Ramon Elortza). 
Cultural homogeneity in a small town may have helped to develop a sense of cohesion. Socio-
cultural factors and community values of solidarity, equality, trust, and a common identity were 
promoted by Arizmendi, highlighting the benefits of networks among the organizations and the 
school, and close connections to the broader community. Caja Laboral addressed the common 
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isolation and consequent vulnerability of small businesses by becoming the hub organization that 
coordinated resources, labour, capital, provided specialized management advice, and linked co-
operatives through the Contract of Association (Matthews, 1999). The co-operatives were 
vertically integrated under the umbrella of the credit union. However, such integration was 
centralist leaving the associated co-ops little room for autonomy and decision-making. The co-
operatives were free to disaffiliate if they chose, but the benefits of belonging to the group 
outweighed the downsides of losing some autonomy and independence. As part of the sharing 
philosophy, "laid out in the contract of association was the commitment of the co-ops to lend 
their best human resources to manage the credit union. The organization was new and started by 
a bunch of inexperienced (wanna-be) bankers so it needed all the expertise we could provide to 
get off the ground" (interviewee Pedro Mendieta).  
 
Following Don Jose Maria's beliefs, the co-operatives were informally linked to each other and  
shared some resources and expertise which was the prelude to what later would be formal 
alliances among co-operatives. For instance, the founding members of Caja Laboral Popular 
were the four existing Mondragon co-operatives—ULGOR, Funcor, Arrasate, and San Jose 
Consumer Co-op—and its worker-members. Between 1956 and 1959, three more co-operatives 
followed ULGOR, which were linked together by the needs and the opportunity of new products. 
Those were Arrasate, a machine tool and tooling company with 40 workers, which supplied parts 
and tools to ULGOR and Funcor; Funcor, a forge and foundry with 38 workers in the 
manufacture of agricultural machinery for farmers who would provide goods to be sold at the 
consumer co-op; and San Jose, a neighbouring consumer co-op with 400 members that would 
market the products of Funcor (Ormaechea, 1993). The linkages among the co-ops were a key 
part of the co-operative development strategy Mondragon embarked on. As more co-operatives 
were strategically spawned, recalled interviewee Pedro Mendieta, “Don Jose Maria was 
convinced that a business alone would not survive long; harder times would cloud its success and 
for that reason it was imperative to draw alliances between the co-operatives.” 
 
Instead of pursuing the traditional competitive logic of private businesses, Arizmendiarrieta 
thought that it made more economic sense to work together and help one another. As a 
consequence, local allied groups or clusters of co-operatives were developed with strong links  
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coordinated by the credit union. The local groups and the credit union were responsible for 
approving all accounts of the associated co-ops, which made easier the difficult task of sharing 
profits and losses among the co-ops. A top-down structure facilitated the harmonization of 
profits and losses, which often creates members' conflicts. Such solidarity would not be easily 
possible in a more decentralized, flat structure that is common in Anglophone Canada. The 
worker members went through an education and awareness raising process that made them buy 
into the project. Also the advantages of belonging to the group may have made more manageable 
burdens such as harmonization of profits and losses, loss of autonomy, and the individual 
contributions to the collective. Evidence of this is the fact that co-ops are free to leave the group 
and they have not. As a community economic development organization, Caja Laboral was 
devised to assist co-operatives in all the necessities of their lives, from financial to more 
sophisticated technical needs as well as a co-operative social-insurance system for the worker 
members. Despite some questionable practices, lessons from Mondragon’s particular approach to 
co-op development include the value of solidarity and trust incarnated in co-operative networks, 
the importance of working together to help rather than compete with one another, community 
support, and the creation of a support organization.  
 
Policy is a consequence of the socio-cultural sphere where social practices, values, and beliefs 
are engraved in the policy realm. For instance, the Contract of Association became official in 
1976, and materialized the initial informal relationships among the co-operatives by setting out 
the rights and responsibilities to the credit union of each associated co-op. For sixteen years until 
the contract became official, the co-operatives were informally acting along those lines, which 
speaks to the conviction of the workers, managers, and leaders to behave in a certain way 
without the need of legally binding documents. However, that conviction was a product of a 
socialization process within an authoritarian cultural framework where power relationships could 
seem normal. "After six years of its creation, Caja still showed poor results; the performance of 
the associated co-ops was far better but Don Jose Maria insisted that we needed to have faith in 
the institution and so we did" (Pedro Mendieta). "Faith in the institution" was materialized 
through the continuous investment of the associated co-ops in the credit union, although the 
organization was not solid yet. Again, Arizmendi had considerable power over his disciples to 
convince them: "The co-operation formulas we applied allowed the institution to survive and by 
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late 1960s its results started to turn around," as interviewee Pedro Mendieta recalls the roles of 
solidarity and mutual help in a successful development strategy. Building consensus is one of the 
features of the co-op model, which might facilitate the normalization of practices and policies 
without legal instruments. The actions of the member co-operatives guided by their values and 
beliefs were then fleshed out in the contract. Policy in this case as in others is embedded in the 
socio-cultural realm;  the practices of social actors preceded policy which then crystallized those 
practices, values, and beliefs.  
 
Jose Maria Ormaechea (1993) founder of ULGOR and Caja Laboral, and first CEO of the credit 
union (1960-1988), explains that, in the contract, co-operatives committed to respect and follow 
the co-operative principles of open membership, democratic control, sovereignty of labour over 
capital, wage solidarity, and fixed interest on capital contributions in exchange for financial and 
technical assistance. They also committed to deal exclusively with Caja, meaning that the co-ops 
should deposit in it all surplus cash and liquid assets including all holdings on behalf of its 
members such as pension funds, social security funds, and workers’ share capital, and abide by 
principles on capital remuneration, members' contributions, and distribution of profits. The 
contract also stated that profits and losses were to be distributed according to this formula: 20 
percent to be retained by the co-op for indivisible reserves and reinvestment; 10 percent or more 
to be contributed to the education and promotion fund or social fund; and the remaining 70 
percent or less to be distributed to co-op members, but remaining with the co-op in the 
individualized capital accounts deposited in the Caja until the worker-owner left the enterprise 
(Ormaechea, 1993). The fact that Arizmendi devised this contract of association with a 
democratic balance of power, and sharing of the profits and losses among the associated co-ops, 
once more shows the contradiction lived in Spanish society. On the one hand, Arizmendi is a 
strong figure with a considerable amount of power to impose his views on his disciples; on the 
other hand, he has the insight to devise values and principles embedded in democratic structures.  
 
This contract crystallized the principles of equality and solidarity, as well as mutual help in 
establishing the credit union’s responsibility to oversee and support the financial health of 
member co-operatives and the principle of member co-operatives aiding any member in financial 
trouble. It ensured the long-term financial health of the co-operatives by way of audits at least 
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once every four years by the Business Division with the technical expertise to address possible 
financial issues looming in a co-operative. Such a collective way of addressing financial 
problems in a co-operative and the distribution of profits underlines, in the Mondragon case, a 
logic and set of values (distinct from traditional IOF ones) governing choices for collective 
benefit and co-op development.  The sustainability of the credit union during the first eight to ten 
years required strong commitment and loyalty from the founder co-operatives willing to take on 
sacrifices and risks to achieve the consolidation of the organization.  
 
4.1.3 Caja Laboral Popular Co-operative Development Policy   
 
Don Jose Maria devised an organization with the mandate, resources, and technical expertise to 
sustain co-operative employment. To this end, the credit union had three departments performing 
equally important and related functions: the Banking Division, the Entrepreneurial or Business 
Division, and the Social Security Division.  The Banking Division fulfilled the vital function of 
providing capital to the associated co-ops through affordable loans. The Business Division 
employed about 120 worker-members (Mathews, 1999) and had the mandate to develop new co-
operatives and expand existing ones, providing professional advisory services for co-operatives 
in all phases of development. The Social Security Division was designed to provide workers with 
social insurance such as workers' pension, sick leave, widower's insurance, and workers' accident 
compensation.  
 
Once a new product or service and a market for it were identified, a group of workers and a 
manager pursuing a new business would approach the Business Division which would study the 
proposal and assign to the group an advisor or “godfather” on behalf of the Business Division if 
the proposal was found viable (Mathews, 1999, p. 207). Then the workers would incorporate the 
enterprise as a co-op and accept a loan to cover the manager’s salary for about eighteen months 
to two years while the Business Division conducted feasibility studies. In that period a product 
might be replaced by another or a new product developed according to the results of the studies. 
Once the product was refined, the Business Division would focus on the necessary steps of the 
development phase: “factory design, production processes, marketing strategies and export 
opportunities” (Mathews, 1999, p. 207).  
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If the Banking Division approved the project, the Business Division’s “godfather” would work 
closely and in innovative ways with the manager of the new co-op until the business broke even 
and the co-op was deemed capable of standing on its own (Mathews, 1999, p. 207). The co-op 
committed to provide monthly financial reports to the Business Division, information that was 
stored in an “electronic data bank” (considered an innovation in the 60s and 70s) (Mathews, 
1999, p. 208).  Usually, loans were planned to be paid back in seven years bearing “no interest in 
the first two years, 8 percent interest for years three and four, and 14 to 15 percent interest in the 
last three years” (Morrison, 1991, p. 125). This repayment model is as innovative as it is highly 
lenient for the new business and stems from the credit union commitment to co-op development. 
The close ties among the co-ops and the credit union made possible this rarity in traditional 
business lending. The credit union's criteria for approving a new business—1) availability of a 
suitable manager; 2) an investment per job not exceeding $100,000 (because a higher cost would 
not be possible to absorb in case of failure); 3) a financial break-even point by the fourth year 
(beyond which the venture would be changed or rejected) (MacLeod, 1997, p. 47)—reflect the 
careful and thoughtful planning to ensure the maximum success of a new venture.  
 
One example provided by MacLeod (1997) can illustrate the co-op development process. A 
market opportunity arose in the field of forklifts. After a feasibility study and the purchase of the 
manufacturing license from Mitsubishi, a new co-op, Oinakar, was incorporated and a godfather 
appointed for two years on behalf of the Business Division. The co-op started assembling 
components purchased from Mitsubishi with plans of manufacturing the complete product.  The 
cost of product development was $60,000, the Basque government provided 40 percent 
($24,000), and the remaining $36,000 was financed with a long-term loan from the credit union. 
However, $2.3 million was necessary to launch the full operation. The thirty-five worker owners 
contributed $9,000 each totaling $315,000 in member capital, the credit union provided a $1.5 
million loan, and the Basque government half a million (p. 47). The co-operative was created in 
1984, and still exists today as part of ULMA Group, formed by three co-ops, Oinakar, Enara and 
Ulma, under the Mondragon Co-op Corporation umbrella.  
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It is important to note that during the years of the dictatorship, central and local government did 
not contribute any funding to the development of the Mondragon enterprises. The co-ops 
developed initially through their own means such as member contributions, community 
fundraising, and credit union financing. Since the democratic reorganization of the country in 
1978, government has contributed to co-op development not only with funding for job creation 
and research projects but also with supportive policy. 
 
This development strategy to finance community-based businesses is highly important for 
community economic development projects (MacLeod, 1997). Often, founders of small 
businesses face innumerable challenges initially, the three most important being the 
technical/professional assistance, affordable financing, and a supportive policy environment to 
nurture the business venture. The Mondragon Group tackled all three.  
 
It is important to highlight the meticulous procedure and strategy of the credit union to assess the 
financial situation of a co-operative and establish a rescue plan for it, if deemed necessary. When 
an established co-op was in difficulty, the Business Division of the credit union set in motion a 
mechanism to rescue it depending on the depth of the problems. An intervener would be 
appointed to assess the situation based on three categories of risk. Mathews (1999) describes it as 
follows: 1."High risk" is the case in which the health of the co-op is in high danger and the credit 
union assigns an intervener, who takes over the management temporarily until a rescue plan is 
set or the co-op must close its doors. The credit union suspends interest payments on loans until 
the co-op is in a better situation. 2. "Medium risk" indicates that bankruptcy might be a 
possibility. The intervener does not take over the management but spends at least one day a week 
at the co-op. The credit union receives only half of the interest payments. 3. "Warning or alert 
level" means the co-op needs professional assistance to address a problem that cannot be solved 
on its own, for which no rescue plan but remedial action is needed. Interest payments are not 
suspended because the remedial strategy will make the burden manageable (p. 208).   
Once the risk was assessed and the reorganization plan was in place, members might have to take 
reductions in their wages and/or contribute additional capital. In the extreme case of having to 
reduce the work force, the Social Council together with the management had the task to identify 
those members staying in their positions, those who had to move to new positions, and those who 
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had to be transferred to another co-operative requiring more labour (Mathews, 1999). The co-
operative then had to seek approval of the new plan from the Banking Division of the Caja. No 
more than a handful of the more than one hundred co-operatives have gone out of business, and 
“45 percent” of the existing co-operatives have been “created by the Business Division of CLP” 
(Ormaechea, 1993, p. 101). In terms of the enterprise model, Jesus Goinetxe points out, 
"Stability is one of the rules on which the co-operative type of enterprise rests; ventures 
involving high risk and high benefits did not fit with the type of business we wanted. Following 
'adventures' was not our business style because we wanted employment for our children and 
grandchildren," which explains the careful planning of every co-op. 
 
In this respect, interviewee Jesus Goienetxe, noted that “Mondragon’s philosophy of co-
operative employment creation has been the pillar of the organization since its inception. 
Mondragon had to find a delicate balance between incorporating new technology that would 
likely replace labour, and maintaining their commitment to job creation which required devising 
creative and innovative strategies. We did not want just to benefit the existing members because 
we were not committed to enrich a few of them; we were committed to the wealth of our 
society.” Pursuing such balance between economic and social goals and not only bottom line 
considerations led to high creativity and innovation.  
 
Staying true to co-op values, dismissal of workers is the last recourse in case of economic 
problems. Labour is considered a “relatively fixed cost,” not variable as understood by the 
traditional economics theory, which would encourage dismissing workers as the first strategy to 
avoid losses (Morrison, 1991, p. 118). Such a notion demands careful planning of the business, 
high screening filters, conservative feasibility studies, and realistic assessment of risks to 
minimize potential failure, all important components of an effective co-operative development 
process. It is not surprising that the co-op failure rate is so low (five co-ops have gone out of 
business among the over one hundred co-ops of the Mondragon group) compared to the fatality 
rate of investor owned firms (Ormaechea, 1993). This result is consistent with a research study in 
Quebec finding 62 per cent of new co-ops still operating after five years, compared with 35 per 
cent for other new businesses; those figures are 44 per cent and 20 per cent respectively after 10 
years (CCA, 2008).   
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The internal tensions co-ops go through are not always resolved along co-op principles. A 
concern in the Mondragon co-ops is gender equality. The main activity of the co-ops, industrial 
manufacturing, has traditionally been and still is a male-dominated sector. Another factor in the 
issues around gender equality is the fact that Spanish culture is paternalist and patriarchal, 
especially until the 1980s when Spain entered the common European market and the 
modernization of the country led to more women in the workforce. Although Arizmendi thought 
that women did not have a place in the co-ops, he changed that view later on and promoted a co-
op for married women in 1969 that still exists today, Auzo Lagun (del Arco, 1983). It reduced 
working hours and flexibility in the working schedule to be compatible with family life (Arco, 
1983). Ironically, the activities of the co-op seem to fit criticisms on gender issues as it provides 
food services to schools, businesses, and hospitals, as well as commercial and industrial cleaning 
services. The strike of 1974 led to workers, all of whom were women, being "fired" in an effort 
to achieve efficiency (Williams, 2007, p. 116). The Catholic Diocese of Vitoria severely 
criticized Mondragon, ULMA and two other co-ops left the group temporarily in protest, and the 
fired women were restored to their original jobs by the Management Council (Williams, 2007). 
Women are still a minority in managerial positions. Although the group has made efforts to 
address the concerns (for instance, the 2011 MCC annual report revealed a 43.6 percent of 
women in the workforce), gender equality in the co-ops still remains an issue and is partially a 
reflection of Spanish culture.  
 
As an initial co-op development strategy, Don Jose Maria divided co-operatives to multiply their 
numbers, each department in a co-op turned into a new co-operative. This creativity and 
innovation was driven by the desire to preserve employment following the Mondragon principle 
of sovereignty of labour over capital. As each business grew, it divided and sub-divided, the 
connections among them creating complex inter-related companies still thriving today 
(MacLeod, 1997). Jose Maria Ormaechea described this process in ULGOR, the first co-
operative: “We made three divisions, the electrodomestic division, the electronics division and 
the foundry. ULGOR (now called Fagor) is the former electrodomestics division; Fagor 
Electronica is the electronics division and Ederlan is the foundry. As co-operatives grew in 
numbers, we continued to divide them” (as cited in Clamp, 2003, p. 11). According to 
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interviewee Jesus Goienetxe, “the internal divisions responded to economic and social needs 
because it was easier to transfer workers from one co-operative in hard times to a successful co-
operative rather than leaving the labour force without work. In that sense, the local group was 
devised by Don Jose Maria so co-operatives could protect themselves and their work force.” 
Solidarity is at the centre of the strategy enabling vulnerable co-ops to weather an economic 
downturn but, ironically, such values had to be taught to the co-ops initially until they became 
normalized behaviour incorporated to the co-ops. 
 
As these examples illustrate, co-operative development goes beyond just applying the procedures 
and screening filters of carefully designed feasibility studies. Institutionalizing co-operative 
development through an entrepreneurial and financial organization such as the credit union 
nurtures community bonding and collective social responsibility through a community-based 
enterprise designed to “pursue the social transformation Don Jose Maria enticed us to bring 
about,” according to interviewee Jesus Goienetxe. That major goal was realized through co-
operative employment, the reforming of the private enterprise as a more humane organization. 
Even if Arizmendi was a leader, who behaved at times undemocratically, he viewed co-
operatives as instruments to achieve higher objectives of social change as they would address 
socio-economic structural barriers. He believed in the capacity of working people to provide for 
themselves through co-operation and economic solidarity: "Man is not born in a set way, but he 
can be made into it," according to Jesus Goienetxe, recalling Arizmendi’s belief not in 
determinisms but in the possibility of human development by way of education to achieve social 
transformation using the co-operative model.  
 
After half a century, the Mondragon co-operatives continue to reinvent themselves in the face of 
legislative and regulatory change. For decades, the credit union provided financial and technical 
assistance for new and existing co-operatives, acted as the coordinating head and hub of the co-
operatives, and provided social security services for worker members. However, in the 1980s the 
National Bank of Spain brought in new regulations regarding securities and risks that prevented 
the continued provision of the training and technical assistance functions and demanded a better 
diversification of the lending risk, which forced co-ops to seek elsewhere at least 30 percent of 
their external financing (Lutz, 1997; Matthews, 1999). This requirement represented a change in 
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the original contract of association that required all the financing activity of the co-ops to be 
done with the credit union (Ormaechea, 1993). Yet this move also liberated Caja to act as a 
traditional credit union institution, moving its investment growth away from the co-ops and 
pursuing other market opportunities (Matthews, 1999). Along with the National Bank of Spain 
regulations, new legislative changes freed credit unions from local boundaries allowing them to 
operate in more than one region, which led Caja to open up branches in several other regions 
(Ormaechea, 1993). The expansion creates risks about losing the grassroots nature of the 
organization, but the fact that only the associated co-ops and the credit union workers are 
members remained the same. The credit union still does not allow community depositors to 
become members. Caja continues to be under the umbrella of the Mondragon Group and is a 
main source of financing for their overall activities (interviewee Pedro Mendieta).  
 
The changes in the credit union precipitated the already in-the-works creation of a second-tier 
co-op structure, Mondragon Co-op Corporation, to assist in the creation of new co-op enterprises 
and the overall coordinating and forward strategic planning, functions previously performed by 
Caja. The Business Division disappeared by the end of 1990 because the co-ops hived off its 
functions to create other co-operatives and centres which assumed the tasks of technical and 
managerial assistance to new and existing co-ops (Matthews, 1999). The most notable of them is 
LKS Consulting Group, with a staff of over a thousand workers and annual revenues of 70 
million euros, which is made up of some Mondragon co-operatives and private companies and 
provides technical assistance in all areas of need for co-operatives and other types of business 
(LKS, 2012). While the creation of such a large organization has allowed for more human 
resources dedicated to advisory services for co-ops, it also takes away resources for co-operative 
consulting since LKS also advises private companies. By creating LKS, the co-ops continue to 
invest in technical assistance crucial for co-operative development. Areas of activity include 
management consultancy, technology, architecture and engineering, real estate, design and 
innovation, and legal expertise. The capacity of the co-operatives to reinvent themselves is 
reflected in changes requiring careful planning, strategic thinking, and consensus building. 
Adapting to new external and internal conditions, the Mondragon co-ops show dynamism, 
confirming Arizmendi's own words: "the sign of vitality is not to endure, but to be reborn and to 
adapt" (Ormaechea, 1993, p. 39). Ironically, the Mondragon group preserved a centralist, and 
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top-down structure after democratic changes in Spain (1978) and after Arizmendi's death in 
1976.  
 
The intensive development plan finds its roots in co-operative values and principles which serve 
as pillars of the system’s strength. Mondragon co-ops are crafted mindfully, including assertive 
reinvestment in established co-ops needing reanimation (Morrison, 1991). Each one of the co-
ops is a dynamic and complex human system underpinned by human values (MacLeod, 1997).  
 
When asked what the main challenge was that the Mondragon co-ops had experienced, 
interviewee Jesus Goienetxe answered, "Responding to changes in a dynamic way since a leader 
or few members may foresee the need for change, but the majority of the worker-members may 
resist the change or not see the need for it." He pointed out that "a co-operative as a democratic 
organization permits us to solve this challenge by building consensus, listening to all the voices, 
and learning from one another." Although not easily done in practice considering the 
authoritarian culture within which Mondragon developed, democratic mechanisms were formally 
crafted in the institutional design. The consensus building and inclusive listening Goienetxe 
points to was actually a slow and gradual learning process. Still there are some traces of 
authoritarian and centralist power relationships in the Mondragon group.  
 
4.2 Mondragon Co-operative Group's Development Strategy: The top-down, solidarity 
framework 
 
The initial focus of the development strategy was to “work together to protect each other,” as 
interviewee Jose Ramon Elortza, former professor of the Polytechnical College, explains. “The 
motto,” he continues, “was to co-operate with one another under the framework of solidarity” 
because Don Jose Maria understood that businesses operating alone and isolated would be easy 
prey in difficult times to larger corporations. Being a co-operative, in his opinion, meant to co-
operate with other co-operatives in solidarity following the 6th ICA co-op principle, co-operation 
among co-ops. For that reason, Arizmendi crafted the idea of the “local or regional group” with 
unions of co-operatives located in the same village or region operating in similar fields of 
economic activity, according to Jose Ramon Elortza. In the early years, there were twelve 
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regional groups of co-operatives (Mathews, 1999). Despite the benefits of "working together to 
protect each other," tensions arise as co-operatives lose some of their independence and 
autonomy that they have surrendered in certain respects. In theory, working together as a group 
meant having to share profits and losses, which sounds idealistic, but in the practice, it is very 
difficult to achieve as conflict and tensions arise. However, the co-ops had to weigh the pros and 
cons of such policies. The benefits of being part of the group seemed to outweigh the burdens of 
sharing profits and losses.    
 
The idea of the group developed out of the rapid growth of the first industrial co-operative, 
ULGOR. Interviewee Pedro Mendieta explains that the policy of hiving off departments of the 
co-op was Arizmendi’s strategy to address the risk of bureaucratization and lack of dynamism 
that can make larger co-ops slower to respond to economic or technological changes. The most 
efficient division within ULGOR, consequently, split off to start a new independent entity. In 
this way, the home appliances manufactured by the new co-operative had an already built market 
and could supply the parent co-op. This was also a strategic policy to strengthen the social bonds 
among the members of both co-ops, who already knew one another, and made the consequent 
networks among co-ops an easier step. Their existing relationship and homogeneity of the culture 
may have helped mitigate member conflicts. 
 
The first co-operative group, ULARCO, was created to assume tasks and responsibilities 
delegated by the co-operatives so that individual entities would not have to spend resources 
duplicating costly internal administrative and marketing functions (Mathews, 1999). ULARCO, 
as we have seen, was made up of ULGOR, Arrasate Co-op, Copreci Co-op, Ederlan, , and Fagor 
Electronica, which was the first spin-off by the three founder co-ops and specialized in 
manufacturing electronic components (Mathews, 1999, p. 214). The structure of ULARCO was 
similar to the internal structure of individual co-ops. Its General Assembly included members of 
the Governing Councils or Board of Directors, the Management Councils, and the Audit 
Committees of the individual co-ops. The General Assembly would elect the members of the 
Governing Council or Board of Directors, and this body would appoint the General Management 
Committee. The Social Council included members of the Social Councils of the associated 
individual co-ops (Mathews, 1999). By delegating administrative and marketing tasks to the 
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group, the co-ops divided the labour more efficiently and avoided, to some extent, 
bureaucratization which would allow them to respond to changes more easily. The group also 
made simpler the transfer of workers from one co-op experiencing difficulties to another in 
expansion.  
 
Working under the strategic direction of a group meant that individual co-ops would have to 
surrender some of their autonomy, which must have caused some internal conflicts. However, in 
the cultural framework of the Spain of that time, it actually made sense to have a strong entity 
coordinating strategy since it reproduced the hierarchical, top-down structure of the major 
institutions of society. To some extent, the group reflected the strong leader, who guided co-op 
development for the first 16 years. However, democracy and worker ownership of the means of 
production were real. On the one hand, the cultural habits of following a powerful, charismatic 
leader, and on the other hand, the desire for democracy, autonomy, and equality are contradicting 
features of the Spanish culture reflected in the Mondragon institutions.  
 
The groups were responsible for strategic planning, coordinating functions, policy setting for the 
individual co-ops, and approval of all accounts. The profits and the losses were harmonized 
which added protection to the co-ops from the market fluctuations and eventual economic 
downturns. The harmonization of profits and losses may be better understood in the light of 
cultural studies and institutional theory as Spanish culture seemed to be more comfortable with a 
collective property framework than Anglophone Canada. For instance, the notion of the 
indivisible reserves, and the co-op education and promotion fund, both of which are not 
reimbursed to members in case of dissolution of the co-op but are assigned to co-op federations 
to promote co-op development, might not be culturally accepted in Anglophone Canada. Key 
informant Jose Ramon Elortza explains, “for example, if a co-operative experienced a deficit due 
to market demand changes in one field of activity, that loss would be compensated with the 
profits other co-operatives in a better situation were enjoying. Our goal was to protect one 
another achieving together what one isolated co-operative would not be able to, and also 
allowing us to achieve economies of scale.” Sharing profits and losses was possible because the 
group decided on unification of budgets and approval of all accounts as well as the transfer of 
workers: “Pooling resources and losses together not only allowed us to grow together without 
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losing jobs but also made economic sense,” he concluded. Although sharing the profits and 
bearing the losses with one another might be against the logic of conventional economic theory, 
this collective socio-economic approach rooted in co-op principles and values proved to be an 
economic advantage. This policy tells us that the 6th co-op principle, co-operation among co-
ops, was in this case a strategic advantage. We need to remember that Mondragon employs close 
to 90,000 worker-owners which speaks to its solidity (MCC annual report, 2011). Although the 
logic of pooling resources is common to co-operatives all over the world, sharing losses and 
profits among different organizations required a strong commitment not easily done in practice. 
Since the group unified budgets and approved accounts of the different co-ops, it may have been 
more manageable to share profits and losses despite the difficulty of doing so in the practice. 
Conflicts among the members and the co-ops and internal tensions may be a natural 
consequence.  
 
The co-operative development strategy of the group was complemented by the internal 
modernization of the enterprises, education of the workforce, and access to finance. MacLeod 
(1997) describes the typical internal development strategy using the industrial co-operatives as 
examples. Three key components are looked after: technology, formation (education and 
training), and finance. As seen previously, the Mondragon co-ops pursue actively cutting-edge 
technology, which is the task of the research and innovation centres. Formation includes 
education and training for the workforce through educational institutions such as the university 
and Saiolan, and special on-the-job training from courses on marketing for managers to weekend 
retreats for board members on finances and balance sheets. Finance is guaranteed through the 
credit union providing the necessary access to capital for expansion of the co-ops. The three 
elements, technology, formation and finance, are in constant synergy interplaying dynamically to 
achieve what each alone could not in a co-op development strategy.  
 
Interviewees Jose Ramon Elortza and Pedro Mendieta recall the frequent meetings of the 
workers with Don Jose Maria and the capacity building: "we would discuss business strategies 
for hours and he would just listen without saying a word until the end of the meeting when he 
would speak his opinion and we would get upset and ask why he let us ramble and waste time 
rather than speaking in the beginning of the meeting and tell us what to do but he would say that 
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we would not learn anything if we were just told what to do." This comment actually gives an 
accurate picture of the contradiction of the culture. Unknowingly the disciples were expecting 
directions from their leader, yet they also wanted to have a democratic and equalitarian 
enterprise. Although Arizmendi, as we have seen, could circumvent democratic participation, he 
could also be exemplary in encouraging his disciples to learn for themselves. The learning 
process and capacity building of the workers was a function of the emphasis on education, a key 
factor in the development of the organizations. In other words, Mondragon was an innovative 
learning organization long before the mainstream came up with the term (Senge, 1990).   
 
During the first three decades (1960-1990) the groups were bounded geographically and by 
sectors of activities with some responsibilities in decision-making but the overall strategic 
planning and coordination of the groups of co-operatives was in the hands of the credit union, 
which had ultimate responsibility for all the groups and their individual co-operatives until 1991  
(see Figure 4.1 below).   
 
Figure 4.1 Organizational Structure of Mondragon (until 1991) 
 
In 1991, the co-ops introduced major structural changes for the co-op groups since new 
legislation forced the credit union to diversify risk rather than continue to be the exclusive source 
of financial services to the co-ops. The result was that a Congress of the co-ops created a super 
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structure, Mondragon Corporacion Cooperativa (MCC), a function also of the co-ops’ decision to 
internationalize their activities (see Figure 4.2). This super entity replaced Caja Laboral in its 
overall strategic planning responsibilities as the head and driving force of the co-operative 
groups. The credit union became a “conventional co-operative financial intermediary” and its 
Business Division split up to create a different co-operative, LKS Consulting, that assumed some 
of its functions, and other tasks were taken by some departments of MCC, and Saiolan, as we 
have seen previously (Mathews, 1999, p. 218). Now MCC performs the activities of strategic 
planning, coordination, and internationalization for the whole conglomerate. Mondragon also 
established a unique governance structure in keeping with their commitment to democratic 
principles through the creation of the Co-operative Congress, made up of 650 delegates 
representing member co-ops, where binding decisions for MCC are made (MCC, 2008).   
 
It was then required that individual co-ops become members of one of the four sectoral groups: 
the Finance Group, the Distribution Group, the Industrial Group, and the Research, Development 
and Education Group. The industrial group was again subdivided in Capital Goods I, Capital 
Goods II, Automotive Components, Domestic Appliances and Electronic Components, Industrial 
Components and Services, Construction, and Household Goods due to the complexity of its 
activities (MacLeod, 1997). The first co-operative group, ULARCO, bounded co-operatives 
geographically and by sector of activity, while MCC requires co-ops to be in groups and 
subgroups according to their activity and not by geography. The co-operatives have grown and 
expanded very much since the first group, ULARCO, was created, and thus the need to have 
different groups and subgroups of activity to better co-ordinate the synergies of the group. 
However, this move has created the risk of losing closeness among the membership from 
different subgroups (MacLeod & Reed, 2009). Until 1991 the groups were created on a close 
proximity around a small village, which made easier to share jobs and services among the co-ops 
in a spirit of solidarity as workers knew each other. The lack of geographic closeness within a 
group may erode personal relationships and the social bonds that make agreements flow more 
naturally (MacLeod & Reed, 2009). See Figure 4.2 below. 
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Figure 4.2 Organizational Structure of Mondragon (since 1991) 
 
 
 
Source: “Organizational structure” adapted from MacLeod (1997, p. 33).  
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planning, co-ordination, and internationalization functions because the group had increased its 
size and complexity and the new head of the group could support the co-ops more efficiently." 
Nevertheless, Mondragon has a tradition of centralizing decision-making and top-down 
approaches, which raises concerns about perpetuating styles observed from its inception.   
 
However, one of the problems of creating such super structure is the risk of bureaucratization 
and loss of member control. In fact, the group is not without critics. Interviewees, Jesus Maria 
Herrasti, CEO of the Garaia Innovation Pole, and Jose Ramon Elortza point out that there is 
some disappointment and discontent at the bottom level in some co-ops. Shop floor worker 
members claim that the power is being held at the top and that "those below" cannot make proper 
informed decisions when the "ones above" do not share all the financial information necessary. 
Nor do they encourage lower level members to pursue financial literacy. This situation fuels a 
feeling of powerlessness among shop floor members in some co-ops—and in turn a drop in 
democratic participation. However, those concerned members still prefer to work in a co-
operative when confronted with the alternative of a private business. This unhappiness expressed 
in some co-ops may lead to a crisis of grassroots participation, very important for healthy co-
operatives, which suggests that the principal-agent dilemma has not been fully addressed.  
 
4.2.1 Internationalization strategy of private sector response to globalization as a means to 
save the co-ops 
 
The internationalization of Mondragon sparked criticisms in terms of job creation at home as 
well as the application of capitalist business practices abroad that contradict co-op principles 
(Matthews, 1999; Reed, 2009). It was thought that opening up subsidiaries in other countries 
would threaten employment in the Basque region. However, interviewee Jesus Goienetxe points 
out that "initially some feared that opening plants overseas would result in lost opportunities for 
job creation at home, but curiously the co-ops in the group that have pursued internationalization 
have created more jobs here than their domestic counterparts, with growth rates close to double 
the average." That seems to suggest that, on the one hand, the positive results of the plants 
overseas helped the mother co-op at home with profits to expand and create more jobs locally, 
and, on the other hand, it also speaks to the choices of the mother co-ops in using those profits. 
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The Mondragon group has been able to retain jobs in the Basque region using an 
internationalization strategy (Clamp, 2000); however, Mondragon is not committed to 
employment creation abroad. In fact, when foreign production can be moved to the Basque 
region, they will do so, leaving foreign workers displaced in overseas plants (Clamp, 2000). 
Partnering in joint ventures with for profit-companies or state-owned firms (especially in China) 
and not with other co-operatives when operating abroad has generated criticism related to the 
application of co-op principles (Reed, 2009). The fact that Mondragon did not set up their own 
co-operatives abroad to create employment overseas, and chose to apply capitalist business 
practices seems to be against the co-op principles of member ownership and participation (Reed, 
2009).  
 
The internationalization of Mondragon does not follow, however, the traditional 
internationalization strategies multinationals apply. The plants set up abroad do not subscribe to 
the practice of taking advantage of cheap labour and looser labour laws to produce the same 
products at a lower cost for the home country, leading to factory closures and jobs' losses. 
Instead, the products manufactured abroad are distributed locally or in neighbouring countries to 
make a profit that MCC uses at home (MacLeod & Reed, 2009; Reed, 2009). If those products 
manufactured abroad were sold at home, it would kill the industrial co-ops in the Basque region, 
defeating Mondragon employment creation goals.  On the one hand, "multi-localization" is a 
very innovative approach to address competitive pressures of globalization; on the other hand, 
the approach strays from co-operative principles (Reed, 2009, p. 34). Interviewee Mikel Lezamiz 
pointed out, "We are aware of the implications of this capitalistic move for co-op principles, and 
we are not happy about it, but we had to respond to competition in a rapid manner to avoid 
missing the train. Starting co-operatives abroad takes a long time and considerable investment. 
We have a plan to start educating workers abroad on the co-operative model and eventually to 
turn the foreign plants into co-ops but it requires a significant amount of money that we can't 
afford right now." This comment highlights the choices made by the Mondragon group not to 
apply co-operative principles with the excuse of competition. The fact that Mondragon has been 
benefiting from those profits for two decades makes the plan to turn the plants overseas into co-
ops less likely. A co-operative group that has branded co-operative principles into management 
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practices should not have strayed from them. It remains to be seen when and how Mondragon 
addresses these concerns. 
 
4.3 Mondragon Co-operative Support Organizations 
 
As explained above, the credit union was the heart of the development strategy of the 
Mondragon co-ops for decades. Following Arizmendiarrieta's vision, the Mondragon co-
operatives created their own support organizations to assist them in all the necessities of their 
lives as needs and opportunities arose (MCC, 2008). One of the reasons to do so was the relative 
hostility of the dictatorial government in the initial years to co-ops  self-organizing beyond its 
paternalistic arm. They challenged the odds against them by developing successfully the local 
economy without any external help during the severe economic depression of the post civil war 
years. The Mondragon co-ops could not count on a friendly government to provide them with the 
supportive policies, legislation, and programs necessary to encourage their development. At 
most, thanks to the relationships Don Jose Maria was able to build among some government 
officials in Madrid, the government turned a blind eye to the development of the Mondragon co-
ops. Instead of forbidding them, it merely assisted in authorizing the incorporation of an 
industrial worker co-op, ULGOR, filling up a legal void at the time. Although it is true that 
without the authorization of the public administration, the Mondragon co-ops would never have 
existed in the form of co-ops, a mere authorization to exist is not a supportive environment for 
co-operative development but rather a "neutral" policy (Hoyt, 1989, p. 89). Most of the countries 
in the world have co-operative legislation allowing these organizations to exist, but that does not 
mean that permission to exist is active government support to favour the development of co-ops 
or "supportive" policy (Hoyt, 1989, p. 89). This fact confirms that government authorization to 
incorporate is vital, but support and assistance are not absolutely necessary elements to develop 
co-operatives successfully. Living in an "occupied region" (as Arizmendi put it) by a controlling 
enemy that suppressed their Basque identity, pride, and culture, the co-operators opted for the 
route of self-help and economic solidarity by creating, first, the Mondragon co-ops, and, second, 
their own support organizations (Whyte & Whyte, 1991, p. 242). Following institutional theory 
with cultural lenses, organizations are a reflection of the culture where they are embedded. 
Although the Mondragon co-operatives reproduced unknowingly the dominant power structures 
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they complained about, the institutional designs by their leader, Arizmendi, challenged economic 
and political domination of the status quo by incorporating worker ownership and a democratic 
system. Despite this contradiction, the Mondragon co-operatives learned through Arizmendi's 
teachings to challenge structural barriers to lessen the burden of repression. 
 
In addition to the Caja and its divisions, support entities included: 
- Mondragon University and vocational training centres for training qualified staff 
- Lagun Aro, a social security co-operative to insure workers 
- Ikerlan, a research and development centre for new products, productions processes, 
energy efficiency, and renewable energy  
- Saiolan, a business incubator centre to support co-op start-ups, sector diversity through 
innovation, and innovative production processes  
- Garaia, a research and development centre in sectors such as energy, construction 
technology, business management, micro-electronics, telecommunications, and 
nanotechnology (MCC, 2008). (See in Appendix 5 the details of these Mondragon Co-
operative Support Organizations) 
 
These support organizations in addition to the credit union were crucial in achieving the decades 
of successful co-operative development. Besides flexible access to capital provided by the credit 
union, education, research and business development play an important role in supporting growth 
of co-operative enterprises.  
 
It is important to note that despite the informal hierarchical structure with the strong leadership at 
the top, Arizmendi did craft co-ops in an unusual way considering the Spanish culture of that 
time. Worker ownership and democratic structure in the co-ops was a novelty. We have to 
concede that he wanted to change the status quo by creating new types of organizations aligned 
with his ideals and values. That is why despite the fact that the organizations informally 
reproduced some authoritarian tendencies of dominant institutions, Arizmendi was so conscious 
to build leadership among the members. As Mondragon started, an educational process was well 
underway to the point that when the leader died in 1976, the co-ops did not collapse. The 
educational process started with community development projects and educational institutions as 
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soon as he arrived in Mondragon in 1941. One of the interviewees noted that even though the 
workers insisted many times that Don Jose Maria take a formal position as CEO in the co-ops, he 
always refused alleging that the workers needed to own the projects (Jose Ramon Elortza). He 
remained formally outside the co-ops as the brains of the organizations until the workers' 
leadership and management skills were fully developed. That is precisely a common problem 
many co-operatives suffer that follow a leader without any regard for building the leadership and 
succession planning in the membership. In the absence of the leader, the co-op collapses.  
4.4 Spanish and Basque public policies to support co-op development 
Besides the strong co-operative development policy Mondragon embraced from the beginning, 
government at the three levels (federal, regional/provincial, and local) has likewise opted to work 
together with the co-op sector toward better policy support for co-operatives since the end of the 
dictatorship. As explained in chapter III, the beginning of the Mondragon co-operative 
experience in 1956 was not easy because the co-operative law of 1942 did not recognize the 
worker co-op model, and Franco's regime was not friendly to the co-operative movement for 
ideological reasons. Arizmendi's search for legal solutions led him to meet with government 
officials responsible for co-operatives, and befriend some of them, which aided in crafting 
worker co-op bylaws despite the legal vacuum. In this way, the officials legitimated the new 
legal figure allowing the incorporation of the worker co-op, ULGOR, in 1959, and also turned a 
blind eye to internal democratic practices once they realized that the co-operators were not a 
political threat to the regime (Aymerich Cruells, 2008). Although the existing co-operative 
legislation under Franco was "destructive" in Hoyt's (1989) framework, the fact that government 
officials identified a fissure in the law to authorize the worker co-op means that it was a "neutral" 
policy (p. 89). As an institutional entrepreneur, Arizmendi worked from the inside of the 
institutional framework to change it as he wanted and precipitated legal, institutional, and social 
innovation. Interviewee Zorione Aregi, head of the Legal Department of MCC, explains that the 
positive socio-economic results of the co-operatives were an important incentive for government 
at all levels to be open to work together with the co-op sector. The co-operatives had to 
demonstrate their value and make change first before government crafted more favourable co-op 
public policy and legislation after the Spanish Constitution of 1978. This suggests that the 
motivation of social actors to pursue change is a primary condition for co-operative 
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development, and neutral policy and legislation a secondary component of the development 
spectrum that comes as a consequence of the visions and pressure of social actors .  
After Franco’s death in 1975, Spain reorganized its political system from a centralist dictatorial 
regime to a parliamentary constitutional monarchy, a type of state respectful of the regions' rights 
to elect regional and local governments. Under the dictatorship, regions did not have the 
authority and autonomy to elect their own representatives and legislatures and only federal laws 
applied to the whole country. Executive, legislative, and judicial powers were in the hands of the 
central Spanish government. International pressure and the need to modernize the country 
encouraged Spain to adopt a system more in tune with the times. A parliamentary representative 
democratic constitutional monarchy was the political system agreed upon following European 
examples such as Holland, the United Kingdom, Denmark, Sweden, Norway,  where a monarch 
is the head of state, and a democratically elected president or prime minister is the head of 
government. Consequently, regions became autonomous communities and could elect their own 
executive government and legislatures.  
The first significant policy change for co-operatives was the recognition of the value of such 
organizations in the Spanish Constitution of 1978. Article 129.2 states: "The public authorities 
shall effectively promote the various forms of participation in enterprise and facilitate 
cooperative enterprises by means of appropriate legislation.  They shall also establish the means 
that will facilitate access by the workers to ownership of the means of production."  This article 
is partly in recognition of the role co-operatives played in the reconstruction of the broken 
economy after the civil war ended in 1939. Key informant Jesus Goienetxe pointed out the 
influence Mondragon had on the crafting of that constitutional article 129.2: “by the time the 
constitution was passed, Don Jose Maria’s legacy was present thanks to the government 
relationships he was able to build, and the Mondragon co-ops had shown their ability to provide 
positive results, so that government could not easily overlook our importance.” Public authorities 
also recognized in this article that workers deserve support to facilitate access to the means of 
production, which Goienetxe claims to be an achievement partially due to the large worker co-op 
constituency in the Mondragon movement.  
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Following Schneider & Ingram (2008), public policy reflects predominant social constructions of 
certain groups in society, and sometimes it acts as a vehicle for change as in the case of this 
constitutional norm. It expresses how deserving a certain group, the co-op movement, is of the 
policy maker's attention to grant it both recognition and the necessary supports. Discourse is 
shaped by values and perspectives, and values are in turn shaped through the discursive process. 
Education around the structural barriers facing social actors precipitated a growing awareness 
that helped reshape the policy field and its discourse to make it more prone to change. Thus, this 
constitutional article's discourse is influenced by social, economic, political, and cultural 
processes in Spain from the civil war years up until 1978, and in turn, the legal norm determines 
those processes for the present and future of the co-operative sector.  
The constitutional norm set the ground to build the rest of the legislation and policies to regulate 
all aspects of co-operatives’ lives. Federal, regional, and local legislation and policies followed 
after the constitution was passed. The Law 27/1999 on Co-operatives is the general federal act 
that regulates all aspects of the co-operatives’ lives in Spain.  
The law establishes the novel figures of the indivisible reserves or reserve fund, and the 
education and promotion fund of the co-operative: “The mandatory reserve fund intended for 
consolidation, development and guarantee of the cooperative, is indivisible between members” 
(art. 55). Only the positive results of the co-operative can be assigned to the indivisible reserves. 
Article 58 explains that a minimum of 20 percent of the profits of the co-operative must be 
assigned to the indivisible reserves if the profits are a result of business with its own members; 
the co-op must assign to the indivisible reserves 50 percent of the profits if those are a result of 
business with non-members. This reserve fund has the ability to be leveraged for loans and can 
cover losses of the co-operative.  
 
Interviewee Zorione Arregi, head of the Legal Department of MCC, points out that the spirit of 
the law has been to facilitate the capitalization of the co-operative with the mandatory 
contribution to the reserve fund, in this way, attempting to “correct the obstacles the co-operative 
suffers to attract capital that are not present in the case of an investor-owned firm.” With the 
purpose of assisting the long-term financial stability and strength of the co-operatives’ assets, 
these reserves cannot be drawn on by the employees/members. This means that in case of 
                                                
 126 
dissolution of the organization, individual members cannot pull their investment because the law 
assigns the collective reserve to the co-op federation to which the organization belonged. This 
mechanism also motivates the members to work towards the success of the organization as in 
case of failure, they would lose their individual investments to the co-op federation. It also 
eliminates the incentive to demutualize or to turn the co-op into an IOF. The policy thus 
prioritizes the collective interest and survival of the organization over the interests of the 
individual members since in case of dissolution the individual members are not able to pull 
his/her personal investments from the organization. As a consequence of the education and 
consciousness raising around the need for a type of organization that better represented popular 
aspirations, this policy created a mechanism to help capitalization of co-ops that gives primacy to 
the interests of the organization over the individual economic interests of the members.  
 
In turn, the Basque Co-operative Act 4/1993 establishes that the minimum contribution to the 
reserve fund for co-operatives in the Basque Country is 20 percent of the profits, similar to the 
Federal Co-op Act 27/1999. Interviewee Mikel Lezamiz, Co-op Dissemination Director at the 
International Department of MCC, explains that the Mondragon Group decided to increase the 
mandatory contribution to 45 percent of the profits to the reserve fund or indivisible reserves 
with the intention of strengthening the co-ops beyond the threshold the law mandates. This 
collective property notion was also noted in the Mondragon internal policy of sharing profits and 
losses among the co-ops. Such a notion might not be easily accepted in more individualistic 
factions within cultures such as Anglophone Canada. 
 
The co-op education and promotion fund is established in article 56 of the Federal Co-operative 
Act 27/1999:  
The co-op education and promotion fund will be allocated according to the bylaws or the 
General Assembly, to activities that meet one of the following purposes: 
a) Training and education of their members and workers in cooperative principles 
and values, or specific areas of corporate activity or employment and other 
cooperative activities. 
b) The diffusion of cooperatives, and promotion of inter-cooperative 
 relations. 
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c) Promoting cultural, professional and caring local environment or community in 
general and improving the quality of life and community development and 
environmental protection actions. 
Despite the market logic cited in the Exposition of Motives, the discourse here is more in tune 
with the social aspect of co-ops.  
 
The education and promotion fund is non-seizable and indivisible between members; even in the 
event of liquidation of the co-operative, it must appear on the liabilities side of the accounts. The 
fund is audited every two years to ensure that co-ops comply with this law; they face fines in the 
amount of their shortfall should they fail to do so. Thus, should the co-operative not spend the 
funds according to the law, the amount becomes public debt and the co-operative risks losing its 
co-operative status. Article 58 establishes that the minimum contribution to the education and 
promotion fund is 5 percent of the profits at the end of the fiscal year but mentions no maximum. 
However, the Basque Co-operative Act 4/1993 increases the mandatory contribution to 10 
percent of the profits for the Basque co-operatives in article 67.2.a. Mondragon’s legal expert, 
Zorione Arregi, explains that the Basque law emphasizes the role co-ops play in community 
economic development, and for that reason, it mandates a higher percentage of contribution than 
the federal act.  
 
As the concept of indivisible reserves gives primacy to the interests of the organization over the 
individual economic interests of the members, so does the education and promotion fund show a 
collective property approach. According to the Basque Co-op Act 4/1993, if a co-operative 
dissolves, after covering the losses and debts, the remaining indivisible reserves, and the 
education and promotion fund must go to the Basque Executive Council of Co-operatives for co-
op development (art. 94.2). In the case of the Federal Co-op Act 27/1999, article 75.2 explains 
that the amount of the education and promotion fund and the remaining indivisible reserves will 
be made available to the co-operative federation that the co-op is associated with. If it is not 
affiliated with any federation, the General Assembly may designate the relevant co-operative 
federation. In the absence of designation, such amount shall be paid to the National 
Confederation of Co-operatives corresponding to the co-operative, and in the absence of the 
Confederation the amount shall be paid to general government revenue for the promotion of co-
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operatives. “The policy maker understood that the reason of these provisions is the public 
purpose of a co-operative,” according to Zorione Arregi. This legal figure was created in the 
framework of the collective property notion, also noted in the Mondragon internal policy of 
sharing profits and losses among the co-ops. 
 
4.4.1 Tax advantages for co-ops 
Co-operatives in Spain receive substantial corporate tax advantages at the Federal and provincial 
level when comparing with privately owned firms. The Federal Co-operatives Tax Act (Law 
20/1990) establishes that worker co-ops, agricultural co-ops, community exploitation of land co-
ops, fishery co-ops, and consumer co-ops are considered "specially protected co-ops" and for that 
reason, the corporate income tax rate is 10 per cent of the profits (art. 2, and 34). The Mondragon 
Group is located in the Basque region, province of Guipuzkoa, which has its own Co-operatives 
Tax Act (2/1997) in which "fiscally protected co-operatives"  are worker co-ops, agricultural co-
ops, community exploitation co-ops, consumer co-ops, and school co-ops (art. 2 and 5). 
Federally and provincially all co-operatives, except credit unions, housing co-ops, insurance co-
ops, service co-ops, school co-ops, transport co-ops, and health co-ops, are considered specially 
protected organizations for tax purposes. Like the Federal Co-op Tax Act, the tax rate for these 
co-ops is 10 percent as well (art. 27).  In turn, investor owned firms' tax rate is about 28 percent. 
This tax advantage is one of the key policies that enable the development of the co-op sector. 
(See Appendix 6 for more details on the tax advantages for co-ops). 
Tax legislation is one of the key policies that enabled the development of the co-op movement to 
achieve significant strength, capacity, and autonomy. Although these tax advantages did not exist 
when the Mondragon Group created its first support systems, services, and institutions, including 
a social security system, financial institutions, innovation and research centres, they certainly 
helped the subsequent development and expansion of the co-op group and its support institutions. 
The discourse of both tax laws, the Spanish and the Basque province of Gipuzkoa, is very 
revealing of the enormous value it places on co-operatives when it declares them as "fiscally 
protected" organizations, and creates another category as "specially protected" for some types of 
them. The norm expresses how deserving the co-op movement is of the policy maker's attention 
to grant it recognition and the necessary fiscal supports for its development. Certainly, the 
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discourse of the legal norm has been shaped by a co-construction process between social actors 
and policy makers as a consequence of a learning process.  
 
Zorione Arregi explains that the policy, as in the case of the indivisible reserves, aimed at 
“correcting the legal obstacles co-ops face in attracting capital and resources that investor owned 
firms do not face when establishing the tax benefits.” Therefore, the intention of the legislator 
has been to try and level the playing field for co-ops since their legal structure does not allow for 
outside investment because it compromises the autonomy of the co-op, and co-operatives 
“produce positive socio-economic results in community development” that justify the 
advantages. 
 
4.4.2 Hybrid co-operative forms: Mixed Co-op and Anonymous Labour Society 
 
Creativity and innovation are, in part, a consequence of democratic participation in co-operatives 
as they try to adapt to cope with major challenges such as economic crises. The Basque Co-
operative Act 4/1993 created the figures of the mixed co-operative and the Federal Anonymous 
Labour Society Act 4/1997 the anonymous labour society, both designed to face economic 
downturns. Specially, the figure of the mixed co-op is important because it was a product of the 
vision and creativity of the Mondragon group. The Federal Co-operative Act 27/1999 copied that 
legal figure in its article 109 using the exact same language as the article 136 of the Basque Co-
operative Act 4/1993. Due to the practicality of the legal figure, the federal legislator adopted it 
as well, which speaks to the creativity and innovation of Mondragon that goes beyond itself. (See 
appendix 6 for more details on these two legal figures). 
 
Pursuing laws and policy change was not a considerable hurdle for the co-operators once 
democracy was in place. According to Jesus Goienetxe, “Policy makers and government official 
regardless of their political colours have been, to varying degrees, on our side; it would have 
been difficult for them to turn us down since we produced very good results in community 
economic development.” Co-construction of policy since the democratic reform of Spain (1978) 
permitted innovative laws and regulations to be devised with the input of the co-operatives. 
Pedro Mendieta assigns to legislation and policies a mere instrumental and distributive character 
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because they can facilitate or not co-operatives’ ability to develop. In this sense, "neutral" policy 
is key for co-operatives to develop, but "supportive" policy is not necessarily indispensable as 
the Mondragon co-ops developed without government supports (Hoyt, 1989, p. 89). 
"Supportive" public policy, that is neither necessary, nor sufficient as Hoyt (1989) reminds us (p. 
89). Mondragon's motivation and determination within an educational process plus an 
advantageous autarkic economic policy were the main determinants of their development.  
 
4.5 Basque co-operative support organizations 
 
Co-operative support organizations are a crucial part of the co-operative development process 
helping address the main obstacles such as lack of funding mechanisms, and technical assistance 
and education (Adeler, 2009; Cornforth & Thomas, 1990). It is also important to highlight for the 
purposes of this dissertation that public policy created co-op support organizations in the Basque 
region, for instance, the Executive Council of Co-operatives, Elkar-Lan Coop, OINARRI Loan 
Guarantee Company, and Elkar-Ikertegia Coop. Before these organizations existed the 
Mondragon group, however, started their own support organizations such as the credit union, and 
research and education centres at a time when public policy did not provide supportive co-
operative institutions. (See appendix 7 for details on the Basque co-operative support 
organizations.) 
 
4.6 Financing Mechanisms 
4.6.1 Inter-co-operative Solidarity Fund, Central Co-operative Fund, MCC Investments, 
MCC Foundation. 
 
As a consequence of the lesser role the credit union has played for the Mondragon group since 
the 1980s’ legislative changes introduced by the National Bank of Spain, which required more 
diversification of the risk and less capital available to the co-ops, the Congress of 1987 
established the Inter-co-operative Solidarity Fund. The Fund added to the sources of capital 
available for new and existing co-ops, especially to inject capital into co-ops in financial 
difficulties (Mathews, 1999).  In 1991 this fund was included as part of the Central Inter-co-
operation Fund, which channels resources for job creation "through the funding of development 
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and internationalization projects, and for strengthening the co-operatives by offsetting losses and 
providing financial guarantees" (MCC, 2008, p. 50). This fund encompasses two support entities. 
The first one is the MCC Foundation, an educational and training institution which helps co-
operatives “with feasibility studies for new activities, marketing and sales networks overseas and 
assistance for co-operatives which are emerging, restructuring or retooling” (Mathews, 1999, p. 
222). The second support entity is a venture capital fund, MCC Investments, whose function is to 
start new co-ops and assist with expansions of existing co-ops. The Central Inter-co-operation 
Fund exists thanks to a 10 percent annual contribution of the co-operatives’ profits and 18.4 
percent contribution of the credit union profits. As an example, in one year (1996), the Central 
Inter-co-operation Fund received $US 80 million, which were distributed to MCC Foundation 
($US 55 million in contributions), and MCC Investments made investments in the co-ops worth 
$25 million, (p. 222). In 2003, another fund was created, the Corporate Solidarity Fund, to 
supplement the system for offsetting any losses that might be incurred by co-operatives in the 
Industry Area, with 4.7 million euros received in 2008 (MCC, 2008, p. 50). These funds speak to 
the inter-co-operative solidarity and the collective property notion embedded in their culture that 
have been a feature of the Mondragon co-ops—and of their success—since they started in 1956.  
 
The Fund for Education and Inter-co-operative Development established in 1989 to help small 
co-ops get access to large bids and major contract projects also funds non-profit educational and 
research projects through Mondragon education institutions and research centres. The funding 
comes from the mandatory 10 percent of the net profits for education and promotion fund. The 
Mondragon co-ops have chosen to assign the mandatory contribution to this Fund for Education 
and Inter-co-operative Development to pool resources and have a coherent strategy coordinated 
centrally. It is interesting to note that the Mondragon co-ops have worked in groups with a head 
institution coordinating and setting policy for the associated co-ops since the beginning. That 
trend continues today even for sharing losses and profits, and depositing mandatory contributions 
in central funds managed by MCC. In 2008, this fund reached 35.3 million euros (MCC, 2008, p. 
50). The Mundukide Foundation was created in 1999 with the object of revitalizing the 
Mondragon co-op principles of solidarity, inter-co-operation, social transformation and 
universality, and apply them to the Developing World. MCC understood that Third World 
                                                
 132 
countries could benefit from the lessons learned by the Mondragon co-op experience, and for 
that reason the foundation pursues co-operative development projects abroad. 
 
4.7 Conclusion 
 
In the context of answering the research questions of this dissertation, Mondragon co-operatives 
have tackled critical pieces of a successful co-operative development strategy: technical 
assistance, education, and financing. Those components plus their innovative internal policy 
mechanisms such as the individual capital accounts, and the principle-based approach to business 
(especially inter-co-operative solidarity, equality and sovereignty of labour over capital) make 
for an effective internal co-op development strategy. Spanish public policy, including new legal 
precedents (incorporation of the first industrial worker co-op and the credit union with a hybrid 
legal structure, both in 1959), the co-op legislation coming out of the 1978 Constitution, and tax 
legislation, complement the policy supports available for co-op development. The Mondragon 
co-ops have been able to make innovative change for themselves and beyond by devising a very 
effective support system for co-operative development.  
 
We should note that along the lines of institutional theory (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991) and 
cultural studies (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005; Hall, 1980), the Mondragon co-op development 
reflects the socio-cultural and institutional features of the Spanish society of the time (1950s). 
Part of the brilliance of the institutional entrepreneur, Arizmendi, is to have identified the 
fissures in the system, and worked within that institutional system to create change in the way he 
envisioned. He worked with government officials as he did with his disciples. He founded a 
trades school to give local youth opportunities, and guided them to start the first industrial 
worker co-op in 1956. This leader was a product of a patriarchal, hierarchical culture even 
though he fought in the civil war (1936-1939) on the Republican side against the dictator Franco. 
Arizmendi reflected a common contradiction of the Spain of the time. He shaped teenagers going 
through the trades school o share his world view seeking social transformation through common 
people's access to the means of production, thereby democratizing the local economy. 
Arizmendi’s reshaping of his disciples  proved to be a long-term task. The economy was 
devastated, the youth had no opportunities for education or employment. As Ormaechea (1993) 
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recalled, they were “full of religious fervour, had been born in very humble families in years of 
social collapse and were on the verge of pathological hunger” (p. 15). In this context, the figure 
of a charismatic leader gave hope to the youth and naturally they followed him without 
questioning his  methods. They did challenge some of his boldest ideas because they thought he 
was asking for impossible ventures, for instance, the need for a credit union, and the viability of 
such a business. These youth who bought into his world view did not mind Arizmendi forging 
their signatures in a meeting that never existed to establish the credit union. Nevertheless, an 
educational process was taking place thanks to the school and the practical learning in the co-
ops. Some of the comments of interviewees show the contradiction of the culture. Unknowingly 
the disciples were brought up to expect directions, yet they also wanted to have a democratic and 
equalitarian enterprise. The learning process and capacity building of the workers was the result 
of Arizmendi's emphasis on education. When he died in 1976, the Mondragon co-ops kept 
growing as a result.  
 
By the last years of the dictatorship, Spain was starting to recover economically and to show a 
desire for a more democratic state, which was achieved when Franco died in 1975. The 
Mondragon co-ops also reflected this change in society. As the learning process deepened over 
time, workers would internalize Arizmendi's values. Nevertheless, institutional design contained 
strong head organizations (i.e. the groups, the credit union, MCC) to coordinate strategy, set 
policy, approve accounts and budgets, coordinate transfer of workers among the co-ops, etc. 
Although the head organizations facilitated difficult tasks such as harmonizing profits and losses, 
it meant a decrease of the autonomy and sovereignty of individual co-ops. Apparently, co-
operatives were willing to do so because  protection from economic fluctuations, and supports 
such as affordable capital, expertise, and research outweighed the downsides of sharing profits 
with other co-ops and losing some autonomy. Still, the conscientization process the students and 
later workers went through was a key component of development that engraved Arizmendi's 
views, which facilitated the crafting and development of resilient co-op institutions.  
 
Although the leadership and capacity building of the workers was happening, once Arizmendi 
died, the Mondragon group kept an institutional design with some top-down features. First, it 
was the groups and the credit union; now it is the Mondragon Co-operative Corporation (MCC) 
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that coordinates strategy and the internationalization process and manages inter-co-operative 
solidarity funds. As we have seen, interviewees mentioned shop floor workers' complaints that 
MCC is too bureaucratic, "inaccessible," keeping the power for those "above," and keeping 
financial information that would allow lower level workers to fully participate in democratic 
decision-making. Although internal democratic processes in the co-ops are real, the fact that 
some workers feel disempowered to participate is an important issue that  could render the co-op 
group dysfunctional.  
 
As institutional shape is the consequence of social actors, so is policy development. Socio-
cultural embeddedness of policy and legislation is a result of the actions of social actors and 
policy makers influenced by cultural, economic, and political processes (Goodrich, Douzinas & 
Hachamovitch, 1994; Bauman, 2002; Engle, 2010) and Polanyi's (1957). Along those lines, 
Father Arizmendi searched for a legal structure for their business venture that would allow for 
worker ownership, democracy, and sovereignty of labour over capital because the existing co-
operative law of 1942 did not include the figure of the worker co-op. The reality of co-operatives 
in Spain under the dictatorship was that they had to operate under the control of the public 
administration without revealing internal democratic practices unsupported in the legislation. In 
fact, a huge disconnection between the legal realm and the actual practices co-operatives 
followed was the consequence of the political and legal oppression (Atienza Mazias, Merino Mar 
& Ruiz Huydobro, 2004). In that scenario, Arizmendi's tenacity in building relationships with the 
government officials responsible for the co-operative portfolio in Madrid proved to be extremely 
valuable because the Mondragon co-ops were able to incorporate as such despite the legal void. 
Although the authorization to exist is a "neutral" policy and not a "supportive" policy for co-ops, 
it was very necessary for the Mondragon co-op development (Hoyt, 1989, p. 89). The brilliance 
of Arizmendi is in identifying the opportunities within the system, in building the capacity and 
leadership of young people, and in designing novel institutional forms that reflected the culture 
and at the same time challenged it for change.   
 
Legislative changes after Franco facilitated co-operative development. In 1978, the new Spanish 
constitution recognized the value of co-operatives, deemed them deserving of all the supports the 
legislation could provide, and acknowledged the importance of facilitating the ownership of the 
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means of production by workers. That norm, in turn, determined future co-operative 
development. Examples of this notion are the Federal Co-operatives Act 27/1999, the Basque 
Co-op Act 4/1993, the Spanish federal tax Act 20/1990, and the Basque province of Gipuzkoa 
Tax Act 2/1997. For instance, the Basque Co-op Act 4/1993 expressly states that in case of tied 
bids for public contracts, the public administration will give the preference to worker co-ops, 
second tier co-ops, or further tiers of worker co-ops, setting an important procurement policy 
precedent. The Mondragon Group had considerable influence in crafting the legislation. Federal 
and regional co-op legislation alike included the legal figure of the reserve fund or indivisible 
reserves, and the co-op education and promotion fund that every co-op ought to contribute to. If 
a co-op dissolves, the indivisible reserves and the co-op education and promotion fund must go 
to a public entity such as the co-op confederation, in the Spanish case, or the Executive Co-op 
Council, in the Basque case, for co-operative development and promotion. This collective 
property framework is also reflected in the policy of pooling resources and harmonizing profits 
and loses in the Mondragon co-ops. Indeed, the social constructions of the co-operators and the 
legislators, thanks to a valued educational process, are captured in the discourse of the legal 
provisions highlighting the public and collective purpose of co-operatives. Spanish and Basque 
socio-cultural features as well as their political and economic processes did encourage innovative 
policy that assisted co-operative development.  
 
The process of crafting and elaborating co-op policy by several interested parties on an equal 
basis, or "co-construction," leads to a more effective policy given that the "flexibility of the co-
operative" approaches may result in "innovations" (Vaillancourt, 2008, p. 12, 36). The discourse 
of both tax laws, the Spanish federal tax law and the Basque province of Gipuzkoa tax law, is a 
consequence of a co-construction process that reveals the value it places on co-operatives when it 
declares all of them as "fiscally protected" organizations, and it creates another category as 
"specially protected" for some types. The norm expresses how deserving  the co-op movement, is 
of the policy maker's attention to grant it recognition and the necessary fiscal supports for 
development that level the playing field with investor-owned firms. One important example 
involves the tax advantages for co-ops resulting from this co-construction process, significant for 
the development of the movement.  
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Innovation and creativity are key themes in the Mondragon development strategy. For instance, 
the mixed co-op, explained Pedro Mendieta, Jesus Goienetxe, and Zorione Arregi, was a legal 
figure devised by Mondragon legal experts advising the Executive Council of Co-ops of the 
Basque Country as the temporary solution to the economic crisis of the 1980s. Indeed, public 
policy plays a critical role in strengthening co-operatives since the lower corporation tax rate, the 
co-op education and promotion fund, as well as internal Mondragon policies of retaining surplus 
in both the indivisible reserves and the individual capital accounts, the co-operative group retains 
80 percent of its annual net profits as assets, significantly enhancing its financial sustainability.  
 
Co-operatives engaging in developing other co-operatives in the Mondragon case avoid some of 
the dangers of government-led development for political reasons.  Established co-ops have gone 
through the process themselves, can provide first-hand technical assistance, support, in some 
cases even financing, and offer a sense of belonging to a movement (Pollet & Develtere, 2004). 
The Mondragon co-ops pursuing the development of other co-ops as a primary goal showed 
positive results. Their institutionalization of co-op development is a testimony to that fact.  
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CHAPTER V. CONCLUSIONS: TWO CONTRASTING VIEWS OF CO-OPERATIVE 
DEVELOPMENT 
 
This dissertation has explored the particular evolution of an organization, the Mondragon group, 
to better understand the co-operative development process. This study has uncovered the 
importance of institutional frameworks in the process of understanding the development of the 
Mondragon group. By analyzing its well-known development story, this dissertation has helped 
rethink the often taken for granted assumptions of much of the literature on co-operative and 
policy development. Within the context of co-operative development factors and strategies 
widely discussed in the literature, this interdisciplinary dissertation has explored the extent to 
which Mondragon's development is deeply embedded in and shaped by the cultural and 
institutional contradictions of its environment. 
 
Institutional frameworks provide stability and order to social life, yet conflict and change as 
much as consensus and conformity in social structures are elements of institutions (Scott, 2005). 
As we have seen in the Mondragon case, institutional frameworks that seem so natural as to 
appear invisible and inevitable have cracks and complexities that open up room to counter the 
dominant logic. Those cracks and fissures become visible with an "erosion of beliefs and rules" 
that leads to those disadvantaged by the system pursuing change through collective action (Scott, 
2005, p. 414). In challenging yet remaining implicated in the dominant system, inherent 
contradictions in the legal and cultural domains become visible as social actors seek change. 
Since co-operatives are collective organizations that tend to emerge as a reaction to the status 
quo, they will often reproduce at least some of the contradictions they engage with as they 
pursue change. For instance, Mondragon social actors sought social change in reacting against 
the dictatorship but not without reproducing some of the authoritarian traces in the structure in 
the co-ops. These tensions and contradictions are often overlooked by the co-op development 
literature, missing the influence of institutional complexities in development. The Mondragon 
co-ops developed in spite of a hostile political environment within a favourable autarkic 
economic policy that created a national market for the co-ops' products. Socio-cultural factors 
played a role in the institutional design Arizmendi crafted for the co-ops, mixing some 
authoritarian features in what is supposed to be a democratic and egalitarian institution, 
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contradicting the third co-operative principle, democracy, and the co-operative value, equality. 
The institutional framework developed as a consequence of and consistent with mid-twentieth-
century Spanish culture, when social actors could not fully escape the top-down social priorities 
of that time. The creation of democratic organizations through sometimes undemocratic means is 
one of the contradictions of the Spanish culture reflected in Mondragon's institutional shape. 
Precisely, change becomes possible because of the fissures and contradictions in the legal and 
cultural domains that allow social actors to take advantage of them, but not without residual 
complexities and contradictions. For instance, Spain did not have worker co-op legislation in the 
1950s, but Arizmendi sought a solution to the legal limbo faced by the first worker co-op, 
ULGOR, finding a crack in the tight, oppressive, and controlling system. He convinced the 
public authorities of the importance of an enterprise that presented no threat to the regime.  
Similarly, Arizmendi achieved the incorporation of the credit union in 1959 with a hybrid 
structure, novel to Spanish legislation, by working together with government officials and 
making them see that the new credit union structure was not against the law.    
 
Chapter III traced the influence of major institutions that help or hinder co-operative 
development by the Mondragon group. Chapter III unveiled Franco's oppressive regime of 
cultural legitimation that used religious and patriotic arguments to manufacture consent and 
legitimize the exploitation of the working class. However, those "regimes of truth" or 
legitimation strategies produce resistance (Foucault, 1991). In that context of domination, new 
educational practices involving a process of conscientization encouraged by the institutional 
entrepreneur, Arizmendi, allowed social actors to envision a new type of organization that 
responded to their socio-cultural and economic needs (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991). A critical 
analysis of co-operative laws and their evolution has revealed the embeddedness of policy and 
legislation in the social realm, which in the particular context of Franco’s Spain privileged the 
groups in power and disadvantaged the rest (Atienza Mazias, Merino Mar & Ruiz Huydobro, 
2004; Aymerich Cruells, 2008; del Arco, 1983; Mathews, 1999; Ormaechea, 1993; Zaar, 2010). 
However, that institutional framework also allowed for social actors to effect change. The 
convergence of structural faults and social actors, the persistence of Arizmendi, and the authority 
of Jose Luis del Arco found a solution to the legal limbo facing the first worker co-op, ULGOR. 
Jose Luis del Arco (1983) interpreted the existing co-op law in its spirit and found that it was not 
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against the structure the workers were pursuing. Although this approach to achieving legal 
change was likely only possible in a dictatorship. Arizmendi was able to identify and take 
advantage of an opportunity in the institutional framework that allowed the co-ops to exist in the 
way he envisioned. In this case, co-op development was a product of the pressure that social 
actors exerted on individuals and institutions to achieve the necessary legal changes. 
 
Following institutional theory (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991), the vision of the institutional 
entrepreneur (Arizmendi) was decisive in creating, maintaining, and changing organizations in 
order to adapt to the external environment and its socio-economic, cultural, legal, and political 
challenges. As a social entrepreneur as well, Arizmendi worked within the system to create the 
new organizations he envisioned would achieve social-economic change. In this case, he devised 
a new institutional form that combined an informal top-down governance model within a 
formally democratic and egalitarian structure, which in itself reflected the contradiction of 
Spanish culture. Living in a dictatorship, the institutions mirrored and mitigated the major 
organizations of the system, reflecting the investments in a more democratic society among those 
that fought in the civil war and lost (Aymerich Cruells, 2008; Richards, 1996). Consequently, as 
some sought change, they crafted new institutions even though those institutional forms kept 
traces of the dominant logic.  
 
Arizmendi's efforts were dedicated to education as soon as he arrived in Mondragon. He 
identified "education and credit", as the two pillars of a healthy co-op movement (del Arco, 
1983, p. 31). Community development initiatives, such as starting a soccer program for youth, 
daily parish work, the journal Trabajo y Union, and the Polytechnic School, were crucial to 
awakening a consciousness around structural barriers, which fueled the motivation to seek socio-
economic change (Freire, 1970). The school both indoctrinated youth and supplied an educated 
work force to the co-operatives (MacLeod, 1997; Whyte & Whyte, 1991; Morrison; 1991; 
Matthews, 1999; Ormaechea, 1993). Similarly, the embedding of the enterprises in a research-
rich environment (i.e., Ikerlan, Saiolan, Garaia Innovation Centre, etc) in order to supply cutting 
edge technology to the co-ops was also a key co-op development strategy. Since the social actors 
were inexperienced young adults and teenagers, the presence of a strong leader that mentored 
and guided them in starting and developing the enterprises was crucial to their development. 
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Despite the fact that Arizmendi was a leader with considerable power over his young disciples, 
an educational process was taking place that was building the skills, leadership, and 
independence of his disciples.  
 
The contradictions in the institutional framework had an important influence on co-operative 
development. The Caja Laboral Popular, or the credit union founding general meeting was one of 
the examples that showed the power of Arizmendi over his disciples as he forged their signatures 
when they refused to go ahead, and incorporated the institution (Ormaechea, 1993). It is also 
important to highlight that Arizmendi was trained in and represented the hierarchical and top-
down Catholic Church, which also influenced his strong approach in dealing with parish work, 
the school, the co-ops, and his disciples. The credit union did not allow community depositors to 
become members to keep the control of the organization in the hands of the workers and the 
industrial co-ops (Ormaechea, 1993). It was devised as the head organization of the group with 
the goal of coordinating general strategy, setting policy for the associated co-ops, and approving 
all of their accounts. This is noted in the institutional design of a central head organization (first 
the credit union and then MCC), for the co-op group that mirrored the role of the strong leader. 
Since the credit union was an indispensable source of capital  as well as a critical provider of 
technical assistance for co-op start-ups or expansion (Caja Laboral Popular, 2012; MacLeod, 
1997; Matthews, 1999; Morrison; 1991; Ormaechea, 1993; Whyte & Whyte, 1991), its services 
to the associated co-ops were crucial to their development and a strong incentive for the 
businesses to stay in the group. Those advantages outweighed the downsides of disaffiliating 
from the group and kept the co-ops within the group. The same central strategy is noted in the 
relationship between the co-ops and the research and innovation centres. The research centres are 
not fully autonomous or able to set their own research priorities, as they are allowed only to 
pursue research on products that can be produced by the co-ops themselves and that also are 
labour intensive in keeping with the mission of employment development. Once more, we can 
see the complexities and contradictions of the structure of the Mondragon group that still linger 
today. 
 
Although there is much to be learned from legal positivism, it typically fails to explore the 
embeddedness of policy and legislation in the social realm as it sees the process of policy 
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elaboration as neutral and objective (Bauman, 2002; Polanyi, 1957). For instance, the internal 
policy mechanisms of the Mondragon co-ops are a result of their needs and aspirations. The 
internal policy mechanisms include the individualized capital accounts designed to partially 
address the principal-agent dilemma (Fulton & Laycock, 1990), the inter-co-operation and 
solidarity values, the employment creation goal, and the establishment of co-op groups or 
clusters for mutual help and control of the associated co-ops (Matthews, 1999; Ormaechea, 
1993). The hybrid type of credit union envisioned by Arizmendi, which included workers as 
members, had no legal support in existing co-op legislation in the same way that the first worker 
co-op was in legal limbo. Spanish legal innovations are also a product of the pressure of social 
actors on the system. Examples of this process include the Constitutional recognition of co-ops, 
the mandatory indivisible reserves, the mandatory co-op education and promotion fund, the 
reduced corporate income tax rates for co-ops, and the Mondragon-devised mixed co-op and 
labour society (Spanish Constitution, 1978; Federal Co-op Act 27/1999, Basque Co-op Act 
4/1993; Federal Tax Act for Co-operatives 20/1990; Guipuzkoa Co-op Tax Act 2/1997). These 
Spanish legal innovations and the Mondragon internal policy mechanisms are important because 
they have positively influenced co-operative development.  
 
Chapter V picks up on the lessons learned from Mondragon's institutional framework to 
highlight some of the tensions and contradictions found in the co-operative development path in 
Manitoba in the last decade. Within this framework, the tensions between collective and 
individualistic approaches in the co-operative sector are unveiled. The particular choices of 
social actors that contradict co-operative principles, as well as the influence of those 
contradictions on co-operative development, are analyzed in light of the findings from the 
Mondragon case. 
 
5.1 A contradiction in co-operative development in Manitoba: collectivism vs. 
individualism in the process of institutional change 
 
The comparative nature of this dissertation permits us to learn from innovative examples 
elsewhere to shed light on how institutions are crafted and how they change in settings close to 
home. It is typically easier to recognize processes of which we are not a part and in which we are 
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thus less invested. The critical distance of the Mondragon case can help clarify change processes 
in which we participate in Canada. Since the researcher has been part of striking changes in the 
co-operative sector in Manitoba within the last ten years, comparing the Canadian and Spanish 
experiences can help clarify decisive factors that have shaped and reshaped Manitoba policy and 
practice. Both examples share complexities and contradictions that let us put the research in 
perspective. For these reasons, a Manitoba case is included into this study to bring light to the 
comparison of institutional change. 
 
All co-operatives face a dilemma in balancing collective interests and individual members' 
interests. However, this tension will produce different outcomes depending on the socio-cultural, 
political, and legal setting of a particular co-operative. Co-operatives are collective organizations 
set to achieve individual goals through the collective participation of all members in the 
enterprise. Tensions and contradictions will arise as a consequence of this dilemma. Finding 
what the membership considers a right balance between collectivism and individualism in the 
organization is related to the needs, views, assumptions, and beliefs of the members, which are in 
turn embedded in the cultural domain. External economic and legal factors will also influence 
the balance between collectivism and individualism. Some co-operatives may be more prone to 
one or the other end of the spectrum revealing collective or individualistic features. Collective 
cultures such as the Spanish one seem more inclined to give priority to the interests of the 
organization over the individual members' interests. That explains why they seem to be more 
comfortable with a collective property approach, which is ultimately captured in the legislation.  
 
As individuals pool resources to satisfy mutual needs through a co-operative organization, co-
operatives also join together to create second tier co-op organizations or umbrella organizations 
to fulfill goals individual co-ops cannot achieve by themselves. Those reasons can be economic, 
as in the case of retail co-operatives forming a wholesale co-op, producer co-ops creating a 
manufacturing co-op, or credit unions forming a credit union central. Co-operatives also join 
umbrella organizations for motives such as advocacy, sector representation, and lobbying as seen 
in the case of housing co-ops. By joining umbrella organizations, co-operatives benefit from the 
collective effort, but also are bounded, to varying degrees, by member dues and decisions made 
by the umbrella organization, which may create tensions. In this way, the advantages of 
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collective organizations have to outweigh the disadvantages, or individual members would not 
see the benefits of pooling resources. According to a key long-time co-op figure in Manitoba, 
"the 6th co-op principle, co-operation among co-ops, encourages co-ops to form umbrella 
organizations because they share in a particular world view." On the one hand, the benefits 
provided by the umbrella organization make it relevant to the members; on the other hand, the 
capacity and mandate of the umbrella organization depend on the members' willingness to 
contribute to it. For that reason, the participation of co-operatives in umbrella organizations is a 
symptom of co-op sector cohesiveness. In the case of Mondragon, the first co-operatives joined 
together to form second tier entities or groups because this made it possible for them to apply a 
more uniform policy and strategy across the associated co-ops, and provided protection from 
possible market fluctuations—an approach that proved to be an added economic advantage. 
However, the Mondragon co-ops have to surrender some autonomy and democracy by belonging 
to a strong and centralist umbrella organization. They are also burdened by member dues and 
sharing of profits and losses. Nevertheless, in their view, the benefits outweigh the downsides 
revealing a collective tendency characteristic of the Spanish culture (interviewee Jose Ramon 
Elortza).  
 
In Manitoba, co-operatives are represented by the Manitoba Co-operative Association (MCA). It 
was in the early 1980s that “representatives from Arctic Co-operatives Limited decided to create 
a Manitoba Co-operative Council to represent co-operatives in the province; it had only one part-
time volunteer staff person and its reach and relevance was very limited," according to a long-
time co-op spokesperson. Building on the intentions of the 1980s, a group of large provincially 
based co-operatives such as Federated Co-operatives Limited (FCL), Arctic Co-operatives 
Limited (ACL), Credit Union Central Manitoba (CUCM), The Co-operators, CUMIS Group 
Limited, Nor’West Co-op, Manitoba Pool Elevators, United Grain Growers (UGG), and Housing 
Co-operative Council of Manitoba (predecessor of CHF Canada – MB Office) created the 
Manitoba Co-operative Council in late 1980s. The Manitoba Co-operative Council was "closely 
related to the Canadian Co-operative Association (CCA) and functioned as a provincial arm of 
the national organization, even though its funding was the result of local member dues," 
according to a key co-operative figure. Its mandate was to engage in education through the youth 
leadership program, international development placing youth in co-op internships overseas 
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through CCA, and regional dialogues. The same key co-op figure mentioned, "The organization 
changed its name to the Manitoba Co-op Association in 2005 and became a non-profit co-op 
with one paid staff." The Board of Directors of MCA has representatives from Credit Union 
Central, Federated Co-ops, Arctic Co-ops, The Co-operators, the Worker Co-op Federation, the 
Housing Co-op Federation, Nostalgia Radio Co-op, and other Manitoba co-ops. The Board 
composition is similar to the Co-op Council's Board.  
 
Whereas estimates suggest that there are over 410 co-ops and credit unions and caisse populaires 
with a membership of 800,000 and about $22 billion in assets (CCA, June 2008), only about 150 
co-ops and their federations participate as members of the Association (Manitoba Co-op 
Association, 2008). According to a co-op spokesperson, "co-operatives in this province do not 
see themselves as belonging to a movement. They are somewhat individualistic and do not want 
to join MCA because they do not see any value in it, or they simply prefer to be left alone." Part 
of their behaviour today may be based on the fact that the Manitoba Co-op Council did not 
engage smaller co-op organizations and did not pursue co-operative development as its mandate, 
according to a long-time co-op spokesperson. Another key co-operative figure mentioned that 
"many co-operatives in this province do not understand the value of belonging to a federation as 
they do not see themselves as part of the co-operative movement." This phenomenon would 
seem to indicate that many co-operatives do not fully commit themselves to integrating all co-op 
principles into their organizations, in this case the principle of co-ops supporting co-ops.  
 
As was seen in the case of Mondragon, the observance of co-operative principles and values has 
proven to be a comparative and competitive advantage for them in the marketplace. In contrast, 
there seems to be a prevalence of economic motives for co-operation over social and cultural 
motives in Manitoba. Poor integration and cohesion among the co-ops appears to be a 
consequence of views that privilege individual interests over the collective ones, and the non-
understanding of co-op principles.  
 
Socio-cultural aspects have an important influence in how institutions are crafted, how they 
evolve, and respond to changes in the environment affecting institutional shape and the 
development path (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991). Since co-operatives are principle-based 
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organizations, they are bounded by "co-operation among co-ops" and "education" principles, but 
the observance of those principles is not mandatory according to the Manitoba Coops Act 
(2011), leaving it up to the co-operative to follow them or not. The Act allows co-ops not to 
follow all the principles and so many co-ops do not feel compelled to or they utterly ignore them. 
As Manitoba co-ops tend to give priority to individualistic interests, they are contradicting some 
co-operative principles, and may be at a disadvantage as they may not see or understand the 
value in working together and educating themselves and others. As a key co-op figure puts it, 
"speaking about co-operation among co-ops, and education of members and public, seems to be 
a bad joke because many co-ops in this province do not have those principles on their radar." The 
prevalence of individualism over the collective interests of the group, and the pragmatism of 
self-interest result in low participation rates of Manitoba co-operatives in MCA, which leads to a 
low level of invested resources that further weakens the movement. 
 
In contrast to the institutionalization of co-operative development Mondragon has crafted, the 
Manitoba co-operative sector has not been interested in co-op development to the same degree. 
Laycock (1987) explains that in the 1980s government invited the Co-operative Council, 
predecessor of the Manitoba Cooperative Association, to participate in research and the 
promotion of worker co-ops, "which was to include a government-sponsored trip for co-
operative officials to Europe" in order to investigate worker and farmer co-ops (p. 145). The 
Council rejected the invitation, responding that "they were not interested in and had no time for 
such activity" (p. 145). Perhaps the fact that the Co-op Council's Board did not count with 
worker co-op representatives, and co-operative development was not in its mandate, may have 
played a role in its disinterest in worker co-op development. It seems that a divide between 
consumer/producer and worker co-ops existed that, to some extent, has been addressed by the 
fact that worker co-ops are part of the MCA board of directors today along with the 
consumer/producer co-ops. 
 
In understanding the process of institutional change, we have to account for a shift in views in 
the co-operatives represented at MCA's Board in the last few years. A few factors influenced this 
recent change. In early 2005, funding from the Co-op Development Initiative (CDI) allowed the 
Co-op Council to become a formal organization, and to hire a full-time staff person, Vera 
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Goussaert, who happened to have a personal history in co-op development. "She brought a 
personal passion for co-op development and a strong character to MCA" according to a key co-
op figure. Since then, the Board "took more seriously the role of leadership in co-op 
development in the province," as one co-op spokesperson mentioned. The presence of a board 
member with personal experience as a co-op developer, Cindy Coker, was relevant in changing 
the views of the Board through a conscientization process. Cindy Coker insisted on the need to 
invest more resources on co-op development, and education through a partnership with the 
university, and championed the co-op development tax credit and the discussions to create a co-
op university program. According to a key co-op figure, "since 2005, the Board of MCA has 
been investing more resources than previously and took a stronger approach in lobbying the 
provincial government to invest in the co-op sector." Those lobbying efforts caused the 
government to announce in the November 2007 Speech to the Throne $250,000 per year for 5 
years in support of co-op development. The provincial government launched the Co-operative 
Community Strategy in 2008 that led to consultations with the co-op sector to decide how to 
support co-operative development (MHCD, 2012). The process of consultations made forty 
stakeholders reflect on what the Manitoba co-op sector should look like in 10 years. The 
consultations galvanized a conscientization process as social actors have to reflect and think 
critically about their circumstances, which is a crucial part of the process of change in 
institutions. One of the steps taken was the approval of the Co-operative Development Tax 
Credit managed by MCA in 2010 (Manitoba Finance, 2010). A convergence of structural faults, 
the new vision of social actors, and the willingness of the provincial government to fund the 
initiatives, resulted in the major co-ops showing interest in supporting co-op development and 
achieving change.  
 
Another sign of the institutional change at MCA has been the investment in education and 
research. The co-op sector invested in the creation of a co-operative chair at the Agriculture 
Economics Department of the University of Manitoba in the early 2000s. According to a key co-
op sector figure, "the co-operative sector had expectations of closer connections between 
academia and the co-op movement as well as the creation of co-operative classes at the 
Agriculture Economics Department, but those hopes did not come to reality." In 2013, the co-op 
sector invested resources to create a co-operative chair at the Business School, University of 
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Winnipeg under an agreement between the university, the co-op sector, and the province to 
develop a business major in co-operative management. The need to address the lack of education 
became visible as a consequence of the consultation process and the persuasive influence of a 
Board member, Cindy Coker. According to a co-op informant, "most of the directors at the 
MCA's Board are senior men close to retirement, who have realized that there is a lack of 
younger and skilled leadership among the co-ops they represent and they have decided to invest 
in a co-op chair position at the School of Business and Administration of the University of 
Winnipeg."  
 
Investing in a university program on co-operative management is a strategy to build the capacity 
and the education of the co-operative sector at the same time as investing in a younger generation 
of future skilled co-operators. However, the interest of the established co-ops in education is 
geared towards managerial aspects that tend to reproduce the ideology, techniques, and 
behaviour of investor-owned firms in co-operatives rather than focusing on co-op education to 
build awareness about the value of co-operatives to keep the co-op spirit alive that may attract 
youth to join the movement.  
 
The financial support from the provincial government and the willingness of the Business School 
to include a co-operative program within the Bachelor of Business degree acted as important 
incentives without which the initiative would not have happened. From the early indifference of 
the major co-operatives represented at MCA in developing the co-op sector, there has been an 
evolution in the perceptions and thinking of leaders of the co-operative movement, and in how 
institutional entrepreneurs forge change. That process of change in the organization was 
precipitated by a convergence of factors such as the formalization of MCA, an awareness raising 
process at the provincial consultations, the role of a Board member and the Executive Director of 
MCA, and the financial support obtained from the government.  Social actors took advantage of 
the contradictions in a supposedly principled-based co-op movement to make change through a 
reflection process.  
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5.1.1 Collectivism versus individualism: a socio-cultural tension captured in policy 
 
As a potential instrument to support co-op development, policy and legislation have been studied 
in a social constructionist fashion because this approach focuses on the values that underline the 
choices and accountability of social actors rather than naturalizing the process of change. In this 
way, this dissertation has uncovered the embeddedness of legislation in the cultural domain. Ish, 
Turner & Fulton (2006) remind us that the legal system "typically reacts to and reflects the 
changing needs and values of society rather than acting as an architect of these values" (p. 4), 
although the legal system can also reshape those values, including their complexities and 
contradictions. For instance, collectivism and individualism are not ever entirely separate but are 
mutually defined. They interplay and reshape each other as social actors have inevitably both 
interests. A culture showing more individualistic tendencies will likely produce policy that 
emphasizes the individual interests in organizations over the collective goals. The collective vs. 
individual tension noted in co-operative development of the province is also noted in the 
legislation and policy as a consequence of their embeddedness in the social realm.   
 
The tax legislation is a case in point. The Canadian tax system does not distinguish between co-
operatives and other corporations, resulting in identical corporate income tax rates (Holland, 
1981). For example, the Manitoba tax structure for personal and corporate income does not 
provide any comparative advantage for co-operatives, although co-ops are benefiting in general 
alongside investor-owned firms as the provincial government eliminated the corporate income 
tax for small-medium size businesses in 2010 (see Table 5.1 below).  
 
Table 5.1 Corporate income tax rates since 1999 
 
Taxable Income 1999 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Up to $200,000 8% 3.0% 2.0% 1.0% 0% 
$200,000 to 
$400,000 
17.0% 3.0% 2.0% 1.0% 0% 
Over $400,000 17.0% 14.0% 13.0% 12.0% 11% 
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Source: Manitoba Finance (2007). “Budget Paper C. Taxation Adjustments”, page C6; Manitoba Finance (2010). 
 
A more specific and advantageous tax policy for co-operatives that serves to strengthen the 
sector and its infrastructure, as is the case in Spain, is almost completely absent in Canada 
(Adeler, 2009). In Spain, the tax legislation grants co-operatives "protected or specially 
protected" status, which leads to a 10 percent corporate income tax rate whereas investor-owned 
firms pay 28 percent as analyzed in chapter IV. Such a preferential tax treatment was never even 
considered in Canada (Holland, 1981) because policy makers tended not to favour or understand 
the value of co-ops (Adeler, 2009), possibly due to a different cultural framework that 
emphasized individual action and ownership over the benefits of collective action and collective 
property frameworks. According to Ish (1995) the law tends to operate within set positivistic 
frameworks that do not recognize or support the differences of co-operatives from private 
businesses. Ish (1995) and Findlay (2003) point to the dilemma co-operatives face as legislation 
and court adjudication of disputes involving co-operatives constrain democratic decision making 
and impose an individualistic ideology within a democratic, collective, and autonomous 
organization. In this case, co-operatives face an institutional contradiction in the legal framework 
that favours a non-co-operative and undemocratic logic. 
 
Following a different institutional framework, Spanish legislation creates mandatory indivisible 
reserves in order to strengthen the co-op sector. While that concept is allowed in Anglophone 
Canadian co-op legislation, it is only on a voluntary basis. Only Quebec has a mandatory legal 
provision for indivisible reserves in co-operatives. Quebec understood the limitations of 
individualism and individual property rights within a collective enterprise and therefore pursued 
the benefits of mandatory indivisible reserves in order to facilitate capitalization of the business. 
(See in Appendix 8 the details of the Quebec mandatory indivisible reserves.) In Manitoba, the 
Manitoba Coops Act (2011) establishes: "For the purposes of this Act, a cooperative is organized 
and operated, and carries on business, on a cooperative basis if,"  . . . "(g) surplus funds arising 
from the cooperative's operations are used" . . .  "(iii) to provide for reserves..." (art. 4.1). This 
article leaves it up to the co-op to voluntarily organize reserve funds if it chooses to do so, but 
still not in an indivisible manner, meaning that in case of dissolution the remaining reserves will 
still be distributed among the members rather than invested in co-op sector development. A 
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provision to ensure that those reserves would be destined to a co-op federation, umbrella 
organization, or co-op development resources more generally seems unacceptable to mainstream 
Anglophone Canada’s individualistic priorities. According to a long-time co-op spokesperson, 
"the idea of mandatory indivisible reserves, which in case of business dissolution cannot be 
distributed to the members, would not be accepted in English-Canada; it is too socialist a concept 
to be accepted among our co-operatives." An important co-operative figure explained that "the 
biggest obstacle to co-operative development in Manitoba is an individualistic ideology that is a 
barrier to collective action." That pragmatic and individualistic culture shapes member 
involvement in co-operatives and determines the co-operative's behaviour, and also impacts 
public policy development.  
 
A new Co-op Development Tax Credit was included in the 2010 Provincial Budget (Manitoba 
Finance, 2010). The Co-op Community Strategy provided the framework and legal background 
to approve it. The tax credit was the result of policy co-construction between the co-operative 
sector and the provincial government. It was the initiative of a board member of MCA, Cindy 
Coker, and a researcher, Monica J. Adeler, who worked on the idea and design of the tax credit, 
and together they were able to convince MCA's board and government of its benefits. The goal 
of this tax credit is to generate investment from the co-op sector in support of co-op development 
in Manitoba through the provision of technical assistance, the co-ordination of existing services, 
and the provision of small grants (MCA, 2010). Every co-op can make voluntary financial 
contributions to a fund managed by the Manitoba Co-operative Association for the purposes 
described, and receive a tax credit for their contribution. The tax credit and its fund are the first 
of their kind in Canada and a number of other provinces are exploring replication of the model 
(MCA, 2010).  The tax credit is provided for annual contributions up to $50,000 and is either a 
refundable or non-refundable tax credit depending on the amount of the co-op’s 
contribution. These contributions will receive a tiered tax credit as follows:   
•    Contributions of $0 to $1,000: 75 per cent refundable tax credit; 
•    Contributions of $1,000 to $10,000:  75 per cent non-refundable tax credit; 
•    Contributions of $10,000 to $30,000:  50 per cent non-refundable tax credit; 
•    Contributions of $30,000 to $50,000:  33.3 per cent non-refundable tax credit; (MCA, 2010) 
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In the first three months of the initiative being active in the fall of 2010, twenty nine co-ops and 
credit unions contributed $72,000 to the fund (Bernas & Reimer, 2012). The larger co-operatives 
represented at MCA's board of directors pressed for change showing leadership and a willingness 
to contribute to a collective approach for mutual benefit although they do not need to take 
advantage of the services MCA provides because they have their own technical assistance and 
advisory services. Precisely, MCA's services are geared toward small and medium sized co-ops, 
which can not afford them and do not contribute to the tax credit. By the end of 2011, several co-
ops and credit unions in Manitoba have taken advantage of the opportunity to contribute to this 
fund and together have raised $159,500 to support cooperative development (MCA, 2012). 
However, this level of co-op participation also reveals a rather low participation rate considering 
that the province has over four hundred co-ops, again revealing the lack of sector-wide interest in 
supporting co-op development.  
 
According to one key co-op figure, "since the province has over four hundred co-ops, it is 
disappointing that only a few of them contribute to the tax credit. They do not seem to 
understand that indirectly they may be contributing to themselves, because they may receive 
services or grants from MCA's tax credit fund." One task for the newly created Co-op 
Development Advisor position at MCA is to promote the tax credit and ensure that co-ops in 
Manitoba understand what the benefits of the model are to them and to the sector. However, 
many co-operatives still "do not have any interest in participating," according to a key co-
operative figure, even though they understand the benefits. The lack of a movement 
consciousness among some co-ops, as well as the fragmentations and individualistic tendencies 
in the co-op sector, has impeded the growth of the movement and undermined the principle of 
co-operation among co-ops. However, the institutional change noted at MCA, and the shift in 
views among the major co-ops will likely have an impact on the smaller co-ops in the medium 
and long term as they benefit from the co-op development tax credit fund. 
 
5.2 Conclusion 
 
This study has analyzed the role and importance of tensions and contradictions in institutional 
frameworks at the heart of co-operative development. Contradictions are an expected part of the 
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co-op development phenomenon because co-operatives tend to be reactionary institutions in an 
active process of change. However, once they are created, they can also become passive 
organizations that resist rather than react. It is important to highlight this dichotomy. As co-ops 
react to the status quo that does not serve some groups well, they inherently carry tensions and 
contradictions in the process of change. Underneath that process of institutional change lie the 
group visions and aspirations that create a new framework while reacting to the status quo. That 
tension of organizations that are simultaneously reactionary and visionary  has been noted in the 
Mondragon group story. Seeking change to an oppressive political and social system, and feeling 
pressured by acute poverty and lack of opportunities, Mondragon's social actors created a new 
institutional framework—democratic and egalitarian—that nevertheless reflected some 
authoritarian features of the society's cultural and legal domains.  
 
The importance of the contradictions lies in their influence on the development of the co-ops. 
Since the members of the co-ops were teenagers and young adults with little knowledge and 
experience in starting and managing industrial enterprises, they benefitted from the guidance and 
mentoring of a strong and creative leader. As interviewee Pedro Mendieta recalls, “We were 
modest and humble working class rural people in a small town of a depressed economy coming 
out of a civil war, barely becoming foremen, mechanics, engineers." Arizmendi educated them in 
a values-based vision that conditioned member choices and goals such as solidarity, employment 
creation and fairer distribution of wealth that led to a collective approach to address needs. 
Centralist organizations, even though they were co-ops, were built as a result of this world 
vision, and presented advantages that more decentralized and isolated co-ops might miss. For 
instance, the economic advantage of protecting each other from market failures through the 
access to capital and expertise, and the sharing of the profits and losses, contributed to minimal 
enterprise failures over the years. The fact that the Mondragon co-ops are legally (through a 
contract of association), economically (through common business dealings), socially (through 
social bonds and a shared vision), and politically (through a strong lobbying and representation 
power in front of government) connected to each other and overseen by a central head 
organization (MCC) gives them economic, political, and social benefits. These advantages seem 
to outweigh the disadvantages of equalization of profits and losses, a tight internal bureaucracy, 
obligations within the group, a constrained democracy, and the loss, to some degree, of 
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autonomy to make their own decisions as individual co-ops. If these disadvantages were too 
much to bear for the co-ops, they are free to disaffiliate. In the context of the Spanish culture and 
times, the institutional framework created for the Mondragon co-ops made sense and proved 
socially and economically successful. The kind of close relationship of the Mondragon group 
with its benefits and downsides, is missed in Manitoba by the co-ops that do not want to belong 
to a group, umbrella organization, or a movement. Nevertheless, the process of institutional 
change has highlighted how some major co-ops have shifted their views to make innovative 
changes around co-op development.  
 
The study of some of the contradictions in institutional frameworks observed in Manitoba has 
focused on the collective vs. individualistic approach of the co-op sector, the non-observance of 
the co-op principles of co-operation among co-ops, education, and their influence on co-op 
development. For instance, the participation of co-operatives in federations and umbrella 
organizations is low. A considerable number of co-operatives do not follow all co-op principles, 
and consequently most of the co-ops in the province do not participate in the collective initiatives 
led by the Manitoba Co-op Association (MCA, 2008). Despite that fact, a process of institutional 
change has been observed at MCA that let us draw a few concluding thoughts. Processes of 
institutional change are often pursued by a group of visionary institutional entrepreneurs who are 
able to work within the system to achieve the changes they deem necessary. Those social actors 
are frequently motivated by an awareness raising process that has allowed them to see their 
structural barriers and identify the gaps and contradictions within an institutional framework. In 
the Manitoba case, the extent of changes achieved will depend on the conscientization process of 
social actors, and the complexities and resistances of the institutional framework. Aided by the 
consultation process, a few Board members at MCA were able to develop a vision, convince 
other Board members of its value, and pursue that vision. That vision was the engine behind the 
changes the institutional entrepreneurs pursued. As the initiatives yield positive results, the 
vision will likely be strengthened, which would further fuel the desire for change. In such a case, 
perhaps an education and awareness raising process may touch some co-ops that currently do not 
participate in the collective initiatives, and may influence them to see themselves as part of a 
movement. That, however, remains to be seen.  
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Appendix 1 
Question Template 
 
The questions below are part of the semi-structured interview guide. Not all of the questions will 
be appropriate for every interview, nor is the list exhaustive given the semi-structured interview 
approach that would allow the interviewer to probe the themes in more depth. However, these 
questions are an approximate guide of the kind of questions that will be asked. 
 
Pre-Interview Activities (Researcher) 
 The researcher will provide the participant with an explanation regarding the objectives 
and scope of this research project.  
 The researcher will provide the participant with a copy of the Interview Consent Form 
(appendix 2 or 3).   
 The researcher will go over the interview guidelines emphasizing that the participant 
participation is confidential and that the participant may end the interview and cease 
participation at anytime. 
 The researcher will inform the participant that voice recording is optional and that if the 
participant wishes, the digital recorder can be stopped at anytime.  
 The researcher will explain her post-interview activities, including information on the 
transcription, the release of the transcript, and (public) dissemination of findings. 
 
Interview Data Collection: History of Person and Organization 
Questions will include the individual’s personal experience and history concerning his or her 
relationship with the co-operative sector and an historical overview of his or her organization, 
its purpose and mandate. If relevant, basic socio-economic information may be asked including 
age, equity group status, education level, work experience, etc. Sample questions include: 
 
 Tell me about yourself? [questions may be about educational level, work experience, 
depending on relevance] 
 Tell me about this community? Is it part of a larger region? What are the boundaries of 
this region? 
 How did you become involved with this organization and/or the broader co-operative 
movement?  
 Tell me about the organization, what is its purpose? Its history? Movement participation? 
  How important do you consider co-operative development in the current climate? 
 
Key Themes 
 What have been the various factors (leadership, government, socio-cultural conditions, 
movement, research, etc.) that contributed to the development of the co-operative sector? 
 What are the public policies that have supported co-op development? And their impact on 
co-op growth? 
 What tax and other financing policies enable co-operative development? How?  
 What policies and other factors might be transferable to other  contexts?  
 What is the organization infrastructure that promotes co-operative development? 
 What socio-cultural factors may have encouraged innovative policy and development? 
                                                
 184 
 
Interview Data Collection: Policy environment for co-operative development 
 
Questions will investigate a variety of topics regarding the participant’s involvement with the 
co-operative movement and his or her respective co-operative enterprise. It will be the 
objective of the researcher to focus her questions on issues surrounding public policies, 
organizational infrastructure, and financial mechanisms to promote co-operative 
development. 
  
Part One:  Co-operative development and its determinants 
 
1. What would you say have been the most important factors in developing the co-operative 
sector in your region, country?  
2. Please, tell me briefly about the history of the co-operative sector in your region in the 
last 20-50 years.  
3. What would you say have been the greatest obstacles to co-op development in your 
region? The greatest breakthroughs? Strengths? Weaknesses? Opportunities and threats? 
4. Would you say that sector support organizations, public policy, education/technical 
assistance, and financing mechanisms are critical to develop the co-op movement? To 
what extent does each play a role? 
5. How does co-operative development in your region compare with other regions? 
 
Part Two: Public policies 
 
1. What state policies (provincial and federal legislation, regulations, procurement, and 
government programs) are responsible for encouraging co-operative development? 
2. What has been the impact of those public policies on co-operative sector and 
communities? 
3. What role has tax legislation played in supporting or hindering co-operative 
development?  
4. Is there any advantage for co-operatives coming from taxation? Any obstacle?  
5. What do you think is the best way to encourage the co-op sector growth?   
 
Part Three: Finance 
 
1. Is capitalization one of the biggest challenges for co-op creation and expansion? 
2. Do you know the financing mechanisms available for start-ups and expansion of existing 
co-ops? Loans, subsidies, patient capital, equity capital? 
3. What are the main financial instruments/organizations available for co-ops?  
4. Has the government or the co-op sector found a solution to capitalization? 
5. What changes do you think are needed in co-operative financing? 
 
Part Four: Organizational infrastructure 
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1. What role have co-operative organizations such as co-operative associations, federations, 
and confederations played in supporting the co-op sector? Are there any other 
organizations for example, credit unions, financial or insurance organizations, media, 
training and research centres, universities, etc? 
2. What individuals or organizations have taken the lead in the development process? 
3. What are the services that those organizations provide? 
4. Please, describe in your opinion the most important services co-op members receive from 
co-operative federations (i.e. policy advocacy, technical assistance, research, education, 
access to credit, networks, alliances among co-ops, sector cohesion, etc).  
5. What have been the biggest challenges to the creation of co-op organizational structures? 
6. Why and how can those umbrella organizations be grown to deliver services to co-op 
members? 
 
Part Five: Socio-cultural factors 
 
1. What are the socio-cultural factors that encouraged innovative policies and development?  
2. Why do you think that some societies tend to favour the co-op model more than others? 
3. Why do you think the co-op model was able to capture the imagination of the first leaders 
of the co-op movement? 
4. What social constructions or popular images (in the media, education, research, etc.) of 
the co-operative sector shape perceptions of and participation in the sector? Is it seen as 
vital and current or not? Inclusive or not? Socially responsible and sustainable or not? 
5. How are the social constructions of policy makers embedded in policy and legislation?  
6. Why did policy makers favour the co-op model vs. other business models?  
7. Do you think the history, culture, and dominant ideology of a region/country shape the 
choices of policy makers about different business models?  
 
Closing questions–  
 
 Are there any questions I haven’t asked but I should have? 
 Do you have any questions of me? 
 
Wrap up remarks 
 
 Would you like a copy of the final study? 
 Would you suggest any people to whom you think I should also speak on these issues? 
 Would you be willing to pass on my contact information to these people? 
 
 
Post-Interview Activities (Researcher) 
 The researcher will ask the participant if there is any additional information that the 
participant would like to include in the official transcript.  
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 The researcher will inform the participant that the next step in the process will be the 
transcription of the voice recordings and that the researcher will contact the participant 
regarding transcript approval. 
 The researcher will thank the participant for his or her participation.  
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Appendix 2 
Interview Consent Form 
 
You are invited to participate in a study entitled Enabling Policy Environments for Co-operative 
Development: A Comparative Experience. Please read this form carefully, and feel free to ask 
any questions you might have of me at adelermonica@gmail.com or of the research supervisor 
Dr. Isobel M. Findlay, Edwards School of Business, University of Saskatchewan at 966-2385 or 
Findlay@edwards.usask.ca.  
 
Researcher: Monica Juarez Adeler 
Centre for the Study of Co-operatives 
University of Saskatchewan 
101 Diefenbaker Place 
Saskatoon, SK  S7N 5B8 
  Tel: 204-788-0849; fax: 204-943-4695; e-mail: adelermonica@gmail.com 
 
Purpose and procedure: I would like to receive your responses to some questions about your 
participation in co-operative development processes and co-operative sector infrastructure.  The 
project will investigate the factors leading to the development of co-operative enterprise in Italy, 
Spain, Quebec and Manitoba with special emphasis on public policies, organizational structures, 
and financial mechanisms.  
 
Questions may be posed about subjects such as your own involvement in the co-operative 
movement, your assessment of the problems and potentials of the movement and your view of 
success factors and constraints to co-operative development. The research is being coordinated 
under the supervision of Dr.Isobel M. Findlay, Edwards School of Business, University of 
Saskatchewan. 
 
If you agree, this in-person interview will be digitally taped for transcription. Your participation 
is appreciated and completely voluntary. You may withdraw at any time should you feel 
uncomfortable or at risk. You may also decline to answer any particular question(s) or ask me to 
turn off the recording device. Should you choose to withdraw from the study, no data pertaining 
to your participation will be retained.   
 
It is estimated that the participation time will be approximately 60 to 150 minutes.  
 
Potential risks: Because I collect your consent and your personal identity information, there is 
some risk that your identity may not be entirely preserved. I will make every effort to preserve 
your confidentiality but you should be aware that controversial remarks, in the unlikely event 
they are associated with you, could have negative consequences for your relationships with 
others in your organization or co-operative community. I will try to ensure that your identity is 
protected in the ways described below. If for some reason I desire to quote you in a way that 
might reveal your identity, I will seek your permission beforehand.  
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Potential benefits: Your participation will help identify factors leading to co-operative 
development, and help inform guidelines and policy decisions both within the sector and 
government.  
 
Storage of Data: The transcripts and original audio recording of the interview, if one is made, 
will be securely stored at the Centre for the Study of Co-operatives under the care and 
administration of the research supervisor Dr. Isobel M. Findlay for a period of at least five years.  
 
Confidentiality and Data Release: Your interview will be transcribed directly by the researcher 
or by a transcriber who has signed a confidentiality agreement. After your interview, and before 
any data is included in a report, you will have an opportunity to review the transcript, and to add, 
alter, or delete information. Interview transcripts will be seen only by the project researcher or 
transcriber. 
  
The research conclusions will be published in a variety of formats: conference presentations, 
publication in academic journals or popular press, or student theses. Data will be reported in a 
manner that protects participant confidentiality and anonymity. Participants will be identified 
without names, giving minimal information (for example, what region they are from) if relevant. 
Pseudonyms or composite profiles may be used. In principle, actual names will not be used; 
however, leaders speaking on behalf of an organization may be asked if certain comments can be 
attributed to them by name in publications. Any communication of these results that has clear 
potential to compromise your public anonymity will not proceed without your approval. 
 
Right to Withdraw: Your participation is voluntary, and you may withdraw from the study for 
any reason, at any time, without penalty of any sort. If you choose to withdraw from the study, 
any data that you have contributed will be destroyed at your request. You will be informed of 
any major changes in the circumstances of this study that may affect your decision to participate. 
 
Questions: If you have any questions about the study, please contact the research supervisor or 
researcher at the numbers provided. This study has been approved on ethical grounds by the 
University of Saskatchewan Behavioural Sciences Research Ethics board on ____. If you have 
any questions regarding your rights as a participant, please contact the Ethics Office (966-2084). 
Out of town participants may call collect.You will have access to published versions of the 
completed study. Please contact the researcher, Centre for the Study of Co-operatives at (306) 
966-8509 or at (204) 788-0849. 
 
Consent to Participate: I have read and understood the description; I have had an opportunity to 
ask questions and my questions have been answered satisfactorily. I consent to participate in the 
study, understanding that I may withdraw consent at any time. A copy of this consent form has 
been given to me for my records.  
 
_________________________________       ____________________________ 
 (Name of Participant – please print)  (Date) 
__________________________________     ____________________________  
 (Signature of Participant)        (Signature of Researcher) 
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Appendix 3 
Telephone and Email Consent Form 
 
You are invited to participate in a study entitled Enabling Policy Environments for Co-operative 
Development: A Comparative Experience. Please read this form carefully, and feel free to ask 
any questions you might have of me or of the research supervisor Dr. Isobel M. Findlay, 
Edwards School of Business, University of Saskatchewan at 966-2385 or 
Findlay@edwards.usask.ca.  
 
Researcher: Monica Juarez Adeler 
Centre for the Study of Co-operatives 
University of Saskatchewan 
101 Diefenbaker Place 
Saskatoon, SK  S7N 5B8 
  Tel: 204-788-0849; fax: 204-943-4695; e-mail: adelermonica@gmail.com 
Purpose and procedure: I would like to receive your responses to some questions about your 
participation in co-operative development processes and co-operative sector infrastructure.  The 
research coordinated under the supervision of Dr.Isobel M. Findlay, Edwards School of 
Business, University of Saskatchewan, will investigate the factors leading to the development of 
co-operative enterprise in Italy, Spain, Quebec and Manitoba with special emphasis on public 
policies, organizational structures, and financial mechanisms.  
 
Questions may be posed about subjects such as your own involvement in the co-operative 
movement, your assessment of the problems and potentials of the movement and your view of 
success factors and constraints to co-operative development.  
 
This information will be gathered through an e-mail or a telephone interview (which may be 
digitally taped for transcription) if you agree. Your participation is appreciated and completely 
voluntary. You may withdraw at any time should you feel uncomfortable or at risk. You may 
also decline to answer particular question(s) or ask me to turn off the recording device. Should 
you choose to withdraw from the study, no data pertaining to your participation will be retained. 
It is estimated that the participation time will be approximately 60 to 150 minutes.  
 
Potential risks: Because I collect your consent and your personal identity information, there is 
some risk that your identity may not be entirely preserved. I will make every effort to preserve 
your confidentiality but you should be aware that controversial remarks, in the unlikely event 
they are associated with you, could have negative consequences for your relationships with 
others in your organization or co-operative community. I will try to ensure that your identity is 
protected in the ways described below. If for some reason I desire to quote you in a way that 
might reveal your identity, I will seek your permission beforehand.  
 
Potential benefits: Your participation will help identify factors leading to co-operative 
development, and help inform guidelines and policy decisions both within the sector and 
government.  
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Storage of Data: The transcripts, e-mails, and/or original digital recording of the interview, if 
one is made, will be securely stored at the Centre for the Study of Co-operatives under the care 
and administration of the research supervisor Dr. Isobel M. Findlay for a period of at least five 
years.  
 
Confidentiality and Data Release: If taking part in a telephone interview, your interview will 
be transcribed directly by the researcher or by a transcriber who has signed a confidentiality 
agreement. After your interview, and before any data is included in a final report, you will be 
given the opportunity to review the transcript of your interview, and to add, alter, or delete 
information from the transcripts or e-mail as you see fit. Interview transcripts and e-mails will be 
seen only by the researchers connected with this project.  
 
The research conclusions will be published in a variety of formats: conference presentations, 
publication in academic journals or popular press, or student theses. Data will be reported in a 
manner that protects participant confidentiality and anonymity. Participants will be identified 
without names, giving minimal information (for example, what region they are from) if relevant. 
Pseudonyms or composite profiles may be used. In principle, actual names will not be used; 
however, leaders speaking on behalf of an organization may be asked if certain comments can be 
attributed to them by name in publications. Any communication of these results that has clear 
potential to compromise your public anonymity will not proceed without your approval. 
 
Right to Withdraw: Your participation is voluntary, and you may withdraw from the study for 
any reason, at any time, without penalty of any sort. If you choose to withdraw from the study, 
any data that you have contributed will be destroyed at your request. You will be informed of 
any major changes that occur in the circumstances of this study or in the purpose and design of 
the research that may influence your decision to remain as a participant. 
 
Questions: If you have any questions concerning the study, please feel free to ask at any point; 
you are also free to contact the researcher supervisor or researcher at the numbers provided 
above. This study has been approved on ethical grounds by the University of Saskatchewan 
Behavioural Sciences Research Ethics board on ____. If you have questions about your rights as 
a participant, please contact the Ethics Office (966-2084). Out of town participants may call 
collect. You will have access to published versions of the completed study. Please contact the 
researcher, Centre for the Study of Co-operatives at (306) 966-8509 or at (204) 788-0849. 
 
Consent to Participate: I have read and understood the descriptions provided; I have had an 
opportunity to ask questions and my questions have been answered satisfactorily. I consent to 
participate in the study described above, understanding that I may withdraw this consent at any 
time. A copy of this consent form has been given to me for my records.  
 
_________________________________       ____________________________ 
 (Name of Participant – please print)  (Date) 
 
__________________________________     ____________________________  
 (Signature of Participant)        (Signature of Researcher) 
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Appendix 4 
Transcript Release Form 
 
 
 
Project name: Enabling Policy Environments for Co-operative Development: A Comparative 
Experience.  
 
I, __________________________________, have reviewed the complete transcript of my 
personal, telephone, or e-mail interview response in this study, and have been provided with the 
opportunity to add, alter, and delete information from the transcript as appropriate. I 
acknowledge that the transcript accurately reflects what I said in my personal interview. I hereby 
authorize the release of this transcript to the researcher and the Centre for the Study of Co-
operatives, University of Saskatchewan, to be used in the manner described in the Interview 
Consent Form (Appendix 1 or 2) or the manner indicated below. I have received a copy of this 
Transcript Release Form for my own records.  
 
If you do not check one of the following, it will be assumed that (a) applies: 
 
________ (a) I prefer to remain anonymous, as described in the consent form. I understand 
that my remarks will not be attributed to me by name. Instead, they may be attributed to an 
unnamed individual (an employee, a member, a manager, a Saskatchewan person, a man or 
woman, etc.) or to a pseudonym or a composite profile. 
 
________ (b) The remarks contained in the authorized transcript may be attributed to me by 
name, or used anonymously, at the author's discretion. 
 
________ (c) I prefer to have all remarks from the authorized transcript attributed to me by 
name if they are used. 
 
________ (d) Certain remarks I have indicated by initials in the margin are to be kept 
anonymous as in (a) above; the rest of my comments (unmarked in the margins) may be 
attributed to me.  
 
 
 
_________________________________       ____________________________ 
 (Name of Participant – please print)  (Date) 
 
 
__________________________________     ____________________________  
 (Signature of Participant)         (Signature of Researcher) 
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Appendix 5 
Mondragon Co-operative Support Organizations 
 
Mondragon University and school co-operatives 
 
Learning from Arizmendi's goal of "socializing knowledge in order to democratise power" 
through education and its popular access to provide equal opportunities (Ormaechea, 1993, p.35), 
Mondragon identified education as a key component of supportive co-operative infrastructure. 
As we have seen in chapter 3, as soon as Don Jose Maria arrived to Mondragon in 1941, he 
started working towards the foundation of a technical school to provide youth with an 
apprenticeship. This goal he achieved in 1943 with the creation of the Eskola Politeknikoa or 
Polytechnic School. In 1948 he started the League of Education and Culture, a non-profit 
organization to promote and coordinate education at all levels for children and adults 
(Ormaechea, 1993). Those two organizations were decisive in "consciousness-raising" resulting 
in the first industrial worker co-op, Ulgor, in 1956 (Mathews, 1999, p.211). The League of 
Education and Culture turned into a co-op in the 1960s, was formed by teachers, parents, 
students, and townspeople, and became part of the Mondragon Group (Ormaechea, 1993). The 
League of Education and Culture transformed into Hezibide Elkartea, an umbrella organization 
within the Mondragon Group whose purpose is to "plan, coordinate and promote educational 
activities in the Alto Deba area" (Ormaechea, 1993, p.36). These activities cover the university, 
the Iraunkor centre for continuing education and in-company training, the Ahizke-CIM centre for 
language studies, the Otalora centre for co-operative research and management training, Basque 
schools, nursery schools, and kindergartens (Ormaechea, 1993).  
 
Following Father Arizmendi’s vision of emphasizing education for human development and for 
co-operatives, the Mondragon Group created Mondragon Unibertsitatea (Mondragon University) 
in 1997. As a co-operative, it was declared a non-profit University of common public interest by 
the Spanish Ministry of Education. The University has about 4,000 students and offers 22 degree 
courses at the undergraduate and graduate level (Mondragon University, 2008). The University 
was created as a co-operative through the amalgamation of three educational co-operatives that 
now constitute the University’s Vocational School or Faculty of Engineering (formerly the 
Polytechnic School), Faculty of Business Studies (1960), and Faculty of Humanities and 
Education (formed as a co-operative in 1997). The League of Education and Culture created the 
Teacher Training College of Eskoriatza in 1976 ( it became a co-operative in 1980) out of a need 
for professional high-school teachers who spoke the Basque language (Mondragon University, 
2012). Following the flexibility of the multistakeholder model first used by the credit union, the 
university incorporated three types of membership: the Mondragon co-ops, the students, and the 
staff.  Three different types of membership as the structure of the university is another novel 
concept, fruit of the institutional creativity and innovation characteristic of the Mondragon 
group. Different types of membership allow for a more balanced representation of different 
interests in the governance of the university. Although Arizmendi galvanized the creation of the 
educational institutions, the town's residents took ownership of the projects as part of a 
community development process at the foundation of co-operative development.  
 
The university’s membership in the Mondragon Group permitted one more innovative solution to 
external constraints: a situation where schools received minimal funds from government. 
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Students developed close ties and enhanced their skills through employment experience in co-
operatives. They even enjoy a co-operative of their own inside the university: Actividad Laboral 
Escolar Cooperativa (Alecop) or School Labour Activity Co-op allowing students to work part-
time in industrial development projects. The venture started in 1966 as an idea of Arizmendi to 
facilitate work experience for students while helping them finance their studies and living 
expenses (Mathews, 1999). Initially a department of the Polytechnic School, in 1976 it became 
financially sustainable and incorporated as a co-op (Ormaechea, 1993). By 1999, the co-op had 
about 600 members (Mathews, 1999).The enterprise develops electrical parts for household 
appliances, electrical components of vehicles, and teaching equipment for technical education, 
and gives training in business management and social participation by learning as worker-owners 
interacting with other peers in a values-based working environment (interviewee Jose Ramon 
Elortza). It also has a service of "lending out workers to other co-ops," which furthers the links 
and worker mobility among the co-ops (Jose Ramon Elortza). Consistent with the Mondragon 
co-operative development strategy, a new idea is developed and tested in a division or 
department of an existing organization and hived off once it becomes independent.   
 
Arizmendi was convinced that immersing industrial enterprises in research and education-rich 
environments was necessary for co-operative development and growth. In this way, education 
and research promoted not only human development but also technological innovation that could 
be applied to further develop products and services. Alecop forms young people in a work 
environment where co-op values and principles shape the role of a co-op member and collective 
approaches to decision-making to reduce co-op failures due to the lack of education on co-op 
values, collective decision-making, member ownership, and democracy.  
 
Once the country reorganized democratically after Franco's death in 1975, the regions started 
funding all levels of educational institutions. The Basque government required that schools 
receiving public funding adapt their curricula to the official public system. Eighty percent of the 
Mondragon school co-ops (including the colleges) voted against the request, and rejected the 
public funding, choosing to remain independent in 1993 (Mathews, 1999). That move was 
possible because the educational co-ops enjoyed the financial support of the Mondragon Group 
(partially from the legally mandatory education and promotion fund binding all co-ops in Spain). 
For example, in 2008 the Group dedicated 10.4 million euros to projects of training and 
education of the membership channeled into higher education, professional training, and general 
education, and 7.8 million euros to research and development projects (MCC, 2008). Their 
commitment to autonomy and self-help as well as the spirit of solidarity was present in their 
decision to reject the government funding.  
 
Linking enterprises, credit union, university, research centres and educational co-ops into one 
group, Mondragon has achieved economies of scale, and has created close relationships among 
individuals and organizations resulting in a more successful or productive unity that addresses 
co-operative development barriers. Beyond effective techniques or recipes to tackle development 
successfully, we should notice that those development components are not independent from the 
socio-cultural context. The values and beliefs of this particular community acted as the engine of 
the co-operative experience and held the development pieces together.  
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Interviewees Zorione Arregi and Jose Ramon Elortza commented on the challenge of trying to 
excite young people about co-operative entrepreneurship. Fred Freundlich, professor at the 
Business School of the Mondragon University, said that in the seven towns of the Alto Deba 
valley where Mondragon is located, 60 percent of employment is in the co-operatives, which 
make up a total of 4 percent of the Basque country’s GDP and 8 percent of its industrial 
production. Most people in the region have worked in a co-operative or a family member has or 
they are closely connected to co-operatives and for that reason, co-operatives have become the 
norm or the mainstream economic model, and are not seen as the exciting alternative that fuels 
activism. That ironic reversal of fortune has an influence on younger people, who are more likely 
to engage in protests around social issues such as Basque nationalism and independence. 
According to interviewees Arregi and Elortza, the university of Mondragon and MCC are 
working with youth to show them that co-operatives are a field of activism as well, but this has 
not yet translated into a formal youth plan. These comments tie into the motivation issue mature 
co-operatives face, one that further complicates the principal-agent dilemma. The circumstances 
and needs that created the co-operatives in the first place may be different than the motivations 
of current members, which may lead them to understand the co-op's main objective as the 
provision of goods and services forgetting the social objectives co-operatives fulfill (Fulton & 
Laycock, 1990). This distortion can denaturalize the co-op and render it dysfunctional. Whether 
MCC is able to successfully address these concerns or not remains to be seen.  
 
Lagun-Aro: the social security co-operative 
 
Addressing the social needs of workers, Lagun-Aro began operating in 1967 as a department of 
the Caja—the “Social Insurance Division”—in the absence of government social security 
programming.  When the first co-operative, Ulgor, incorporated as a worker co-operative in 
1959, its workers considered to be self-employed were therefore ineligible for government social 
security, placing a burden on the recently formed credit union which had to provide insurance for 
retirements, sickness leaves, widower’s pension, health, worker’s compensation and 
unemployment. Originally, the division was established as a fund to which associated co-
operatives would contribute their payroll deductions assigning money to it so benefits for the co-
op members could be claimed (Mathews, 1999). The Division of the credit union grew to the 
point of hiving off a separate co-operative entity, Lagun-Aro, with a Board of Directors or 
Governing Council including representatives of the co-operatives associated with the Mondragon 
Group to ensure close ties among the co-ops. The Board composition followed the same formula 
as the credit union. In terms of addressing the social needs of the members in a spirit of 
solidarity, Jesus Goinetxe, former CEO of Lagun-Aro,  explains, "Besides the personal deduction 
to the salary of every member to cover social security, we instituted a 'solidarity premium', which 
was designed to alleviate the situation of those members with larger families, and propensity to 
sickness who tended to have more expenses; and in case of widowhood, besides its 
compensation, the widow would be offered a job in any co-operative of the group to help the 
surviving spouse and family".  
 
In 1988, the Basque government provided universal health care and pension benefits. The health 
clinic established by the co-operatives and overseen by Lagun-Aro was then taken over by the 
Basque government “as a model for other towns in the province” (Mathews, 1999, p.210). Since 
1988, Lagun-Aro has contracted out the pensions’ function to a government fund, Mutualidad de 
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Autonomos. As of December, 2010, Lagun-Aro had a 4.47 billion euros endowment fund and 
insured 29,973 people in 146 co-operatives (MCC annual report, 2010). Although the state has 
assumed some of the services Lagun-Aro used to provide to members, Lagun-Aro complements 
state-run social welfare and has diversified its services to other areas such as life insurance and 
general insurance services (Mathews, 1999; Morrison, 1991). New insurance companies started 
as needs arose, all of which form the Lagun-Aro Group: Seguros Lagun Aro, a general insurance 
subsidiary; Seguros Lagun Aro Vida, a life insurance subsidiary; Aroleasing and Arofinance, 
subsidiaries for leasing and consumer finance; and Lagun-Aro Intercoop, a subsidiary for 
shopping malls development (Mathews, 1999).  
 
Ikerlan: research and development co-operative 
 
Founded in 1974, Ikerlan was hived off the Mondragon Polytechnical College as a support co-
operative specializing in modern technologies. Arizmendi’s insistence that human and social 
development would be made possible by “mastering technology” led the co-operatives to pursue 
their own research and development centres (Mathew, 1999, p.213). According to Jose Ramon 
Elortza, "the financial independence achieved with the credit union made us think about a certain 
degree of autarky in technological matters, plus the high need of the industrial co-ops to invest in 
technology led us to start Ikerlan, a centre of research and development". "The products 
manufactured by the co-ops", Elortza explains, "required foreign licenses or patents for their use, 
which was taking a considerable cut of the profits, so it was important that we developed our 
own products that could give a competitive edge to the co-ops". Staying true to the employment 
creation policy that "any potential product researched at Ikerlan, had to be carefully thought to be 
applied and developed in the co-ops, and had to be labour intensive; otherwise, it would not be 
undertaken" (Jose Ramon Elortza). 
 
As in the case of Lagun-Aro and other support co-operatives, Ikerlan’s General Assembly is 
made of its worker-owners and the associated co-operatives (Mathews, 1999). The research 
focuses on three major areas: “electronics; computer-assigned design and manufacturing” for 
robotics and advance automation; “energy systems and renewable energy sources” (Mathews, 
1999, p.213-214; Ormaechea, 1993). Ikerlan takes up contracts to research and develop high 
technology for the co-operatives associated with the Mondragon Group, the Basque government, 
and private businesses not in competition with the co-ops. Ikerlan has participated in 
international projects under the sponsorship of the European Union including the “Biospace 
Separation Spacelab experiment (purification of proteins under microgravity conditions)” 
together with NASA (Mathews, 1999, p.213). In December, 2008, Ikerlan produced revenue of 
18.32 million euros, “of which 7 million corresponded to generic and strategic research projects 
funded by the Basque, Spanish and European governments; and 11.32 million to R&D projects 
contracted by companies” (MCC annual report, 2008, p.33). Currently, it has about 266 
researchers and technicians. "The birth of Ikerlan came out of a need to create a research centre 
that would become the engine of the future technological development. As the credit union was 
our financial engine and strategic backbone, Ikerlan became our technological engine" (Jose 
Ramon Elortza).  
 
Saiolan 
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Saiolan assumed in 1985, in part, the task of the Business Division of Caja Laboral in the early 
days acting as a business incubator specializing in the creation of new ventures using high 
technology. The centre was a department of the Polytechnic School and hived off as an 
independent organization in 1985 as a result of the Mondragon co-operatives’ efforts to tackle 
the acute unemployment among youth in the early 1980s (interviewee Jose Ramon Elortza). 
After a year, the Centre spawned two new ventures, Lantek (specializing in technical software), 
and Diara (industrial design) (Saiolan, 2011). The funding for the Centre comes from the 
associated co-operatives and the government as well as from consulting contracts with local 
businesses. 
 
The embedding of enterprise in research-rich environments is a key strategy for successful co-
operative development. The centre actively recruits young entrepreneurs from university and the 
co-operatives who receive for two years training in modern technologies applied to businesses. 
Saiolan offers entrepreneur scholarships for which applicants compete every year. For example, 
in 1996, 300 applications were received but only 12 scholarships were granted (MacLeod, 1997, 
p.48). At the end of the program, promoters have to present their projects to the credit union for 
financing “at a reduced interest rate of up to $100,000 per project” (MacLeod, 1997, p. 49). The 
co-operative spawns an average of two to three new ventures every year (MacLeod, 1997). Since 
2005, Saiolan's 35 researchers share a building space in the Garaia Innovation Pole with the 
Business Innovation Centre, a research centre, which allows for easier networking and 
knowledge exchange (MCC annual report, 2010). 
 
Mondragon Technological Centres 
 
Over the years the Mondragon Group has created several cutting-edge technological centres 
besides Ikerlan and Saiolan to develop better products and services to serve the co-operatives and 
create a competitive advantage for them. For example, ETIC-Embedded Technologies 
Innovation Centre was set up in 2008, in order to provide training, advice, and project 
development in the field of embedded technologies. Currently, ETIC is working on a project 
with Microsoft to develop embedded systems, which have applications in the home, health, 
industrial automation, energy, transport, etc.  (MCC annual report, 2010, p.37). 
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Mondragon Technological Centres 2010 
 
Name Budget               
(million euros) 
Workforce 
Aotek  2.5 31 
C.S.Centro Stirling 0.6 8 
Edertek  4.1 32 
Etic  0.6 10 
Hometek  3.5 39 
Ideko  7.6 101 
Ikerlan  20.2 266 
Isea  1.1 11 
Koniker  1.9 27 
Lortek  3.2 42 
MIK 2 25 
MTC  7 105 
Orona EIC  2.5 53 
UPTC  2.3 38 
Total                 59.1 788 
 
Source: Annual Report of Mondragon Corporacion Cooperativa (2010, p. 39). 
 
This table shows the number of research centres the group has created, and their relevance in 
terms of budget and workforce, powerful symbols of the Mondragon commitment to co-op 
development through research and innovation. Altogether, the research centres, the university, 
and the industrial co-ops dedicated exclusively 1,293 people to research and development, and 
144 million euros in 2010 (MCC annual report, 2010). It is important to note that during Franco's 
regime, the existing research and innovation centres did not receive government funding. Since 
the country reorganized after his death in 1975, municipal, Basque, Spanish and European 
funding has heavily helped the development of research projects in these research and innovation 
centres. That suggests that government support for co-op development is an important aspect that 
should not be overlooked.   
 
According to interviewee Zorione Arregi, the head of the legal department of MCC, two new 
organizations to create and support co-operatives were developed at MCC in 2008. Promo Koop 
was constituted thanks to the Confederation of Basque Co-ops and Mondragon to start new co-
ops and help small existing co-ops to provide social and health care services to the community 
following the demand in the region. The funding for this organization was arranged through 
agreements between Mondragon co-ops and Promo Koop as the co-ops were willing to 
contribute both a portion of the Co-op Education and Promotion Fund and the know-how of 
Mondragon experts. Key informant Zorione Arregi points out that the first two years have not 
been favourable due to the economic crisis so Promo Koop has not received yet the financing it 
was expecting. The second organization is the Centre of Promotion of Co-operatives created 
within the Mondragon Group to explore new sectors of the economy where new activities or 
services could start. The initial business plan explored what new sectors of the economy 
                                                
 198 
Mondragon should pursue in the next 10 years to start new co-ops in those fields, for instance, 
home care for seniors and for people with disabilities, and health care services. 
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Appendix 6  
Spanish and Basque Public Policies to Support Co-op Development 
The Exposition of Motives of the Law 27/1999 registers that "the constitution mandates the 
support and promotion of co-operatives through adequate legislation." The Exposition of 
Motives continues by acknowledging that "the promotion of co-operativism ... is compatible with 
the requirements of profitability and competitiveness proper to the most developed economies 
and with the values that have shaped co-operatives for more than hundred and fifty years." In this 
way, the law acknowledges the dual socio-economic nature of co-operatives as its Exposition of 
Motives states: "the ethical values that give life to the co-op principles formulated by the 
International Co-operative Alliance, especially those that incarnate solidarity, democracy, 
equality and social vocation, have a place in this law as it acknowledges them as indispensable 
elements to build a viable enterprise that meets the members’ identity."  The law aims to level 
the playing field for co-operatives to compete successfully in the market: "the elements of a co-
operative can live in harmony with the demands of the market.... the objective of the law is that 
the values incarnated in the historic figure of the co-operativism, a response of the civil society 
to constant new economic conditions, be compatible and keep an adequate balance with the 
ultimate goal of the members, which is the profitability and the success of the entrepreneurial 
project". Although this law views co-operatives as deserving of support to develop fully and 
properly, it does not challenge the dominance of market rationality. Rather the norm aims to 
build the supports for co-operatives to better prepare them to compete in the market on fairer 
terms. 
Article 1 defines a co-operative and explicitly establishes that a co-operative must follow the 
definition and principles of the International Co-operative Alliance (ICA). Any licit economic 
activity can be organized and developed under the form of a co-operative. The minimum number 
of members to create a co-operative is three members, and second tier co-ops can be created with 
a minimum of two co-operatives. The reduced number of members to constitute a co-op 
concedes more flexibility than in cases of a greater number and has the potential to be more 
productive of co-op development.  
 
Lezamiz highlights the principle of solidarity embedded in the Mondragon policy of profit 
distribution (net profits of each co-op after taxes) in this way:  
                  -     10% Fund of Education (Law mandates 10%) 
– 45% Reserve Fund of Co-op or indivisible reserves (Law mandates 20%) 
– 45% Returns to workers' individual capital accounts to capitalize receiving an 
annual interest of 7,5% in cash  
 
Since the beginning, Mondragon has had a strong policy of capitalizing and strengthening the co-
ops with the view of long-term sustainability at its core. Since the beginning, worker-owners 
have agreed to “save today to have co-op employment for our children and grandchildren” 
policy, says Mikel Lezamiz. The legal concept of the indivisible reserves committed to a 
collective property framework versus an individualistic one also prevents individual members 
from pocketing the co-op's assets if the business is dissolved.  
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This collective property framework and the individualized capital accounts crafted for the 
Mondragon co-ops allowed for the pursuit of individual goals as well as collective ones 
addresses partially the principal-agent dilemma. As mentioned in chapter 1, the principal-agent 
dilemma affects all co-operatives since members' (principals) wishes and needs may not be 
satisfied by their hired managers (agents) because those may undertake actions that are not in the 
principals’ best interests (Fulton & Laycock, 1990). For instance, managers and employees may 
pursue good salaries, job security, promotions, etc., which may be in conflict with the member-
owner goals (Fulton & Laycock, 1990). The principal-agent dilemma can lead to serious member 
conflicts, which may render the co-operative dysfunctional and eventually, cause it to disappear.  
Arizmendiarrieta designed the individual capital accounts that every worker-member owns in the 
co-op. Out of the 45 percent of the co-op's net profits destined for the workers, part goes to 
salaries and part is assigned to the individual accounts, which remain in the credit union, Caja 
Laboral, until the member leaves or retires and is also earning interest every year. Interviewee 
Mikel Lezamiz mentioned that "depending on the number of years a member has worked in the 
co-op, the amount can be significant; for example, a member who has worked for 30 or 40 years 
could pull $250,000 out of his/her account at retirement, which is an enormous incentive for 
members to stay in the co-op until retirement." It also creates the incentive for the member to 
work for the success of the organization, thus aligning the interest of the individual member with 
the interests of the organization. However, this provision can also create disincentives for the 
workers to join as members because they do not receive immediately the full extra remuneration 
from the co-op's net profits, and they have wait until retirement to receive full payment. Despite 
the downsides, Arizmendi is deemed to have designed in the Mondragon policy a somewhat 
adequate balance between the interest of the co-op and the interest of the individual member, 
thus intending to negotiate the agency dilemma (Mathews, 1999). Indeed, this internal policy 
mechanism to address the agency problem teaches an important lesson for co-operative 
development.  
 
The education and promotion fund is relatively flexible in its use and covers support of 
community schools, member education and development, and environmental initiatives 
(MacLeod, 1997). Although each individual co-op manages its own fund, the Mondragon co-
operatives decided to pool that money and spend it in through their joint Co-operative Education 
and Promotion Fund, explains Zorione Arregi. In 2008 the Mondragon Fund reached 35.3 
million euros, or 142 million euros over a four-year period 2005-2008 (MCC, 2008, p. 54). In the 
last year for which such data is available, the Mondragon annual report (2008) details how its co-
op education and promotion fund has been spent in the year 2008: 
• Projects in training and education of the membership: 10.4 million euros, channeled into 
higher education, professional training and general education. 
• Promoting cultural activities: 2.2 million euros.  
• Research and development projects: 7.8 million euros. 
• Promoting the use of the Basque language and other minority languages: 1.7 million 
euros. 
• Care schemes (programmes in support of the disabled, caring for the elderly, reinsertion 
of substance abusers, etc.) and support for the activities of NGOs and development 
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projects in emerging economies or third world countries: 6.3 million euros. 
• Other activities: 6.9 million euros (MCC, 2008) 
As a priority, Mondragon addresses one of the co-op development obstacles, the lack of 
education and technical training of members, managers, and board members. And it also chooses 
to dedicate funds for cultural activities and concern for the community locally and abroad (Third 
World countries).  
 
Tax advantages for co-operatives 
 
The Federal Tax Act for Co-operatives 20/1990 in its “Exposition of Motives” explains the need 
for a special tax law for co-operatives: 
 in continuation with a tradition of the tax law, under which the cooperative societies have 
always been given special attention by the policy maker, who, conscious of their special 
features as associative entities and their social role, have historically recognized certain 
tax benefits, a tradition that, ultimately, is consistent with the mandate to government, 
contained in paragraph 2 of Article 129 of the Constitution, to promote, through 
appropriate legislation cooperative societies. 
In its article 1 the law praises the essence of co-operatives: "in consideration of the co-
operatives’ social function, features and activities, the present law regulates the fiscal duties of 
co-operatives” with exception of the tax laws of the historical regions of Basque Country and 
Navarra which have competence to pass their own fiscal laws (art. 1). 
 
The Exposition of Motives acknowledges the potential of co-operatives to solve the tension 
between capital and labour, and "establishes fiscal benefits for them due to their social function 
since they facilitate workers access to the means of production and promote the formation of 
people through the investments of the members with that goal." This precept assigns value to 
worker ownership of the means of production and tries to resolve the traditional conflict between 
labour and capital using the co-operative model. In granting benefits, the law shows a deep 
understanding of the co-operative model as a community-based socio-economic organization 
empowering workers. In part, it acknowledges the Mondragon co-ops’ contribution to legal 
innovation with implications beyond themselves incorporating the first worker co-operative in 
the country.   
 
 With the object of establishing fiscal benefits for co-ops, the law declares all of the different 
types of co-operatives as "fiscally protected" (art. 6). Then the law differentiates them in this 
way: “Co-operatives fiscally protected are classified into two groups: 1) protected co-operatives 
and 2) specially protected co-operatives” (art. 2). The first group comprises all co-operatives 
constituted as such under the Federal Co-operatives Act unless they have lost their status of co-
operatives due to a sanction (art. 6).  The norm considers the co-operative status as a privilege 
with certain tax benefits, which means that in case of sanctions due to failure to comply with the 
indivisible reserves and/or the education and promotion fund obligations, for instance, the co-op 
status will be lost. The second group or specially protected co-ops are detailed in the article 7: 
worker co-ops, agricultural co-ops, community exploitation of land co-ops (its members have the 
rights of use and usufruct of land, not the property of land, with the purpose of an agricultural 
exploitation), fishery co-ops, consumer co-ops, and second or further tier co-ops whose members 
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are the previously listed types of co-ops. The types considered "protected" are credit unions, 
housing co-ops, insurance co-ops, service co-ops, school co-ops, transport co-ops, and health co-
ops. Using the term "protected" in the discourse highlights the importance the law assigns to co-
operatives—a measure of the success in educating policy makers on co-ops’ relevance for 
communities, and on the need to level the playing field with private businesses, which is one of 
the goals of the International Year of Co-ops 2012 as declared by the United Nations. 
 
The law introduces the distinction between income coming from co-operative activities and non-
co-operative activities. To determine the taxable base, “co-operative and extra-co-operative 
results” will be considered separately (art. 16). The following article (17) explains what the law 
considers as “co-operative result” to determine taxable income; all the activities the co-operative 
carries out with its own members, the fees paid by members, subsidies the co-operative receives, 
and interests and incomes generated by the capital deposited by its members. Deductible 
expenses are, among others, the amounts the co-operative allocates with mandatory character to 
the education and promotion fund, but those should not exceed 30 percent of the net surplus of 
the co-op each financial year (art. 18-19). The “extra-co-operative results” are all the activities 
the co-operative carries out with non-members generating revenue for the co-op, profits out of 
investments or financial participations in non co-operative businesses; and the economic 
activities or income obtained from sources unconnected or strange to the specific purposes of the 
co-operative. (art. 21). The article 33.2 details the benefits protected co-ops receive on the 
corporate income tax applying the following tax rates: 
a) to the co-operative results the tax rate will be 20 percent. 
b) to the extra co-operative results will apply the standard rate of 30 percent that private 
businesses pay.  
 
Credit unions are considered protected co-ops but their tax rate is slightly higher: 26 percent of 
the co-operative results and 30 percent of the extra co-operative results (art. 39-40). It is 
interesting to note that the norm makes the distinction between co-operative results and extra co-
operative results following the social purpose assigned to these organizations. That means, if the 
co-op behaves according to its social purpose, the income generated is a co-operative result and 
taxed to a lesser degree; if it doesn't, its income is considered an extra co-operative result and 
taxed more. The rationale for the disposition is based on the law’s understanding of the social 
purpose of the co-operative model. Protected co-ops are exempt from the property transfer tax, 
the legal acts tax, and 95 percent of the economic activity tax, and property tax that agricultural 
co-ops and community exploitation of land co-ops pay for real estate (art. 33.1, 4). The last two 
taxes are collected by municipalities so the federal government commits to reimburse them with 
the shortfall (art. 33.4). 
 
In the case of specially protected co-ops, article 34 of the federal act establishes that all the 
benefits included in the previous article for protected co-ops apply to them plus a discount of 50 
percent of the corporate income tax rate for protected co-ops, which means that the final rate for 
specially protected co-ops is 10 percent. This is a significant advantage when considering that 
the standard rate private businesses contribute is 30 percent. The reduced tax rate helps co-ops 
address one of the barriers to co-op development: capitalization.    
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The Basque Country and Navarra were the only states or regions of Spain that were given 
autonomy to regulate themselves in fiscal matters. Each Basque Country province has its own 
tax act for co-operatives but they are all very similar, explains Arregi. Mondragon is situated in 
the Basque province of Guipuzkoa and for that reason, the Guipuzkoa Co-operative Tax Act 
2/1997 will be explored.  
 
The Guipuzkoa Co-op Tax Act 2/1997 differs from the Federal Co-op Tax Act 20/1990 in that it 
does not distinguish co-operatives and extra co-operative results. The reason is that the 
Mondragon Group participated actively in crafting the Guipuzkoa Act and had considerable 
influence in convincing the legislators of the complexities required to do separate accounting for 
co-operative results and for extra co-operative results, according to Arregi. This is a clear 
example of co-construction of policy (Vaillancourt, 2008) as social actors benefiting from the 
education process that is the hallmark of Mondragon worked together with policy makers to craft 
tax legislation in tune with the needs of the co-op sector. 
 
The preamble of this Act states the intention of respecting co-operative principles, and at the 
same time the Act aims at incorporating innovative tools that allow cooperatives to continue to 
compete and expand in a market as difficult and changing as the current one:  
Given the qualitative and quantitative importance that co-operatives have throughout the 
Basque Country and more specifically in the Province of Gipuzkoa it was necessary to 
prepare a Regional Standard governing its tax system.... And this need is justified on the 
very reality of the co-operative movement in general, with its beneficial social and 
economic effects for society at large that made appropriate such regulation. (preamble of 
the Act) 
The Act incorporates co-operative discourse and acknowledges the role and value of co-
operatives for community development predisposing the policy maker to pass favourable 
legislation to grow the co-op sector. The Preamble further explains why such fiscal legislation is 
necessary: "the need for this norm is also justified in the diversity of the Basque co-op 
movement, from the many small co-operatives but no less important, to the large business group, 
a model of development and leader of co-operativism at the international level." A sense of pride  
for being home to an international model of co-operativism is clear in crafting this tax norm.  
 
For the effects of this Act (art. 2), co-operatives are classified in two groups: “fiscally protected 
co-operatives and not protected co-operatives.” The first group is divided between “protected co-
operatives and specially protected co-ops.” All the co-operatives incorporated under the Basque 
Co-operatives Act 4/1993 will be considered “protected co-ops” (art. 4). Specially protected co-
ops enjoying all the benefits described in this act includes worker co-ops, agricultural co-ops, 
community exploitation of land co-ops (its members have the rights of use and usufruct of land, 
not the property of land, with the purpose of an agricultural exploitation), consumer co-ops, 
school co-ops and second or further tier co-ops whose members are the previously listed types of 
co-ops (art. 5). The unprotected co-ops are those which have lost tax protected status detailed in 
this Act, which means that the co-operative loses the fiscal advantages assigned to the protected 
and specially protected co-ops having to pay the general tax rate for investor-owned firms (art. 
11-13). A co-operative will lose its status if it has failed to assign monies to its indivisible 
reserves or reserve fund, and to its education and promotion fund, if it has distributed among the 
members the indivisible reserves, if it participates more than 25 percent in non co-operative 
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entities, and if it fails to comply with the law or the by-laws in any way (art.12). It is worth 
highlighting that the causes for loss of the co-op status are basically any behaviour of the 
organization strange to its social purpose, which means that the policy maker understood that co-
operatives are principle-based organizations that ought to behave in such a way. Once they do 
not behave as co-operatives, they should be treated as private businesses or other types or 
organizations, and pay a different tax rate accordingly. 
 
In determining the tax base, deductible expenses are 50 percent of the amount the co-op assigns 
to the indivisible reserves, the wages paid to worker-owners, 100 percent of the amount destined 
to the co-op education and promotion fund, the interest earned by the members for their 
contributions to the capital of the co-op, and any donation to co-op promotion organizations and 
co-operation entities (art. 14). To avoid double taxation, the act allows the members of a 
protected co-op to deduct 10 percent of the personal income earned in their personal tax 
declarations, and 5 percent in the case of members of a specially protected co-op (art. 25).  
 
The corporate income tax rate for protected co-ops is 20 percent (art. 26). The Act explains that 
if a co-op suffers sanctions due to failure to comply with the law or its by-laws, it will pay 30 
percent income tax, the same as the standard investor-owned firms. However, small-size 
protected co-ops will have a reduction in the rate to 19 percent (art. 26.2). Credit co-operatives or 
credit unions are considered protected co-ops under the act but their rate is slightly higher, 28 
percent (art. 33). 
 
The corporate income tax for specially protected co-ops is half of the rate the protected co-ops 
pay, which is 10 percent (art. 27). Half of the rate specially protected co-ops pay, 5 percent, will 
be the rate for agricultural co-ops to help them modernize their agricultural production (art. 
27.2). Second and further tier co-ops will enjoy the rate of the protected co-ops unless they were 
composed by specially protected co-ops in which case, that will be the rate applied to them (art. 
28). This article affects the Mondragon Group which is a third tier co-op comprising second tier 
co-ops and individual co-ops, considered specially protected co-ops under the law. 
 
Municipalities are permitted to reduce property taxes, economic activity taxes and transmission 
of property/assets taxes for co-operatives since they have the authority to regulate these taxes 
(art. 26.4). Therefore, depending on the Municipality there will be tax advantages for co-ops, too. 
“In the municipality of Mondragon, all co-ops have some benefits in the transmission of assets 
tax, and the agricultural co-ops have discounts on the property taxes,” explains Zorione Arregi.  
 
When asked about future trends in legislation, Arregi explained that “it is much easier to 
convince policy makers about the need to support small-medium size co-ops than larger ones as 
it is the case of the Mondragon group”. Future legislative changes may not always be so 
favourable to large co-ops, she said. In times of crisis, the government looks at how much 
revenue it gives up to larger co-ops, and may be increasingly prone to cut some of the tax 
advantages for large co-ops in the future. That is a potential challenge that will have to be 
addressed if there are legislative changes.  
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Hybrid co-operative forms: Mixed Co-op and Anonymous Labour Society 
 
In a mixed co-operative, only fifty-one percent of the votes and shares belong to worker-
members, and forty-nine percent of the votes and shares are owned by outside investors who are 
not members (art. 136).  In these cooperatives, "the right to vote in the General Assembly shall 
respect the following pattern”: 
a) At least fifty-one percent of the votes are allocated in the ratio defining the Statute, to 
co-op members. 
b) A maximum quota, to be determined by statute, of forty-nine percent of the votes are 
distributed among partners with right to vote, and if the statutes so provide, may be freely 
marketable" (art. 136.2).  
The distribution of profits follows that voting formula: shareholders profits will be distributed 
among them in proportion to the capital invested, and co-op members' profits will be distributed 
among them according to the general criteria for co-operatives (art. 136.4). This new co-op 
model allows for worker ownership and control of the business while benefiting from outside 
capital, especially needed in hard economic times. 
 
The mixed co-op, explained key informants Pedro Mendieta, Jesus Goienetxe, and Zorione 
Arregi, was a legal entity devised by Mondragon legal experts advising the Executive Council of 
Co-ops of the Basque Country as a temporary solution to the economic crisis of the 80s. The 
economic downturn made it more difficult for co-ops to attract the necessary capital to start new 
industrial worker co-ops or expand existing ones as they often require large investments that 
workers are unable to pool. So the Mondragon Group, through the Executive Council of Co-
operatives, elaborated the draft legislation for the Basque Co-operative Act 4/1993 that included 
this new hybrid legal figure with the intention of injecting the initial capital required for the co-
op to take off, and then gradually worker-owners would buy back the shares of the investors as 
times get better to become a full standard worker co-op. In relation to the new legal entity, Pedro 
Mendieta argues, “we always had the idea that if we cannot create more co-ops the society does 
not benefit, and we would not be serving our co-op principles; we could not stop the economic 
crisis but we could adapt to cope with it; legislation has been an instrument for us to thrive.”  
 
The Gipuzkoa Tax Act 2/1997 article 5.3 establishes that the mixed co-ops "are not specially 
protected co-ops", a necessary clarification considering that this type of co-op includes workers 
as members. Pedro Mendieta explains that the law wanted to incentivize the conversion from a 
mixed co-op to a full worker co-op because the intention was that it be a temporary business 
form working its way out of the economic downturn. Once the business was back on its feet, the 
worker owners should be in a financial position to buy out the outside investors to become a full 
worker co-op. Mondragon's goal of creating co-operative employment was present in the crafting 
of the tax legislation.  
 
In terms of employment creation and ownership of the means of production by the workers, 
Spain passed the Federal Anonymous Labour Society Act 4/1997 that abrogated the previous 
Federal Act 15/1986.  It is interesting to note that Spanish-speaking countries use the term 
“sociedad anonima” for corporations and investor-owned firms, which can be translated literally 
as anonymous society, an expression suggestive of organizations whose shareholders maintain a 
private identity.  
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Article 1 defines a labour society as "an investor-owned firm or limited company in which the 
majority of the capital is owned by workers who provide services paid to them personally and 
directly, and whose employment is of a permanent duration". The Exposition of Motives 
explains that the policy maker justified the creation of this legal figure on the Constitutional 
article 129.2 that mandates the policy maker and the public powers to facilitate through 
legislation the access to ownership of the means of production by the workers. There are two 
types of shares: "a) the labour class is held by worker-owners, and b) the general class is for 
those who have invested in it but do not work for the business" (art. 6). Workers in a permanent 
relationship with the business must own at least 51 percent of the shares. Workers who do not 
own shares must not work more than 15 percent of the total hours worked each year, or not more 
than 25 percent if the company has less than 25 workers with shares (art. 1.2). 
 
Public policies can be used as a mechanism to create the favourable legislation, funding 
instruments and co-operative models necessary for development and innovation that address 
major development barriers (Adeler, 2009; Loxley & Simpson, 2007). The two business figures, 
the mixed co-op and the anonymous labour society, have the intention of empowering working 
and middle class workers, who do not have the necessary financial resources to start their own 
business and get access to ownership of the means of production. The policy maker and social 
actors had the intention of addressing structural barriers to satisfy popular needs and give 
working and middle class people a possibility to uplift their socio-economic situation through 
policy and a business figure. The mixed co-op example show that policy and legislation are 
useful instruments to promote co-operative development.  
 
Procurement Policy 
 
The Basque Co-operative Act 4/1993 art.138 details special support and procurement measures 
for co-ops: “The worker co-operatives and the second or further tiers of worker co-ops will have 
preferential right in cases of tie bids for the tenders and auctions in which they participate and 
which are called by the Basque public administrations and entities subject to them to carry out 
works, services and supplies” (art. 138.4). Housing co-operatives in the fulfillment of their 
purposes may acquire public land by direct allocation system from public administrations (art. 
138.7). The law establishes the government's preference for worker co-ops and the second and 
further tiers in cases of tie bids for public contracts. Again, the Mondragon Group's influence in 
crafting the legislation is very noticeable in this procurement policy that clearly benefits the 
Mondragon co-ops. For instance, besides industrial co-ops, some of the group's industrial sector 
are construction co-ops, which are preferred to carry out public works in case of tie bids with 
other types of businesses.  
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Appendix 7 
Basque Co-operative Support Organizations 
 
Executive Council of Co-operatives of the Basque Country 
 
The Executive Council of Co-operatives was formally created by the Basque Co-operative Act 
1/1982 of February 11. In the first years, the efforts of this organization to support the Basque 
co-operative movement contributed decisively to the implementation of the Federations of Co-
operatives, which started their activities between 1988 and 1991. The Executive Council 
achieved international presence in October 1988 as it became a member of the International Co-
operative Alliance (ICA). Through the ICA, members of the Executive Council participated in 
analyzing, debating, and crafting the International Co-op Identity Declaration approved in 
September, 1995 in Manchester (UK). 
 
The current Basque Co-operative Act 4/1993 states: “the Executive Council of Co-operatives of 
the Basque Country, constituted as the highest organ of promotion of co-operatives, is a public 
entity to advise Basque public authorities on all matters affecting co-operatives. It enjoys legal 
personality and capacity to act to perform its duties.”(art. 145). The Executive Council channels, 
through the federations of co-ops, concerns and proposals of the co-operative movement to move 
to a competitive environment. The plenary or Board of Directors is composed of three 
representatives of the Basque Government, seven representatives of the co-operative federations, 
and three representatives of the Basque Universities with Institutes for Co-op Studies. The seven 
representatives of the Co-op Federations are composed as such, two for the Worker Co-op 
Federation, one for the Agricultural Co-op Federation, one for the School Co-op Federation, one 
for the Consumer Co-op Federation, one for the Transport/Carrier Co-op Federation, and one for 
the Credit Union Federation. The three universities represented in the Board are the Mondragon 
University, the Basque Country University, and the Deusto University.  
 
Functions of the Executive Council are the promotion of the co-operative movement, advocacy, 
collaboration, contribution to the betterment of the legal regime, advice on co-operative matters 
to the public administration arbitration through its Basque Conflict Resolution Service for co-ops 
and their members (art. 145.2). The Executive Council is a financially autonomous entity whose 
budget is formed by:  
a) the amounts assigned to it in the general budget of the Basque Government 
b) the indivisible reserves and co-op education and promotion funds of dissolved  co-ops 
c) the donations of the co-operative movement 
d) the proceeds of their activities and assets, 
e) any other income whether from public or private source (art. 145.5) 
 
Their total budget in 2011, detailed in its annual report (2011, p. 32), was close to 2.1 million 
euros, 1 million euros coming from the Basque Government, and 1.1 million from co-operative 
liquidations in the Basque region.  
 
The Executive Council participates actively in the process of co-construction of public policy to 
support the interests of the co-op sector in the public administration and the legislature, 
according to interviewee Jesus Goienetxe, current Board member of the Council.  
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The Executive Council has participated with other co-operatives and organizations, and invested 
capital in the creation of three separate entities to pursue these goals: 
 The promotion of new cooperatives (Elkar-Lan Coop.) 
 The granting of guarantees (OINARRI  Loan Guarantee Company) 
 The study and research in the legal and socio-economic area of co-operatives (Elkar-
Ikertegia Coop) 
Following the goal of co-op development and support to the co-op sector, the Executive Council 
directly addressed three key co-op development issues by creating these entities: technical 
assistance and education, the provision of loan guarantees for co-ops, and the creation of new 
start-ups.   
 
The Executive Council has been crucial in the support and development of the Basque co-
operative sector. It was created by law on the suggestion of Mondragon co-ops whose co-op 
development objectives extend beyond the group to benefit the whole Basque region.  
 
ELKAR-LAN Co-op  
 
ELKAR-LAN is a second tier co-operative whose mandate is the promotion of co-operatives to 
create co-operative employment and, therefore, social and economic development. It was created 
thanks to the "Consejo Superior de Cooperativas" or Executive Council of Co-operatives of the 
Basque Country, the Confederation of Co-operatives of the Basque Country, and several 
federations of co-operatives. ELKAR-LAN Co-op provides free of charge services to groups of 
people wanting to start a co-op. The services are, for example, business plans, feasibility studies, 
bylaws, legal, accounting counseling, technical assistance, information about grants and 
subsidies, and close couching or advising of the co-op until it reaches its first year of life (Elkar-
Lan, 2010). These services are often lacking because co-operatives cannot afford to pay for 
them, which leads to poor results, and even dissolution of the co-op (Cornforth & Thomas, 
1990). 
 
Number of new Co-operatives started in the Basque Country in 2011 
 
PROVINCE NUMBER OF CO-OPS NUMBER OF JOBS 
Alava 14 62 
Bizkaia 30 121 
Gipuzkoa 52 192 
TOTAL 96 375 
  
Source: Executive Council of Co-operatives Annual Report (2011, p. 15) 
 
With only "four people on staff, it launched 40 co-operatives in 2008 and the total climbed to 65 
in 2009," according to interviewee Jesus Goienetxe, who has emphasized the importance of the 
overall goal on pursuing co-operative development. The General Assembly and Board of 
Directors of Elkar-Lan include membership from the Basque Confederation of Co-operatives, the 
Worker Co-op Federation, the School Co-op Federation, the Credit Union Federation, and the 
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Executive Council of Co-ops, co-operatives, who have technical expertise and capacity to inspire 
new players to the co-op movement. 
 
OINARRI Loan Guarantee Company for the Social Economy 
 
OINARRI Loan Guarantee Company for the Social Economy is a financial entity created by the 
Basque Co-operative Federations, the Anonymous Labour Society Association of the Basque 
Country, and the Executive Council of Co-operatives. The birth of OINARRI was due to two 
facts: first, the Basque Federations of Co-operatives and the Anonymous Labour Society 
Association of the Basque Country raised concerns with respect to the financial problems of their 
member organizations, and, second, co-operatives and labour societies needed more adequate 
attention from financial institutions, for financing. Indeed, the initial start-up capital and then the 
successive contributions of the members constitute the main avenues of funding, but these are 
not sufficient to meet the investment needs they face. They have to resort to external financing, 
and experience shows that these companies have great difficulty in obtaining it (OINARRI, 
2009). 
 
After approval of the Central Bank of Spain, OINARRI was formally established on October 31, 
1996 under the name "OINARRI, Loan Guarantee for the Social Economy, SGR". In the 
beginning its services were destined only to co-operatives and anonymous labour societies but at 
the end of the year 2000, OINARRI followed the general trend in the financial institutions as 
credit institutions or mutual guarantee companies, and considered expanding its scope. 
Consequently, OINARRI business currently operates with all Basque SMEs for the social 
economy.  
 
OINARRI guarantees about two thousand businesses per year, achieving 2,464 companies by the 
end of 2009 (OINARRI annual report 2009, p. 15). The total capital of this organization at the 
end of 2009 was 17,829,000 euros coming from co-operatives, credit unions, labour societies, 
and Basque Government (p.27). During 2009, OINARRI guaranteed an amount of 171.5 million 
euros for SMEs (p. 30). The organization runs with a volunteer Board composed of Basque Co-
operative Federations, the Anonymous Labour Society Association of the Basque Country, and 
the Executive Council of Co-operatives, and has over 20 permanent staff (p. 11). Its president 
and vice-president come from the Mondragon Group, Fagor Electronica and Eroski 
Supermarkets respectively. 
 
OINARRI has been wise in securing the collaboration of "the European Union Guarantees 
Programs for SMEs" for its financial guarantees (p.41). Financial guarantees granted by 
OINARRI have partial guarantees from the Spanish Company of Refinancing (CERSA, Co) for 
amounts not exceeding 625,000 euros. In addition to this refinancing subscribed by CERSA, up 
to a limit of 75 percent, OINARRI has an additional refinancing by the Ministry of Finance of 
the Basque Government, which speaks to the government support of the social economy (p. 41).  
 
ELKAR-IKERTEGIA Co-op 
 
Elkar-Ikertegia Co-op, a second tier co-op, is a centre for studies and analysis of the Basque co-
operative movement created in 2005 by the Executive Council of Co-operatives, the 
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Confederation of Co-operatives of the Basque Country, several federations of co-operatives, and 
the Mondragon group. Located in the town of Mondragon, it specializes in research in the legal 
and socio-economic area of co-operatives that can support the co-op movement (Executive 
Council annual report, 2009). Its president is Zorione Arregi, legal expert at the headquarters of 
MCC. They are researching the impact of the fiscal legislation on co-operatives in the Basque 
Country to determine whether the current tax law for co-operatives still responds to their needs, 
and also exploring the legal realm of the small-sized worker co-op, according to interviewee 
Arregi. Although gender equality in the Mondragon co-operatives remains an issue, the centre 
elaborated a guide to be implemented by co-operatives with practical measures to achieve gender 
equality, which "helps fulfil the basic principles of co-operatives" (Arregi). The Centre counts 
only one part-time support staff in it hopes to become an agile instrument to be contracted out by 
enterprises or government (Arregi). 
 
 
                                                
 211 
Appendix 8 
Indivisible Reserves in the Quebec Co-op Act 
 
Article 4 of the Quebec Co-op Act establishes: "The rules of cooperative action are as follows:" 
[...] "(4) a reserve must be established." In the case of winding-up a business, once the debts have 
been satisfied, that mandatory reserve "shall be transferred to a cooperative, a federation, a 
confederation or the Conseil de la coopération du Québec by the meeting of the members by 
means of a resolution adopted by a majority of the votes cast" (art. 185). The Quebec Act also 
mandates that 10 percent of the co-operative’s surplus must be assigned to the reserves (art. 146). 
The Quebec provisions most closely resemble the Spanish legislation, which  may have 
influenced co-op development in Quebec since it is the Canadian province with the highest 
number of co-operatives (3,300 co-ops) according to the Conseil Québécois de la Coopération et 
de la Mutualité (2012). 
 
